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1.1 Climate change and the energy transition
1.1.1 The problem
Climate change is one of the largest challenges facing humanity in its current
form [1]. The change of the earth’s climate is caused by the accumulation of
greenhouse gas emissions which have changed the heat balance of the earth
causing the global average temperature to rise above the range of temperatures
of the previous millennia (currently approximately 1 ◦C above pre-industrial levels
at a CO2 concentration level of 408 ppm, July 2018) [2, 3]. Although the
climate of our planet has changed previously (over geological time scales), human
activity for the first time has become the main cause for the current, potentially
irreversible global warming. Without additional efforts earth’s average surface
temperature is expected to further increase to 3◦C to 5◦C warming [4] relative to
pre-industrial levels. It involves however much more than temperature increase;
loss of polar ice, melting of glaciers, sea level rise, changes in precipitation patterns
will undoubtedly effect life of earth, triggering loss of biodiversity and social unrest
[4].
To limit this change of our climate, in 2015 195 state parties committed in
the Paris Agreement to limit the increase in global average temperature to well
below a 2◦C temperature rise from pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to
limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius [5, 6].
The energy system is the single largest contributor to the emission of
greenhouse gases, predominantly the result of the burning of fossil fuels [4].
Society therefore will have to engage in a transformative change of the energy
system to limit the emission of these greenhouse gases; an energy transition.
Climate change mitigation scenarios show that greenhouse gas emissions from
the energy system will have to be diminished by 2070, giving the world society
approximately five decades to complete this transformation to complete this
transformation and have a 66% chance of complying with the Paris Agreement
[7, 3]. At the same time, the energy system has an essential role in our current
society as it fulfils the energy demand of households, businesses and the economy
as a whole. The energy system therefore faces three simultaneous challenges;
providing energy access and security, keeping energy affordable and making the
system sustainable.
To describe what would be necessary to eliminate these greenhouse gas
emissions we can look at an adapted version of the IPAT-equation [8], see Figure
1.1. The equation in this figure shows that the global emission of greenhouse
gases, predominantly CO2 is dependent on four factors; the number of people, the




to supply these services and finally, the CO2 emissions associated with delivering
this energy demand1. To limit climate change and get the left-hand side of the
equation in figure 1.1 down to zero, one of the factors on the right-hand side will
have to become zero (or net-zero).
Figure 1.1 – A simple formula that summarises the challenge of mitigate climate change,
adapted from [9]
.
Unfortunately, getting one of these factors to zero is not straightforward. The
first factor, the number of people on earth, is expected to increase substantially in
the decades ahead from 7.6 billion in 2017 to around 10 billion in 2050 after which
growth is likely to flatten off [10]. Additionally, the second factor is expected to
almost triple from now to 2050 as currently societies strive for economic growth to
create a better life for their citizens [11]. Current solution directions are therefore
directed at limiting growth of the first two factors and focus on decreasing the
third and fourth factor; energy efficiency and decarbonisation.
Exploratory scenarios explore how the trends related to these factors will
influence future emissions trajectories [12]. They are based on historical
relationships between key drivers (e.g. demographic statistics and the relation
between GDP and energy use, also known as energy ladders [13]). As these
exploratory scenarios are based on empirically validated relationships, they form
highly plausible narratives of how the future of the energy system may unfold.
However, often these exploratory scenarios are ultimately unsustainable as they
cross internationally agreed planetary boundaries thereby risking economic and/or
environmental disruption [14].
1Although there are other greenhouse gases (methane amongst others) the emission of CO2
from burning fossil fuels has been the largest contributor to climate change since the industrial
evolution, partly because of its long lifetime in the earth’s atmosphere. [4]
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However, often these exploratory scenarios are ultimately unsustainable as they
cross internationally agreed planetary boundaries thereby risking economic and/or
environmental disruption [14].
1Although there are other greenhouse gases (methane amongst others) the emission of CO2
from burning fossil fuels has been the largest contributor to climate change since the industrial
evolution, partly because of its long lifetime in the earth’s atmosphere. [4]
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1.1.2 Three directions towards a solution
Fortunately, the solution directions are generally well known; technically, econom-
ically as well as socially we know how to prevent crossing limits of even further
warming of our planet.
Technical Normative scenarios from a broad range of actors such as Shell
[7] and Greenpeace [15] depict what solution directions are possible. With
regards to technical elements they refer to increased energy efficiency and the
decarbonisation of the energy system. This will entail large scale electrification,
deployment of hydrogen, deployment of more energy efficient technologies,
large scale deployment of biomass and the application of carbon capture and
sequestration to minimise CO2 emissions. All of these options are available and
rapid cost decline of a range of technologies in last decades [16] have made the
technical part of the solution come into sight: Solar photovoltaic panels capturing
solar radiation, wind turbines, batteries and electrolysers all have shown dramatic
costs decline over the past decades, often surpassing main stream expectations
[17].
Social It is also well known how social factors could decrease the size of the
problem. Having less children would limit the first factor (population size) in
Figure 1.1 and behavioural change to less energy intensive service demands could
decrease the second factor. Flying less, vegetarianism and other lifestyle changes
would have substantial impact. [18, 19, 20]
Economic As we know by now that mitigation of climate change will be cheaper
than having to adapt to a new climate [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26], pursuing a energy
transition thus makes economic sense. This will require that previously coupled
factors (in general between I and PAT in Figure 1.1, e.g. between economic
growth and GHG emission growth) will decouple resulting in green growth if
possible at all [27, 28]. Economists even have laid out an incentive that could
achieve it; a global price on carbon which will make polluters pay and internalise
the social cost of carbon emissions [22].
1.2 The main research question
So, if the possible technical, social and economic solutions are known, what is
then still the question? At this moment we do not know how and at what
pace collective behaviour will emerge from individual behaviours and incentives as




Since the atmosphere is shared by all actors on this planet, mitigation efforts
by one can be offset by increased emission by others. This makes that “effective
mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests
independently” [4] which highlights it will be essential to align individual incentives
to the collective mitigation effort. Will I invest to mitigate climate change if my
efforts can be offset by others? Therefore, the main question of this dissertation
is:
How do individual incentives and their interaction influence the path and
the pace of emergence of the energy transition?
The motivations and incentives that guide individual decisions will change
overtime. Societal developments, population increase, affluence increase,
technology development, political developments and a changing climate all will
effect the alignment and dynamics of incentives. We are now at the stage where
“we’re the first generation to feel the impact of climate change, and the last
generation that can do something about it” [29]. This gives mitigation efforts an
individual rationale. Further alignment requires stakeholders to agree on the goal
(which can be obscured by statistical artefacts see Chapter 4) and fortunately
in some areas the alignment of individual incentives is starting to emergence:
Technological development makes investments in mitigation efforts commercially
attractive (see Chapter 3), but often market regulations are not yet ready to
integrate large shares of new energy technology (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
With an increasingly changing change, the by societies perceived seriousness of
the problem also increases (see Chapter 5), making studying these dynamics ever
more urgent.
The combination of these questions is the narrative of Figure 1.2. Here we
see the exploratory scenarios on the left, while on the right we see the result of
normative scenarios. Normative scenarios describe pathways to a pre-specified
future [30] which, in this case show how the emissions trajectory of the required
energy transition might look like. The question however remains how we can
connect these two types of scenarios. Essentially it will involve the everyday
decisions of actors, individual consumers, business decision makers and policy
makers.
How these actor interactions will work out is hard to comprehend but
simulating these actor behaviours in computer models gives us the means to
explore the dynamics of these actor interactions. Vice versa it gives the possibility
to quantify narratives of how collective behaviour emerges from these actor
interactions.
But how will these decisions be different from the empirical observed decision
making structures of the past? Subsequently this leads to questions around how
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individual decision by actors may lead to collective behaviour and ultimately the
emergence of an energy transition.
Figure 1.2 – World energy-related CO2 emissions. Figure shows historical emissions
[31], exploratory scenarios (indicatively shown in red and blue based on Shell New Lens
Scenarios [32]) and normative scenarios (based on IEA 2◦C scenario in light green and
IEA Beyond 2◦C scenario in dark green [33]). Yellow area with question mark indicates
area where actor behaviour dynamics will be crucial to connect the scenarios. Adapted
from Gert Jan Kramer, unpublished.
1.2.1 A complex question
The interaction between the social, economic, technical system elements on our
planet makes the transition of the energy system a complex problem [34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. Complex here differentiates a problem from being simple or
complicated. A simple problem such as making a cup of thee, is a problem for
which it is relatively easy to determine whether a successful outcome has been
achieved; there is a straightforward procedure to achieve a successful outcome
and this procedure does not have to followed exactly to still achieve an acceptable
outcome. A complicated problem such as solving a jigsaw puzzle, assembling a




criteria for a successful outcome. Such a successful outcome can be achieved
by following a comprehensive set of strict rules and this procedure is completely
reproducible.
For complex problems such as the energy transition there is not such a well-
defined procedure and the iterative interaction between many heterogeneous
actors who possess human reflexivity (the ability to change or adapt their
behaviour based on the action of others) make that the process is not reproducible.
The outcome of such processes emerges from these actor interactions.
1.2.2 Emergence
Emergence is a key element of complex problems. It can be defined as being
“stable macroscopic patterns arising from local interaction of agents” [41, 42].
Emergence occurs when interconnected system elements produce patterns or
trends that are not guided by a central actor but evolve from the interactions
themselves. Stock market dynamics, fashion trends and traffic jams are examples
of emergent behaviour. In Section 1.3.3 we will see how we can model these
emergent phenomena.
1.3 Research approach
The research approach to the aforementioned question, has been based on the
development of narratives and their quantification by means of simulation models.
They will be discussed subsequently.
1.3.1 Narratives
Narratives of the energy transition are plausible, internal consistent story-lines of
how the energy transition may develop [43]. Narratives can be used to tackle
complexity as narratives are not about objective reality, but are statements of
what is significant [44].
A story of how the energy transition may develop requires us to understand
what pace the emergence of the energy transition will have and what path it will
take. In turn this requires us to create a better understanding of the mechanisms
that influence the pace and the path of the energy transition. They will emergence
from the decisions actors will take, how they are incentivised and how their
interaction will play out. Eventually this will lead to a consistent story of how A
will lead to B.
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Quantification of these narratives is important to facilitate stakeholder engage-
ment. With quantification we understand the process of expression and/or
determination of the amount of something. This quantification, involving the
conceptualisation of system elements, is facilitated by energy system models.
These models facilitate experimentation, promote rigorous analyses and provide
a tool to communicate about findings [45, 46, 47]. The combination of narratives
and their quantification, is known as scenario development or scenario planning
[12, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55].
Our approach to this quantification by means of energy system models
involved the following elements:
Agent-based modelling as additional tooling Conventional energy system
models are predominantly techno-economic in nature and rely on empirical
observed relationships, rational agents and optimisation or equilibrium techniques
[56]. By conceptualising actor behaviour in model-entities called “agents”,
narratives of realistic actor behaviour can be simulated. The application of agent-
based modelling in this way gives additional tooling for the quantification of these
narratives. This dissertation therefore makes a contribution to the methodological
toolbox of scenario development, futuring and system thinking [57, 58].
Fundamental dynamics Given the nature and scale of the problem of climate
change and the challenge of the energy transition, analysing the dynamics between
individual incentives and collective behaviour in a meaningful manner, required us
to concentrate our approach to the underlying, fundamental dynamics of the
energy transition focusing on the root cause and effect of these dynamics.
Transdisciplinary Our approach has focused on bridging the gap between
qualitative approaches to scenario making by means of narratives and the
quantification of these narratives by means of simulation models; facilitating
collaboration between story tellers and modellers. This required our approach
to be receptive for scientists from various backgrounds, which resulted in a
combination of insights from these diverse scientific fields. This makes this
research truly transdisciplinary [59].
The past and the future Bridging the gap between story tellers and modellers
means uniting historical derived patterns which drive exploratory scenarios with
the behaviour of actors in the unknown future. In how far will the future look like
the past? This requires us to constantly make judgements on what drives the
actors’ behaviours. In Chapter 2 specifically selected intellectual framings whose




throughout this thesis to inform the agent conceptualisations, will be discussed
in more detail.
Stakeholder engagement Since climate change has to be tackled by societal
actors (politicians, firms, and citizens) and given the limited time frame to tackle
the problem of climate change, it is the scientists’ responsibility to engage with
these societal actors to find the appropriate response to these problems. This
required our approach to facilitate stakeholder engagement, between scientists
and policy makers, between scientists and business decision makers and between
scientists and the general public.
Validation As explored more elaborately in Chapter 5, large-scale complex
simulation models suffer from the large parameter space for which values cannot
be determined within a reasonable amount of time, if measurable at all [60, 61].
A common solution is to fit the model predictions to empirical data which often
lead to impressively good results [62]. However, a good fit does not guarantee
any realism of parameter values or model structure. True validation of these large
simulation models, some argue, is therefore simply impossible [62, 63, 64, 65].
Simulation modelling therefore requires balancing the complexity of the simulation
model instigated by the research question at hand, with the challenge to maintain
transparency, reproducibility and tractability; the ultimate challenge of agent-
based modelling [66, 67, 68]. More fundamentally these simulation models are
self-invalidating as they are aimed at actors that can change their behaviour based
on the provided insights. Fortunately, these models are not meant as forecasts
but as exploration of actor interactions.
A minimal representation These discussed elements; i) to address the scale
of the problem of climate change (with regards to time and space), ii) to
facilitate stakeholder engagement, iii) to face the challenges of agent-based
modelling and iv) to bridge the gap between story tellers and modellers, has
lead us to our general research approach. This approach has focused on finding
a minimal representation of the relevant system elements with a minimum set of
assumptions that still did right to the complexities of the problem. This makes
that, in the wide spectrum of modelling approaches with regards to the detail
of the model conceptualisation [69] and in contrast to following a descriptive,
KIDS approach (Keep It Descriptive) [70, 42, 69], our approach to agent-based
modelling can be characterised as following a KISS (Keep It Simple) approach
[42].
Post-normal science This research approach can be characterised as being
post-normal science (as will be elaborated on in Chapter 2). Our approach
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recognised that researching the problem of climate change and the energy
transition brings us to the border of science as uncertainties are large, decisions
stakes are high, choices have to be made and values are in dispute. To increase
transparency, reproducibility and tractability all the presented models in this
dissertation are open source and can be found online accompanied by model
descriptions following the The ODD (Overview, Design concepts, and Details)
protocol [71, 72]. Our research has resulted in various scientific journals as well
as in publication and presentation in various other media for the general public
(see the list of Publications).
1.3.3 Agent-based modelling
As described in our research approach, we have used a relative new modelling
method called agent-based modelling (ABM) to explore the emerging mechanisms
between individual incentives and collective action. Agent based modelling has
gained increased attention since the beginning of the century [73] as these models
that work on the basis of realistic behaviour have the unique possibility to make the
story teller’s “who does what to whom, when and how” amendable to quantitative
modelling.
The fact that models based on the assumption of neoclassical economics
with its associated idealised rational agents have their limitations, was already
recognised by economists in the 1950s [74, 75]. This resulted in efforts to increase
the realism of economic theory by incorporating findings from psychology in what
we now know as behavioural economics. With agent-based modelling, computer
scientists, psychologists, sociologists and ecologists now have the opportunity
to model (human) decisions making more realistically and simulate collective,
emergent behaviour which other modelling methods are not able to reproduce
[41, 76].
Also in the energy domain, there is recognition of the fact that the
next generation energy system models should incorporate the complexity of
the energy system with its many interacting system elements [77, 78, 34].
However, traditionally energy system models were dominated by techno-economic
considerations. They are generally based on neoclassical economics and rational
agents and struggle to capture transformative change and dynamics such as
disruption, innovation, and non-linear change in human behaviour [79]. Therefore
the importance of simulating the actual behaviour and interaction of different
actors (company’s, governments, consumers) is increasingly being recognised
[56, 80, 81, 54].
Consequently, researchers increasingly focus on the fact that the energy




which are in part formed by collective behaviour at lower system levels. The
application of agent-based modelling (ABM) to model the energy transition can
subsequently complement the knowledge about the energy transition because
it allows us to model the complex non-linear properties of the energy system.
[77, 78, 34, 82]
The basics of ABM
ABM is a modelling method to simulate systems from the complex adaptive
systems (CAS) perspective [83]. This system perspective emphasises the fact
that a system is composed by many heterogeneous and autonomous agents
that interact which each other. These interacting agents endogenously develop
emergent system behaviour through constant interaction over time within a
specific environment. These agents, software entities representing actors in the
system, often represent people or groups of people but can also represent entities
such as companies or governments. [84]
In contrast to top-down exploratory models that focus on past relationships
between key-drivers and rational decision making (in general based on costs), in
agent-based models the behavioural rules of the agents determine the system
dynamics. The decision-making process of agents can therefore be extended
with bounded rational behaviour. The determination of these rules in the
conceptualisation of the model is essential. In this dissertation the agent-
based models are based on multiple perspectives provided by specifically selected
intellectual framings of the energy transition, which will be discussed in Chapter
2.
Results from ABM typically show probability distributions and several attract-
ors of possible outcomes and in this way ABMs give a more nuanced story about
possible scenarios. Often there is no single possible pathway, but there is a range
of possible outcomes based on the chaotic nature of recursive interaction among
actors in the system which is in line with our understanding of the real world. This
reflects the fact that the system at hand is inherently complex and sensitive to
small changes in the initial settings. This is in contrast to conventional techno-
economic modelling studies which focus on techno-economic considerations and
can give the impression we know much more than we really do about societal
systems [85].
Common applications can be classified in five areas: modelling flows (e.g.
traffic), markets (e.g. stock markets), several kinds of diffusion processes (e.g.
innovations [86, 87, 88], epidemics) and formalising social theories [89].
One of the many simple examples to illustrate the use of ABM is a highway
with car drivers which by their interaction (acceleration, deceleration, overtaking)
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can form a collective emergent system state, a traffic jam which could not be
reduced to individual behaviour of agent but stems from the collective interaction
between the agents.
Many of the mentioned examples have used Netlogo as software tool. Netlogo
is a free and open source software tool [90] and includes a modelling library with
several example models in different areas of research. Other modelling tools are
Repast [91] and Swarm [92] amongst others.
The ABM community has steadily grown the last two decades and there has
been efforts to standardise the modelling practise [93] and there is a well-rooted
protocol to report agent-based models [71, 72]. For a further introduction to
agent-based modelling we refer the reader to [94, 67, 84, 89].
1.4 Relevance
The relevance for the research presented in this dissertation is twofold; societal
and scientific.
1.4.1 Scientific
The scientific relevance of this research comes from the understanding that the
complex problem of the energy transition requires multiple perspectives to get a
grasp of the dynamics of this transition. By applying agent-based modelling, a
different perspective to various problems around the energy transition can been
given which enabled us to depart from the traditional perspective of rational
agents. With this approach we could focus on the simulation of a more realistic
actor behaviour from which potentially collective behaviour emerges. As we will
see throughout this dissertation, this perspective has given additional insight in the
possible narratives of the energy transition, in the design of electricity markets and
in societal dynamics influencing the pace of emergence of the energy transition.
The application of agent-based modelling also has proven to be an important
additional methodological tool for scenario development as it gives researchers
the means to bridge the gap between narratives and the quantification of these
narratives. Applied to the energy transition, this has given a new perspective of
how the energy transition could develop.
To facilitate stakeholder engagement and combine insights from various
scientific disciplines a transdisciplinary research approach is vital to generate
scientific insight and the successful application thereof. But vice versa, as we
will see in Chapter 2, facilitating transdisciplinary research requires an application
of agent-based modelling that is still understandable for the various scientific,




agent-based modelling focused on a minimal representation while encompassing
the fundamental complexities of the energy transition.
1.4.2 Societal
The energy transition will have to emerge from the collective action of various
heterogeneous actors, citizens, policy makers, business decision makers amongst
others. With regards to policy makers, this dissertation gives an additional
perspective to the design of policies for the energy transition. By simulating
the realistic behaviour of agents, we will see that insights from the developed
models give an important additional perspective to policy design when evaluating
policies have a specific purpose, in this case CO2 reduction.
The use of models and scenario development already has a strong foundation
in strategic business decision making [95]. We will see how the application
of agent-based modelling can be used as additional tooling for this scenario
development as it gives business decision makers a new perspective on how the
energy transition may develop.
1.5 Aim and outline
This dissertation is intended to bring a deeper understanding to the fundamental
dynamics of the energy transition. The application of agent-based modelling
will give an additional perspective and tooling to scenario development. It
has the potential to bridge the gap between qualitative story tellers and the
modellers that focus on the quantification of these narratives. Insights obtained
by simulating realistic actor behaviour will provide insight in the dynamics between
individual incentives and collective action and will put current and possible future
developments into perspective. These simulations are aimed at facilitating
transdiscipinary research and stakeholder engagement while doing justice to the
complex dynamics. Ultimately the insights from these studies can subsequently
be used to support strategic decisions making by public as well as private actors
and to anticipate the consequences of their (future) decisions.
1.5.1 Research questions
The main research question in this dissertation is:
How do individual incentives and their interaction influence the path and
the pace of emergence of the energy transition?
This is the research theme of this dissertation. We can never hope to answer this
question in its full form but it did guide our research endeavours. It has led to
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a sequence of more specific question which are addressed in Chapter 2 to 7, see
table 1.1. The logical sequential order of these questions will become clear in the
next section, Section 1.5.2.
Table 1.1 – Research questions by chapter. Right-hand column indicates the used
research method.
1.5.2 Structure of this dissertation
These research questions are addressed in Chapter 2 to 7 and conclusions are
formulated in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2 The transition of the energy system will have to emerge from the
interaction between many societal actors. This chapter presents selected relevant
intellectual frameworks to come to grips with the different incentives of these
actors. It gives background to the fundamental dynamics underlying the energy
transition and has been used to inform the conceptualisation of the various models




Chapter 3 Narratives of the energy transition give us a perspective on the
possible pathways in which the energy transition may develop. This chapter
presents two of these narratives. All Renewable and Balancing Act show the
possibilities society has to tackle climate change and transition the energy system.
Both narratives start from the notion that today the energy transition progresses
with the build-out of electric renewables and sector electrification. But these
developments will run into limits as some sectors are hard to electrify and
therefore, a demand for hydro-carbon based fuels will persist. That demand
could either be met by balancing remaining emissions with negative emissions
which would require overcoming the associated collective action problems, or by
producing a new type of renewables-based fuel, a Solar Fuel which deployment
could provide an individual incentive for investors. This chapter puts current and
future development into perspective, and shows what one needs to believe in for
these narratives to become reality.
Chapter 4 Aligning individual incentives to collectively engage in an energy
transition along the pathways described in Chapter 3 and building models to
study these dynamics requires thorough understanding of energy metrics. These
energy metrics are the building blocks of policy targets and energy scenarios.
This chapter shows that two fundamental dynamics of the energy transition,
electrification and decarbonisation make that key energy metrics such as Total
Primary Energy and Electricity Generation Capacity become unrepresentative,
ambiguous, difficult to interpret and ultimately, misleading. This is problematic
as these metrics potentially steer climate policy and investment decisions based
on statistical artefacts, rather than valid representation of the energy system.
To overcome these problem recommendations for decision makers and energy
modellers are presented.
Chapter 5 Now we know what solution possibilities there are, how fast will
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technology developments and costs reductions have given investors an individual
incentives to deploy these technologies, this chapter explores whether market
regulations are ready to integrate ever larger shares of these new technologies
and whether a full decarbonisation emerges if the realistic behaviour of investors
is taken into account. To explore these dynamics the realistic behaviours of
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electricity mix has been analysed.
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Intellectual framing of the energy transition
2.1 The pace and the path of the energy transition
The transition of the energy system will have to emerge from the interaction
between a wide set of actors. In democratic and capitalistic organised societies,
people (in theory) will have a choice, in the ballot box and in the shopping street.
However, it is an illusion to think they have a completely free will and are the only
actors influencing the path the energy transition takes. As long as politicians,
investors, policy makers, journalists, and even scientist have sufficient societal
support they can (try to) steer the system in a particular direction. Moreover,
these actors are part of social structures; companies for which they work, political
party on which they vote, that potentially act differently from the actor in solitude.
Next to societal players the energy system involves many technical elements.
Resourcing primary energy carriers, crude oil, natural gas, coal but also wind and
solar radiation require large scale infrastructures; oil rigs, wind farms and coal
mines amongst others. The distribution of large flows of mass and energy involves
large scale infrastructures; electricity networks, pipelines and tankers to name a
few. Additionally, processing these flows involves refineries and converter stations.
Large energy consuming industries also involves large scale infrastructure, e.g.
the steel industry. The size of these infrastructures makes that the return on
investment of these large scale infrastructures is distributed over decades. The
combination of the social system with this physical system is often referred to as
being a socio-technical system [96, 97].
Next to the socio-technical system elements the energy system has an
influence on the earth’s ecosystem. Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from
the use of the fossil resources have influenced the earth’s climate [4]. It has and
will warm the atmosphere, with various adverse effects on the ecosystems of the
planet of which we humans are part.1
The interaction between all these different societal actors, the technical energy
system as well as earth’s ecosystem will determine the pace and the path of the
energy transition. The dynamics of how such collective behaviour emerges from
individual actor behaviour has been studied in many different scientific disciplines.
It is the common thread of this chapter. This chapter will give the reader
background to the fundamental dynamics of the energy transition as well as give
an introduction to the foundations on which the chapters in this dissertation are
built.
In this chapter we discuss the theoretical background, our transdisciplinary
perspective on the nature of the problem of climate change and we present the
associated relevant intellectual framings of the decision making structure of actors
1The connection between the social system and the technical system is also referred to as
the economy and its physical counterpart is referred to as the technosphere [98, 99].
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Figure 2.1 – Three systems. This research is located at the intersection of the physical,
social and ecosystem.
in the energy transition. Starting from the fundamental nature of climate change,
perspectives from economics, psychology and sociology will be discussed. These
intellectual framings serve as starting point to the analysis in the subsequent
chapters in this dissertation.
Section 2.2.1 will discuss the traditional paradigm of neo-classical economics
and subsequently this chapter will show that the problem of climate change
requires additional perspectives to be able to appreciate the full complexity of
the dynamics around the energy transition.
2.2 Economic decision making
2.2.1 Rational choice
Although various definitions exist, economics can be seen as the science of choice
in cases of scarcity [100]. The problem of climate change can be seen as such
a case of scarcity: limiting climate change sets an upper limit to the emission of
greenhouse gasses [101].
A particular branch of economics, neoclassical economics and its associated
assumption on rationality has a long academic tradition as basis for reasoning
about the collective behaviour of humans in the economy. Although it can be
seen as meta-theory (a set of implicit rules or understandings for constructing
satisfactory theories), its fundamental assumptions are generally accepted even
though its empirical basis is very limited [102]. It is based on the following three
assumptions: i) People have rational preferences among outcomes; ii) Individuals
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maximise utility and firms maximise profits; and iii) People act independently on
the basis of full and relevant information. [103]
Based on these assumptions economic theories show that in an ideal economy,
where property rights are defined and protected and every activity has a price,
efficient pricing emerges from the balance between supply and demand. Based
on these axioms, Adam Smith’s argued that self-interested individuals will be led,
as by invisible hand to an efficient outcome [104].
Put together, the assumptions of neoclassical economics and rational choice
theory bring about theories on how these individual choices lead to the behaviour
of the group of individuals. Additionally, they serve as basis for the development
of fair, liberalised markets. The study of cases in which the axioms of neo-classical
economics do not hold, sometimes framed as market failures, lead to the study
of several types of collective goods, one of which is the common pool resource.
[105]
2.2.2 The common pool resource dilemma
As the internationally agreed limit to keep climate change well-below 2 ◦C requires
the world’s society to transform the energy transition within the coming decades,
climate change will be the ultimate driver for the energy transition.2 As we will see,
this driver will bring about a dilemma between individual incentives and collective
behaviour which can be conceptualised as common pool resource dilemma.
Figure 2.2 shows a perspective on the various drivers for the energy transition.
Climate change influences economic decision making; the interaction between
individual choices and collective action, ultimately resulting in an investment
decision in the energy system. Technology here functions as enabler and creates
decision possibilities.
Climate change has two aspects that make it a common pool resource
dilemma. First, the atmosphere can be seen as resource and the problem of
climate change limiting our unimpeded use of this resource. We can even think
about a carbon budget that is available to us before we hit limits of dangerous
climate change articulated in internationally agreed goals to limit global warming.
The crucial element is that our atmosphere is shared by all of us and that
physical exclusion of potential users is impossible (low excludability). Secondly,
the problem of climate change has the element of rivalry to it; collectively limiting
global warming will mean that emissions of greenhouse gasses by one will limit
the availability of carbon budget to others. These two aspects differentiate types
of goods, shown in the matrix given in Figure 2.3. [107]
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Figure 2.2 – A perspective on the energy transition. Figure shows climate change
conceptualised as common pool resources dilemma. It is the ultimate driver for the
decision-making process that may lead to the required investments to transition the
energy system. Technology here creates decision possibilities and in that sense can be
understood as enabler for this transition.
As the problem of climate change can be seen as common pool resource
dilemma, the transition of the energy system entails the dilemma of the
management of this resource-type. This framework can help us understand how
different driving forces work out on individual and collective level.
Several examples of common pool resources situations have shown how
successful management of these resources can come about. Examples include
local irrigation systems, various fishing grounds, the Montreal Protocol to limit
ozone depletion amongst others. Section 2.2.3 will cover the identified design
principles for success.
The tragedy of the commons
In the tragedy of the commons, Garrett Hardin [108] articulated the most famous
example of a common pool resource dilemma. He describes a situation in
which individual herdsman acting on their own self-interest have an incentive
to increase the number of sheep grazing on a common pasture as it brings
personal benefits (wool, milk etc) while increasing the number of sheep abridges
the collectively owned pasture, ultimately leading to a depletion of the resource.
It shows the misalignment of incentives in these type of problems; in CPR
situations there is an individual incentive that is contrary to the common good.
Successful management of these resources therefore requires effective regulating
the behaviour of beneficiaries. However, in practice the danger of free-riders
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Figure 2.3 – Types of goods can be differentiated with regards to their excludability
of potential users and the rivalry of the resource. Potential users for CPR are difficult
to exclude and the use by one influences the availability to others. Public goods such
as global peace, public radio differ from CPR as the use of pure public good does not
influence the availability to others, while with toll goods, potential users can be excluded
such as is the case with theaters or private clubs.
(because of the low excludability of CPRs) often make it difficult to negotiate a
successful agreement between users [107].
Climate change is often seen as a tragedy of the commons as there is individual
benefit of using fossil fuels (delivering energy services) while the emissions are
affecting the commonly owned atmosphere, ultimately changing the climate.
Formalised games can highlight the (mis)-alignment of incentives between
individuals and the collective. Game theory provides this formalisation with which
the alignment of incentives can be analysed [109]. One of these games is the
“prisoner’s dilemma”.
Figure 2.4 – The tragedy of the commons. Individual herdsmen have the incentive to
increase the number of cattle on a commonly owned pasture because the costs are bore
societal while there are individual benefits
The prisoner’s dilemma can be seen as formalisation of the tragedy of the




most presumably Albert Tucker gave the name and interpretation "Prisoner’s
Dilemma" to the most well-known game theoretic paradox [110].
The paradox involves two separately imprisoned suspects that are offered a
deal to betray each other. The deal structure (see Figure 2.5) gives an individual
incentive for betrayal while cooperation (by both staying silent) would effectuate
to the lowest conviction.
Figure 2.5 – A prisoner’s dilemma. Table shows the sentence prisoners face in various
scenarios; there is an individual incentive for betrayal while cooperation (by both staying
silent) would effectuate to the lowest conviction.
The dilemmas the prisoners are facing is another example of a situation where
the self-interest of actors will lead to an inefficient outcome. The example
inductively shows that in some situations the assumptions of rational choice do not
hold, but also defies Adam Smith’s invisible hand as following individual incentives
does not lead to the best outcome for the collective [107].
However, slight modifications to the game showed that cooperation “can”
emerge. Nobel prize winner Robert Axelrod started to transform the prisoner’s
dilemma into an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, an experiment in which players were
faced with the same problem repeatedly. To find the best strategy he organised a
competition between different research groups and found that “tit for tat” was the
most optimal strategy for the individual to achieve an optimal outcome for the
group. Tit for tat is merely the strategy of starting cooperation and thereafter
doing what the other actor did on the previous move. This showed that social
norms and especially reciprocity are key factors to support cooperation between
actors. [110]
Outside the field of game theory, researchers in the field tried to deduce how
individual behaviour in CPR dilemmas can lead to collective cooperative behaviour
[111]. These findings will be discussed in the next section, Section 2.2.3.
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2.2.3 The successful management of CPRs
The management of private goods (with their high excludability and substactab-
ility) is relatively easy in comparison with managing CPR’s because the property
right holder (owner) will have the incentive to sustainable manage the private
good as he or she is the only user. However, even in situations where property
rights are absent, successful governance has been observed [107]. Examples of
such successful management of CPR in the field can helps us understand the
dynamics between individual incentives and collective action in the context of the
energy transition.
In last decades, case studies collected and analysed by, amongst others Nobel
prize winner Elinor Ostrom have built up evidence that successful self-governance
of common pool resources can evolve and that the tragedy of the commons in
CPR situations can be omitted [112, 113]. The origins of such social behaviour
are still debated but Ostrom’s findings are backed-up by evolutionary studies that
have shown that humans, as one of few species that have evolved to show social
behaviour, are subject to two different kinds of rationality: Group rationality
defending the interest of the group; and individual rationality defending the
interest of the individual [114].
Ostrom isolates the free-rider problem as central to the successful man-
agement of CPR dilemmas [107]. Actors who cannot be excluded from the
resource and are without incentive to act in the common interest, will tend to
take advantage on the efforts of other users. However, by restricting access and
creating incentives for users to put effort in the management of the resource,
cooperative behaviour can emerge.
The large body of literature among many different scientific disciplines have
resulted in identification of a large number of variables that increase the likelihood
of cooperation in social dilemmas. As articulated by Ostrom [111, 107], among
the most important are the following:
Information Informal monitoring is feasible and reliable information is available
about the immediate and long- term costs and benefits of actions.
Individual motivation The individuals involved see the common resource as
important for their own achievements and have a long-term time horizon.
Reputation Gaining a reputation for being a trustworthy reciprocator is
important to those involved.





Sanctioning When individuals and groups face rules and sanctions imposed by
external authorities, these are viewed as legitimate and enforced equitably on all.
Leadership Social capital and leadership exist, related to previous successes in
solving joint problems.
Unfortunately, these conditions are in reality rarely met simultaneously. They
mostly refer to local case studies with few participants. This has resulted in one
essential insight from the CPR field of research: there is no single panacea for
the management of CPR’s, every situation has its characteristic features and thus
problems and solutions [115, 107]. The mentioned variables however give a hint
about what factors should be monitored in CPR dilemmas. They are therefore
also relevant in models that focus on CPR problems.
Global CPR dilemmas are even more difficult to manage given their scale.
Two examples of successful management of a global CPR dilemma give hope for
societies ability to tackle the problem of climate change: the phase out of leaded
gasoline [116] and the phase out of ozone depleting substances [105]. Were
leaded gasoline harmed public health, the emission of ozone depleting gasses
harmed the environment. Without too much elaboration, both were possible
because there were viable technological solutions to the problem, and there were
commercial gains for substitutes (for more detailed comparisons see [105, 117]).
By modelling these global CPR dilemmas, the interaction between individual
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of climate change has several elements to it that make it especially challenging
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Time scale of climate change The consequences of the problem of climate
change are exposed at long timescales (intergenerational)[4] due to the long time-
scales of climate feedback loops. The benefits of increased mitigation effort to
limit the CPR problem, in this case the climate change problem, are therefore also
exposed at long time scales. The actors that bear the costs of mitigating climate
change therefore do not necessary gain all (or any) benefits from their efforts
which make them less likely to bear the costs in the first place. This explains the
interest in and focus on ancillary benefits of mitigation measures such as reduced
air pollution which gives benefits give on shorter time scales and therefore changes
actor’s incentives. It also explains the fundamental difference between mitigation
and adaptation; adaptation would almost immediately be effective giving an actor
a direct incentive while mitigation efforts face long feedback times and involve
more indirect incentives.
The fact that the underlying energy infrastructures (economic, social and
physical) can only be developed and improved over decades [123] means that
we shape them in their continuous development process. Therefore, the energy
transition is complex in the sense that it contains huge numbers of elements that
interact during long time spans. The underlying systems are affected by all sorts
of actions taken and decisions made by various actors that are part of the same
energy system. This iterative interaction can result in non-linear behaviour [105].
Geographical scale Next to the long time scales, the consequences of climate
change are also exposed at large geographical scales (international) [4]. Although
climate change is intrinsically a global issue, impacts will be unequally spread
around the planet. Some nations will likely experience more adverse effects
than others and there will even be countries (on the short term) benefiting from
climate changes influencing the distribution of incentives. Therefore, the problem
of climate change is in fact a global common pool resource problem facing a
global collective action problem, simply because the resource, the atmosphere,
is of global scale. This global character also means that the number of actors
influencing the system is at a global scale. This in contrast with classic common
pool resource problems such as irrigation systems and fisheries that usually have
a more local character.
Unpredictability While the basic science of global warming is simple, the causes
and likely impact of climate change are highly complex as they involve processes
with considerable uncertainty [4]. As has been explored earlier, the overall impact
of climate change depends on the relationship between GHG emissions and climate
change (the climate sensitivity) and the effect of a changing climate on the
economic system (the welfare sensitivity), see Figure 2.6. Although decreasing,




Figure 2.6 – Climate and welfare sensitivity. Figures shows that the economic impact
of GHG emissions depends on the climate and welfare sensitivity.
The fact that the effects of climate change are hard to predict with regards to
time and space, is one of the reasons that significant proportions of society doubt
the cause and effects relationship of climate change (as we will see in Section
2.3) [124]. This climate change related uncertainty, as in generic CPR dilemmas,
leads actors to favour self-interest [125].
2.2.5 Application in this dissertation
Economic decision making gives a view on individual decision making in times of
scarcity. Within this field, the concept of the common pool resource dilemma
has served as base for analysis and several actor formalisations throughout this
dissertation.
The application of an agent-based modelling approach enabled us to depart
from the conventional policy perspectives on economic decision making which
is grounded in the neoclassical economics paradigm, i.e. that people are profit
maximising rational decision makers in a perfect market, see Figure 2.7. In this
paradigm policy makers are aware a particular market may be imperfect, but
the general notion is that a fair and optimal market design needs to reason
from rational actors (as we have seen in Section 2.2.1). Conventional policy
making therefore, focuses on perfecting this market by removing market failures.
However, the application of agent-based modelling enables policy making that
accepts the notion of imperfect markets and bounded rationality of actors. In
Chapter 7 an idealised market with bounded rational agents is simulated which
shows that removing a market failure (by applying a carbon tax) is not enough
to achieve a successful policy outcome.
The CPR dilemma comes back in several parts of this dissertation. In Chapter
3 the management of this dilemma is used to differentiate two narratives of the
possible path of the energy transition. In Chapter 5 the CPR dilemma is used to
inform the agent behaviour within the concept of critical transitions. Chapter 6
and 7 indirectly refer to the dilemma; in the agent-based simulations of investor
behaviour in electricity markets investors characteristics and future decisions
depend on their performance in the electricity market, which subsequently depend
on decisions by competing investors.
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Figure 2.7 – Policy perspective matrix. The application of agent-based modelling enables
modellers to depart from the conventional perspectives on economic decision making
which is ground in the neoclassical economics paradigm. In this perspective policy makers
are aware a particular market may be imperfect, but the general notion is that a fair and
optimal market design needs to reason from rational actors. Conventional policy making
therefore, focuses on perfecting this market by removing market failures. However, the
application of agent-based modelling enable policy making that accepts the notion of




As discussed, the successful management of global CPR dilemmas in the past
often involved a viable technological solution. With regards to the technological
solution to the problem of climate change; in Chapter 3 we will see that
the technological solutions have shown substantial cost reductions and their
deployment is gaining pace (electrification, solar PV and wind). Focus now
increasingly goes into integration of these technologies. We will see one part
of that story in Chapter 3: for a large part of the energy service demand,
the technical solutions (CCS and BECCS) are not commercially attractive and
deployment only allows for a license to operate that has to be mandated. This
chapter shows what one needs to believe for a carbon-neutral substitute for fossil
fuels (a Solar Fuel) to become commercially attractive. Chapter 6 and 7 tell the
other part of the story, the actor dynamics involving integration of ever larger
shares of renewable resources in the electricity mix.
2.3 What’s on the agent’s mind?
From the 1950’s on-wards insights from psychology and sociology have been used
to increase realism to economic decision making. This branch of economics is
now known as behaviour economics [126]. How are we different from the rational
self-interested actor as assumed in neo-classical economics?
Psychologists as well as sociologists have defined several factors that influence
the action level of individuals, often formulated with help of different frameworks,
models or theories (e.g. theory of planned behaviour, value-belief-norm model).
They can be differentiated into three groups; awareness of the problem, world
views and values, and behavioural factors [127, 125, 128, 129, 130]. They will
be discussed subsequently.
2.3.1 Awareness
Firstly, the awareness people have of the problem of climate change is important
[127, 129]. However, being aware of the problem is not enough; to take effective
action one also needs to understand the cause and effect and how to take action.
This is not obvious. Although awareness has been increasing [131], best practices
are not always clear nor universal. What is the best way to lower your climate
change impact? Life-cycle assessments [132], in theory the most comprehensive
analysis to compare options, are technically complex and full of large uncertainties
(climate sensitivity and welfare sensitivity or a broad range of environmental
impact categories). These uncertainties, especially in cases of CPR-dilemmas
lead people to favour self-interest [127, 133].
One of the sources of information is media and journalism. In liberalised
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markets where media rival each other for the attention of the consumer, eye-
catching, notable news stands out. This is a long-ingrained characteristic that is
based on our animal instinct to look out for the unusual as it can anticipate danger.
In the case of climate change that is often the climate denier or the conspiracy
thinker which play into gut feel disproportionately influencing the awareness and
action level of society. [127]
2.3.2 World views & values
One’s world view also influences one’s decisions. Where moral and ethical values
as intergenerational and international equity can be a reason to act, there are
also worldviews and values that can result into inaction. Whether you believe
in supra-human powers, Gaia, God or techno-salvation it can all be a reason
to decrease the relevance of one’s individual choices [127, 128, 134, 135, 136].
Another worldview that can play part can be described as system justification;
the tendency to defend the societal status quo [137]. This is best exemplified
by a quote from former U.S. president George H. W. Bush: “The American way
of life is not up for negotiation” [138]. This also relates to the resistance to
change. The famous NIMBY: Not In My Backyard characterises the resistance
to a proposed development in an actors local area while they would support or
tolerate development further away from them.
What makes things more difficult is that the various values people have, are
potentially conflicting [139, 140, 141]. A biologically raised chicken is more CO2
intensive than an intensively farmed chicken but has had a happier life [142]. So
what do you prioritise, your appetite for chicken, animal welfare or climate change
impact?
Also political world views can influence peoples incentives. Economic liberalism
prioritises the freedom of choice and efficient markets, limiting governmental
interventions to prioritise on only the most basic collective goods [143].
But these world views and values tend to be flexible. Cognitive dissonance
is the term attached to the mental discomfort people experience when multiple
beliefs, ideas or values contradict [144]. People tend to try to decrease this
dissonance by bending the earlier hold beliefs, ideas and values; feeling inadequate
to prevent the problem makes me justify my actions, for example by making myself
believe the problem is less severe than I thought previously. Ultimately this can
lead to climate change denial [145].
2.3.3 Behaviour
With regards to the behaviour of actors in the context of climate change, several




actors’ behaviour from the assumptions of rationality [75, 146]:
Optimism bias There is considerable evidence that suggests that people
discount their personal exposure to environmental risks. For example, although
global citizens do expect that environmental conditions will worsen in the coming
decades, they expect that people in other places will be worse off than themselves
[127, 147, 148].
Discounting People tend to discount the future and undervalue distant or
future risk [149, 147]. They do so heterogeneously and dynamic over time. For
example Kahneman showed that people who would choose one candy bar now
over two tomorrow, at the same time would choose two candy bars 101 days
from now over one candy bar 100 days from now. This phenomenon is also
known as hyperbolic discounting [150].
Comparisons People are very social and tend to compare actions of other
continuously with themselves, subsequently influencing future decisions [144].
Social norms, informal understandings that govern the behaviour of members of a
society, can encourage certain behaviours [151]. These norms can spread through
social or physical networks. A well-known example is the spread of photovoltaic
(PV) panels through neighbourhoods; the visibility of these PV panels make
neighbours more inclined to invest in these panels themselves [152, 153].
Fear of inequity The fear for free-riders, common in open resource situation
such as climate change, can lead to fear of inequity. This fear ultimately can lead
to in-action and stall progress [154, 107, 155].
Loss averse Although rationally investments should be regarded as sunk costs
after they have been made, in reality people are loss averse. This makes dispensing
of a good after investment more difficult than it would have been if one had not
invested in it [156, 157]. This makes investments in old technology, a car on
personal level or industrial processes on corporate level, difficult to replace.
Pricing Putting a price on something has the potential to remove morality and
ethical arguments from the decision-making process [158].
Low-cost hypothesis Once the decision to take action has been taken, the
low-cost hypothesis says people are more inclined to take the easy option rather
than the more effective option [128, 159].
Rebound-effect When people have made a decision the rebound-effect, the
effect that peoples gains of action are diminished by a subsequent action, will
decrease the overall effect of action [160, 161]. For example, the decrease of
34
Chapter 2
actors’ behaviour from the assumptions of rationality [75, 146]:
Optimism bias There is considerable evidence that suggests that people
discount their personal exposure to environmental risks. For example, although
global citizens do expect that environmental conditions will worsen in the coming
decades, they expect that people in other places will be worse off than themselves
[127, 147, 148].
Discounting People tend to discount the future and undervalue distant or
future risk [149, 147]. They do so heterogeneously and dynamic over time. For
example Kahneman showed that people who would choose one candy bar now
over two tomorrow, at the same time would choose two candy bars 101 days
from now over one candy bar 100 days from now. This phenomenon is also
known as hyperbolic discounting [150].
Comparisons People are very social and tend to compare actions of other
continuously with themselves, subsequently influencing future decisions [144].
Social norms, informal understandings that govern the behaviour of members of a
society, can encourage certain behaviours [151]. These norms can spread through
social or physical networks. A well-known example is the spread of photovoltaic
(PV) panels through neighbourhoods; the visibility of these PV panels make
neighbours more inclined to invest in these panels themselves [152, 153].
Fear of inequity The fear for free-riders, common in open resource situation
such as climate change, can lead to fear of inequity. This fear ultimately can lead
to in-action and stall progress [154, 107, 155].
Loss averse Although rationally investments should be regarded as sunk costs
after they have been made, in reality people are loss averse. This makes dispensing
of a good after investment more difficult than it would have been if one had not
invested in it [156, 157]. This makes investments in old technology, a car on
personal level or industrial processes on corporate level, difficult to replace.
Pricing Putting a price on something has the potential to remove morality and
ethical arguments from the decision-making process [158].
Low-cost hypothesis Once the decision to take action has been taken, the
low-cost hypothesis says people are more inclined to take the easy option rather
than the more effective option [128, 159].
Rebound-effect When people have made a decision the rebound-effect, the
effect that peoples gains of action are diminished by a subsequent action, will
decrease the overall effect of action [160, 161]. For example, the decrease of
34
Intellectual framing of the energy transition
time that people shower can raise enough social capital to justify an extra flight
to the other side of the world, eventually increasing climate impact.
These insights from psychology have initiated policy experiments to encourage
climate change mitigation measures that make use of these insights under the
theme nudging. Several successful examples have shown their positive effects
[162]. For examples, subsidies to isolate attics in the UK became successful
only after they were offered in combination with providing services to clean these
attics. Other examples include changing the default choice, whether it is printing
1 or 2 sided, or providing a vegetarian versus omnivore menu.
Although the effect of these nudging experiments are proven, the question
remains whether these relatively small-scale experiments will bring about the
drastic and large scale transition the world will need. They do however add
an extra effective policy design option to encourage the energy transition.
2.3.4 Application in this dissertation
These insights have been used at various location in this dissertation. The fact
that actors show bounded rational behaviour comes back in Chapter 5, 6 and
7. Insights about the differing world views and discounting have been applied in
6 and 7. In these two chapters investors are modelled in the electricity market
which have different world views and discount investment heterogeneously. Social
behaviour of actors, especially with regards to comparisons and network effects
comes back in Chapter 5. In this chapter the influence of these aspects has
been explored by modelling agents that influence each other to become active
or in-active with regards to the energy transition. The point about awareness
comes back in Chapter 4; awareness of the problem of climate change begins by
monitoring the system in an effective way by using a representative set of (energy)
metrics. The core of Chapter 3 turns around differing world views, in this case
of the reader; what pathways can be laid out based on different world views?
2.4 Critical transitions
The successful management of CPR often requires a regime shift to sustainable
manage the CPR. Therefore, the analysis of CPR dilemmas is closely related to
the analysis of regime shifts or critical transitions in socio-ecological systems.
Historical energy transition as well as fairly recent ones such as the “Energie
wende”, the German energy transition, have been described in the context of
such a critical transition [163].




that may lead a fast, disruptive transition of the average public attitude with
regards to a problem. Such a transition can be triggered by small changes to
the perceived seriousness of the problem (based on changes of the external
environment). These small changes can lead a bifurcation point that makes a
previously stable system show a critical transition to another system state.
Originally derived from ecological case studies, Scheffer et al. [164] have
formalised the concept and applied it to societal problems. In this way social
aspects such as peer pressure, the absence of leaders and the complexity of the
problem could be explored. They have been distinguished as critical aspects that
can influence the type of transition the average public attitude of a society will
take with regards to the perceived seriousness of the problem (see Figure 2.8)
[164].
Figure 2.8 – The concept of critical transitions. Figures shows a situation in which the
average public attitude to a problem increases slowly with the perceived seriousness of
the problem. When a bifurcation point is reached, a critical transition can occur to a
state with an higher average public attitude to a problem.
2.4.1 Application in this dissertation
In Chapter 5 this concept will be explored in more detail. It will serve as basis
for an agent-based exploration of this concept in which the dynamics between
agent-interactions can be further studied. Social aspects such as interaction via
networks, heterogeneity of the population and the effect of leaders have been
incorporated to analyse their effect on the emergence of collective action to
engage in an energy transition.
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2.5 Dealing with uncertainty and high-impact
The energy transition is an urgent multi-dimensional complex process across
large time and geographical scales that involves the interaction of many different
societal and physical elements which faces large uncertainties [165]. It is an
illusion we can possibly and meaningfully simulate all these elements in an (agent-
based) model, even more so as the iterative actor interactions in combination with
human reflexivity (the circular relationship between cause and effect of human
action) makes the social system fundamentally unpredictable. Choices have to
be made on what to include and what to exclude and on the boundaries of the
model. Given these choices, when can we still be certain that the generated
scientific insights actually represent the truth?
Traditionally there are two ways of doing science to generate scientific
insights; induction and deduction. Where deduction starts from a set of axioms
(explicit assumptions) to derive a logically certain conclusion, induction starts
from specific observation of reality to derive general conclusions. Arguably agent-
based modelling is a third way of doing science (also known as generative science
[41]); from deductive generated model data produced by models based on explicit
assumptions from various frameworks, inductive analysis generates insights [42].
The presented framing in this chapter, which relevance was triggered by our
research questions gave us guidance on the importance elements to include in
simulation models.
Generally model validation ensures that the model is correctly representing
reality but models designed to simulate the energy transition are impossible to
validate completely as they simulate fundamentally unpredictable systems into the
unknown future [63]. Post-normal science (PNS) is a novel approach to science
which give guidance to the scientific method in these type of cases [166, 167].
PNS differentiates itself from what Thomas Kuhn articulated to be normal
science [168]. While normal science relies on a common set of rules either provided
by inductive or deductive analysis, Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, the
developers of this approach, argued that in cases where facts are uncertain, values
in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent a different approach is necessary. In
these cases “speaking value-free truth to political power” is impossible as scientists
have considerable room to make choices in the assumption of their analyses [169,
170]. Therefore, these decisions are increasingly politicized and require politicians
to weight the arguments and make a decision based on their political worldview.
To put PNS in perspective, three styles of analysis are distinguished to deal
with specific problems; applied science, professional consultancy and PNS which
can be differentiated in figure 2.9 in the space spanned by two axes, decision




in the applied sciences, the normal peer-review process is sufficient, professional
consultancy is considered appropriate for analyses that cannot be peer-reviewed
and where decisions are pressing [166]. When uncertainties are even larger and
decision stakes are higher we enter the space of PNS. PNS refers to three key
elements to deal with these kinds of scientific problems.
Uncertainty management Different methodological perspectives to the same
problem give additional insight.
Plurality of perspectives Multidisciplinary, transdisciplinary and interdisciplin-
ary teamwork within science makes collaborative teamwork with policy makers,
business and society possible.
Extension of peer community The extension of the peer community could
bring in insights from representatives from social, political and economic domains.
Figure 2.9 – A diagram differentiating Applied Science, Professional Consultancy and
Post-normal Science. Figure shows that when decisions stakes are uncertainties large,
we enter the space of Post-normal science. During this process decision are increasingly
political in nature as scientific research increasingly delivers insights by means of
perspectives rather than “the truth”. Adapted from [171].
2.5.1 Application in this dissertation
The problem of climate change is often described as being post-normal science
(e.g. [172, 173, 169, 174]). PNS also provides the best description of our
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research approach. Referring to the three elements of PNS:
An additional methodological perspective The application of agent-based
modelling to the various questions in this dissertation has provided an additional
methodological perspective to the discussed problems. In Chapter 5 the idea of
PNS will be explored in more detail but the application of ABM to electricity
market modelling in Chapter6 and 7 clearly has provided a new perspective on the
most effective design of these markets.
Transdiciplinary This dissertation describes truly transdiciplinary research and
in the process deliberately involved stakeholders from different domains. Firstly,
by combining insights from different scientific disciplines. Insights from eco-
nomics, psychology, sociology and biology provided insights into actor behaviour;
computer science and physics provided insights into how to model these social
phenomena. Secondly, this research has been conducted at three universities in
The Netherlands; in Leiden at the Institute of Environmental Sciences, in Utrecht
at the Copernicus of Sustainable Development and the Technical University in
Delft, at the faculty of Technology, Policy and Management.
Extension of peer community Next to the various research institute, this
research was carried out in collaboration with the industry, the R&D department
within Shell, Shell’s scenario team and Shell’s New Energies business. Additionally,
results have been discussed at several occasions with policy makers, specifically
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Today the energy transition progresses with the build-out of electric renewables
and increased electrification of end-use. However, significant demand for
hydrocarbon fuels will persist. That demand could be met by capturing and storing
fossil fuel emissions and balancing remaining emissions with negative emissions by
deploying existing technologies. This requires active government involvement to
orchestrate and support the transition. A radical alternative exists in the form of
Solar Fuels, carbon-neutral fuels produced from renewable electricity, water and
the circular use of CO2. If and when Solar Fuels could be produced at affordable
cost and scaled, their market introduction could be market-led needing no more
than price-protection in the form of a carbon price. We give a specific target for
the future viability of solar hydrocarbon fuels of 200 US$ per barrel. While this
is potentially achievable in the long run, policy reliance on it is a significant bet.
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3.1 The choice at the heart of the energy transition
The task to build-out and reshape the world’s energy system is central to two of
the greatest challenges for the 21st century: fulfilling the economic aspirations of
a growing world population while drastically reducing CO2 emissions to limit global
warming. Since 2000, the world has tried to make progress on these challenges
by the rapid deployment of “new renewables”, notably solar PV and wind [175].
This expansion appears likely to continue apace as costs continue to fall and
decarbonisation efforts increase under the pressure of “Paris” [5]. Any future
scenario therefore includes large-scale electrification with significant contributions
of solar PV and wind electricity, which will continue to be the workhorses of
energy-sector CO2 mitigation in the decades ahead. There is no alternative.
Even when electrification is pushed to its limits, however, demand for fuels will
persist – often in the form of hydrocarbons. How these fuels will be supplied while
committing to climate targets is a societal choice for which the world has yet to
make up its mind.
Figure 3.1 – A paradigm for the two dimensions of progress in the energy transition.
Second circle in Pathway 2 shows energy going into solar fuel production process (580
EJ/y). The 2070 date given is consistent with the Paris Agreement. Total Final
consumption (TFC), Fossil hydrocarbons (Fossil HC), Renewable, non-hydrocarbon-
based electricity (RE), Bio-Energy with CCS (BECCS).
In our view, two fundamental directions in the pursuit of ‘progress’ are possible,




planning hurdles, such as through active government involvement This pathway,
Balancing Act, has several aspects. It requires orchestrating the roll-out of
new infrastructure: long-distance electricity transmission, hydrogen distribution
networks and the deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS). It also
requires coherent policy actions across countries, for bio-energy to grow to its
full potential in an environmentally responsible manner.
Many commentators are sceptical that we can overcome these collective
action problems. Instead, they put their faith in the possibility of developing
new technology [176] with just a limited government role just to get the ball
rolling. This leads us to Pathway 2, All Renewable, that relies on unpredictable
technical progress. Most of the progress we see today is of this type: renewable
technologies (wind, solar), vehicle electrification and efficiency measures, helped
initially and when needed by substantial subsidies or mandates, but eventually
becoming completely market-led once their costs are competitive. Taken to its
logical conclusion, this ultimately will become a bet on solar fuels: the making
of everyday hydrocarbon fuels like methane, gasoline and jet fuel from solar and
wind energy, water, and the circular use of CO2.
Balancing Act and All Renewable differ in
one other crucial manner. Balancing Act’s
reliance on biomass and carbon storage will
eventually constrain the world’s total fuel
supply, which may eventually raise difficult
questions around lifestyle-change and limits to
growth [20]. All Renewable with its reliance
on solar and wind, at least in theory, offers
scope for an unlimited supply of renewable
fuels. As history time and again shows, this
is an enduring aspiration, see box [177].
3.2 Current and future energy demand
Our current energy system, responsible for 70% of all greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, has an annual take-in of 590 EJ primary energy. 80% is of fossil
origin, a percentage that has hardly changed since the 1960s. Another 10%
is biomass (most of it traditional), hence a full 90% of the world’s energy
supply is hydrocarbon-based. After conversion losses two-thirds of this primary
energy reaches the end-user, with some 20% in the form of electricity. Fuels
and chemicals feedstock account for 70%, while biomass and heat make up the
remaining 10% of consumption by end-users [31].
A recent Shell scenario, Sky [7], depicts a transition pathway that is consistent
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with the Paris agreement but at the same time acknowledges that energy demand
will grow as the non-OECD develops and billions more enter the global middle
class. In this world the demand for energy services (lighting, heating, transport
kilometres, tonnes of steel produced, etc) will grow substantially. Even under
optimistic assumptions that energy efficiency will improve (by a factor of between
two and six in the Sky scenario, across different sectors), total final energy will
increase by 60% to 2100. This would equate to around 650 EJ / year, or 65 GJ
/ person / year, half the level of demand per person in the OECD today.
How can the broad range of energy services be met with net-zero CO2
emissions? What are our options to meet Paris? In what follows we will follow
the logic of Figure 3.1; electrification pushed to its inevitable limits leading to a
branching point of how to deal with the remaining fuel demand.
3.3 Renewable electricity and electrification: im-
mediate push to inevitable limits
Since the beginning of the century, we have seen that solar PV and wind industries
have grown from insignificance to US$ 300 billion per year, adding 150 GW
every year [178, 179]. Yet such is the scale of the world’s energy system, that
between them they still comprise less than 1% of the global energy supply today
and so further very substantial growth will be needed. In the coming decades
these technologies will increasingly have to be paired with storage and ongoing
electrification of sectors which traditionally relied on fuels, specifically transport
(by introducing electric vehicles) and heating of the built environment (by applying
heat pumps). In short, the transition is gathering pace and the list of near-term
options for change is impressive. But at the same time, it is one-sided, heavily
leaning on electric renewables, electrification of demand and strong efficiency
improvement. It leaves the fuels half of the energy transition still to be done.
This includes industrial sectors where GHG emissions are inherently difficult
to strip from the production process such as in steel and cement making. Also,
while recognising the electrification potential of passenger road transport, the
decarbonisation of the heavy-duty transport (ships, aeroplanes, lorries) will be
limited. These sectors must be expected to remain significant reliant on energy-
dense, portable fuels for a long time. Another critical aspect is that at least 15%
of the total energy demand, 100 EJ / year, will need to meet feedstock needs for
the chemical and materials industry. This “non-energy use” is dominated by oil
and natural gas today, and may have increasing shares of coal or biomass, but it
fundamentally relies on carbon.




world, for it contains no carbon. But the slow progress over the last decades
makes clear how great the infrastructural challenges are. There can be no
doubt that hydrogen will play a role, but only in regions and sectors where the
infrastructure challenge can be overcome. This is specifically the case in large
industrial clusters. Transport and the built environment are sectors where the
hurdle for introduction is much greater, and hydrogen’s future in those sectors
is both uncertain and globally limited. This leads us to the view that also in a
net-zero emissions-world, hydrocarbons are likely to continue to be the mainstay
of fuel provision.
Our best estimate, in line with Sky, is that at least a third of the energy supply
will require some sort of carbon-based ‘fuel’, or some 225 EJ per year.1 This will
lead societies to a choice as to how to proceed to make these fuels carbon-neutral:
to face up to the difficult organisational challenges (as in Balancing Act) or to
bet on uncertain technological advances (as in All Renewable).
3.4 The orthodox energy transition for fuels: effi-
ciency, bio-energy and offsets
Pathway 1, Balancing Act, would seek to deliver the 225 EJ of fuel through
a combination of bio-energy and fossil fuels, and is similar to Sky Scenario
assumptions. Following the current views on the sustainable resource base for
biomass, between 100 and 200 EJ primary energy could be supplied by biomass as
feedstock for biofuels and bioplastics [181]. After converting the woody biomass,
we could expect biofuels to deliver up to 80 EJ / y of final energy. This would
leave 145 EJ, or 25% of the system, relying on fossil resources.
The use of fossil fuels however entails emissions. To get to a balance of
“sources and removals by sinks” [5], the ubiquitous use of CCS will be essential,
but those emissions that cannot be captured and sequestrated centrally (such
as from the transport sector) will need to be offset by negative emissions. To
attain these negative emissions, most major long-term outlooks [182] including
Sky rely on the capturing and sequestration of point sources bio-energy emissions
currently seen as the most promising option to deliver negative emissions at the
required scale.2
None of this requires transformational technological breakthroughs. The
1This is in line with experts that showed that a mid-century, low-cost 100% decarbonisation
scenario for the energy system using only electric renewables is in-feasible. [180]
2Importantly, this calculation relies on the hydrocarbons (fossil and biomass) that are used
to make materials being properly disposed of after use. If waste plastics, for example, cannot
be recycled, and if they are burnt to provide electricity and heat, then those emissions in turn
will need to be captured with CCS.
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technologies exist today and large-scale CCS projects have already stored more
than 200 million tonnes of CO2 [183]. At a long-term cost of 50 US$/tCO2
[183], CCS would add about 3 US$ / GJ to the average energy costs of a
mix of coal, gas, oil, and biomass combined, giving a total of 15 US$ / GJ
(of which CCS is 20%). Further deployment will bring CCS cost down, but
further deployment will need better alignment of incentives. Societal support
for strong policy signals will be required to trigger the appropriate investments,
alongside a clear legislative framework and a planning of co2 infrastructure. Only
by overcoming these coordination hurdles will large scale deployment of CCS arise.
3.5 The technology leap: what one needs to
believe for solar fuels
Pathway 2, All Renewable, by contrast, supplies the demand for hydrocarbon
fuels with a new, carbon neutral fuel, a Solar Fuel, produced by capturing co2
directly from air. Such fuels have recently gained much attention under the
headings of Power-to-X (X being gas, liquid or product) and electricity-based
fuels [184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189].
Production of these solar fuels banks on the integration of a suite of
technologies, that individually need both greatly improved performance and
cost reductions to make it into an economic and scalable option. But when
hydrocarbon fuels can be synthesised at an affordable cost from renewables and
co2 in circular use from the atmosphere, the prospect offers a practically unlimited
supply of carbon-neutral (high energy density) fuels.
Although in both pathways the energy industry would be completely trans-
formed, what sets All Renewable apart from Balancing Act is that, though the
technology challenges are harder, the public policy challenge may be a great
deal easier. Consumers can continue using energy exactly as they do today, but
without affecting the climate as any consumption would simply be returning co2
to the atmosphere that had been drawn from it to make the fuels. Starting
with R&D incentives, the transition would proceed by entrepreneurs and large
companies making use of market mechanisms, since they do not need to rely on
any new infrastructure. In addition, the resource base for all practical needs is
unconstrained and most countries could choose to produce solar fuels locally if
they wished. Therefore, All Renewable depends on the ability to develop and
deploy key technologies well beyond their current pilot stage but thereafter only
on its affordability.
We suggest a reasonable target to be 200 US$ / barrel (bbl). The cost of




solar fuels are in the form of useable fuels, for which retail prices can be much
higher. For example, gasoline in Germany typically sells for the equivalent of 250
US$ / bbl today. As such, this does suppose societies are willing to pay a premium
for one or all of the attractions above. Yet it would still be affordable, particularly
in time and as economies grow. In our outline assessment here, we find that
when assumptions from technology experts in different fields are combined, and
optimistic yet plausible values are used, an overall cost of around 200 US$ / bbl
comes into sight. Although some elements are only at pilot stage today, a first
order indication is that the cost today could be around 850 US$ / bbl. With
regards to the energetic and economic costs, what do we need to believe in order
for solar fuel to become reality?
Figure 3.2 – The five principal elements of solar fuels production: Solar Photovoltaics
(Solar PV), Direct Air Capture of CO2 (DAC), Hydrogen (H2), Activation of CO2 to
CO, and Synthesis (e.g. via Fischer-Tropsch) of the fuels.
Using an engineering process that we can conceive today, there are five
principal elements to manufacturing solar fuels, see Figure 3.2. A barrel of fuel
products, like gasoline or diesel, contains 5.5 GJ of energy, with a little over 100
kg of embedded carbon. As such, the production process of a barrel of solar
fuel would need to draw about 0.5 tonne of CO2 from the atmosphere.3 Around
5 GJ would be needed to run this Direct Air Capture (DAC)process [191] and
an additional 9.6 GJ would be required to produce hydrogen and upgrade the
captured CO2 to CO [192]. Together with the produced hydrogen, this CO can
be synthesised to a fuel. As such, the energy efficiency could be close to 40%,
requiring 14.3 GJ of electricity to produce 5.5 GJ of solar fuel. Based on current
projections [193, 194], it is reasonable to expect that in favourable locations, the
cost of solar PV (or other renewable) electricity can fall from typical values of
3Some scientists have put forward work on artificial photosynthesis as an alternative, but
the theory as well as the technology is at an earlier and more speculative stage [190].
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around 50 US$ / MWh today [195] to 15 US$ / MWh. This would equate to
60 US$ / bbl for the electricity costs. Recently, engineers have put forward a
pathway for developing DAC at a cost of 100 US$ / t CO2 [196, 197, 198]. As
a result, this contributes nearly 50 US$ for the cost of our barrel. Previously, the
comprehensive analysis by the American Physical Society in 2011 [199] estimated
a cost of 600 US$ / t CO2. This is the greatest contribution to the change in
the economics of solar fuels from today.
Electrolysis of water to produce hydrogen is established but limited in scale.
IEA estimate [200] the current cost of electrolysers at around 1200 US$ / kW
(input electricity). There are substantial efforts to reduce the cost from today,
targeting 300 US$ / kW [201]. At that level, the equipment would add around
50US$ to the tally.
Finally, the Fischer-Tropsch process for synthesis is used in full-scale industrial
production today for converting natural gas or coal to liquid fuels. Here it would
take the activated CO2 as carbon feedstock. The costs of this activation - for
which several alternative technologies exist4 [203] - are still speculative but let
us assume it could be done for 10 US$ / bbl. With further development and
economies of scale of these processes, the final Fischer - Tropsch synthesis would
cost around 20 US$ per barrel [204].
There would inevitably be other costs for processes such as the water handling
and gas transport, and for other equipment such as the hydrogen storage tanks.
If the combined cost of these could be no more than 5% of the total costs, then
alongside the other progress, the 200 US$ target could be realised (see Figure
3.3 for summary of the calculation).
Figure 3.3 – Outline costs for solar fuels production
4The leading options for converting CO2 to CO are the reverse water-gas shift reaction [202] or 





A fifty percent increase in energy consumption in about 50 years, combined with
increasing environmental stresses will bring the world to uncharted territory. Even
if wind and solar PV succeed in replacing half of the existing energy system, as
well as meeting the significant demand growth in the decades ahead, they will
run into the systems limits of electrification. Close to a half of the energy system
will need a fuel from one source or another. That is where the path forks.
The world can either choose to rely on the policy and infrastructure
coordination, necessary to bring CCS, bioenergy and BECCS to the required
scale. This is the path of Balancing Act, a development trajectory for which the
technologies are ready to be scaled. However, for decades now, nations have
hesitated to make a start, as with CCS, or have struggled with the governance
and co-ordination, as with biofuels. Nevertheless, the Paris Agreement may offer
a resilient global architecture and it remains a plausible approach.
However, the scepticism over the world’s ability to overcome these collective
action problems and the reluctance to embrace technologies such as CCS and
BECCS [205, 191], has created space for an alternative narrative. In turn, that
relies on technologies that are at a lower level of readiness, but that offer the
promise of less hindrance from the problems that have held back the deployment of
CCS and biofuels. This narrative, All Renewable, explores the rapid technological
progress to make solar fuels affordable and scalable over an unprecedentedly short
time period [123]. It presents a daunting technical challenge. While affordable,
All Renewable is still a significantly more expensive route than Balancing Act.
Furthermore, Balancing Act is more resilient: All Renewable will only work if all
its five components make great technological advances. Yet if solving the co-
ordination problems of Balancing Act proves insurmountable, the world may be
forced to commit to All Renewable to address climate change, whether it wants
to or not.
In order to avoid postponing action and hence making a late, risky bet on
All Renewable by default, we recommend that it would be prudent policy to
stimulate developments along both pathways simultaneously. And if only some
of the elements of All Renewable prove successful, then they are likely to benefit
Balancing Act anyway.
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promise of less hindrance from the problems that have held back the deployment of
CCS and biofuels. This narrative, All Renewable, explores the rapid technological
progress to make solar fuels affordable and scalable over an unprecedentedly short
time period [123]. It presents a daunting technical challenge. While affordable,
All Renewable is still a significantly more expensive route than Balancing Act.
Furthermore, Balancing Act is more resilient: All Renewable will only work if all
its five components make great technological advances. Yet if solving the co-
ordination problems of Balancing Act proves insurmountable, the world may be
forced to commit to All Renewable to address climate change, whether it wants
to or not.
In order to avoid postponing action and hence making a late, risky bet on
All Renewable by default, we recommend that it would be prudent policy to
stimulate developments along both pathways simultaneously. And if only some
of the elements of All Renewable prove successful, then they are likely to benefit
Balancing Act anyway.
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mental building block to the architecture of international climate agreements.
Many of these climate targets focus on the transition of the energy system which
has led to the development of various energy transition scenarios. Now that fossil
resources are being replaced by non-combustible and renewable energy sources
a re-assessment of the applicability of the current set of metrics on which these
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Now that energy derived from renewable and non-combustible resources
with abundant availability but limited instantaneous availability becomes more
prominent the ongoing electrification of the energy system combined with the
decarbonisation of the electricity system has caused the current set of energy
scenario metrics to become ambiguous. More specifically we show that Total
Primary Energy (TPE) and its related indicators, Energy Efficiency (EE), Energy
Intensity (EI) as well as the key metric Electricity Generation Capacity (EGC) have
become unrepresentative, potentially misleading and for a large part irrelevant.
This is problematic as these metrics steer climate policy and investment decisions
based on statistical artefacts rather than valid representation of the energy
system. This study concludes with a set of requirements on energy scenarios
to overcome these problem that will lead energy scenarios to focus on Total Final
Consumption within a mix of related energy metrics.
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4.1 Introduction
Since the energy system is the largest contributer to the world’s greenhouse
gas emissions [206], decarbonisation of the energy system is key to limit global
warming to 2 ◦C. Especially now that international negotiations [207] to limit
global warming depend on National Determined Contributions (NDCs) [208],
consistent, transparent accounting of these different targets and commitments
becomes increasingly important.
Many of these NDCs depend on or make reference to (energy) scenarios
[209] which are quantified narratives of future pathways [210]. These scenarios
are often based on extrapolations of historical relationships collected in energy
balances. Only four organisations [106, 211, 31, 212] publish these (historic)
energy balances [213], whereas many more publish scenarios (e.g. Shell [7],
Greenpeace [15], International Institute for Applied System Analysis [214], World
Energy Council [215]). These scenarios help policy makers and many different
societal stakeholders to debate policy options, monitor policy effectiveness
and discuss trade-offs between various technology, system and value chains.
Moreover, they support investors to make informed strategic decisions in an
uncertain future.
These policy targets as well as scenarios are based on various metrics, such
as Total Primary Energy and Total Final Consumption amongst others. An
adequate, relevant and representative set of these metrics is of vital importance;
they must be sufficiently broad to characterise the system, relevant for policy and
business decision making and concise enough to facilitate smooth communication
with and between (non-)experts. Here two kinds of metrics can be distinguished.
The first are primary metrics which are absolute values (e.g. Total Primary Energy
and Total Final Consumption). The second are indicators which are relative,
typically ratios of primary metrics (e.g. Energy Intensity, Energy Efficiency).
4.1.1 Metrics and transition dynamics
With the effect of climate change becoming more evident, stakeholder’s interests
(i.e. objectives of policy makers, opportunities and risks for businesses and
the general public) have changed. Where previously policy targets and business
strategies were focused on the depletion of (fossil) resources, in the last decades
there is increased focus on the impact of the use of resources. Moreover, where
previously the total resource availability was of concern (i.e. oil, gas and coal
reserves), presently the instantaneous energy availability is of primary concern
(wind and solar radiation), marking a shift from Joules of primary energy to Watt




Now that the energy transition progresses, the resource mix of the energy
system changes and energy from non-combustible sources (i.e. wind, solar)
becomes more prominent. These “new” resources are different from fossil
fuels in two fundamental aspects: they are abundant rather than scarce but
their instantaneous availability is limited, rather than being dispatchable on
demand. Furthermore, two major developments in the energy system are
ongoing: i) ongoing electrification of end use and ii) the decarbonisation of
the energy system. We will show that these developments in combination with
the fundamental differences with regards to the resources they rely upon, cause
two key primary metrics to become impaired: Total Primary Energy (TPE) and
Electricity Generation Capacity (EGC). Related indicators derived from these
primary metrics, i.e. Energy Efficiency (EE) and Energy Intensity (EI) are also
affected.
The source of these problems lies in the difficulty of finding a representative
quantification of the energy system via an appropriate accounting method while
the system is structurally changing. How do you account for the Joules contained
in a barrel of crude oil and the kWh of electricity from a solar panel in a single
metric?
Although often the explanation of the different possible accounting methods
used for these quantifications are buried away in appendices [213, 216, 217, 218,
219], several researchers have mentioned the associated problems of accounting
of energy metrics. Giampietro and Sorman [220] question the overall usefulness
of energy statistics, and subsequently [221] argue to focus on a broader set
of metrics instead of a “one size fits all” approach. Also Wang et al. [222]
mention the difficulty of accounting for primary energy. Segers [223] advocate
the use of an accounting method that compares renewable energy sources with
typical conventional energy sources using a substitution method. Harmsen et
al. [224] discuss the relationship between two policy targets, Europe’s 2020
renewable energy target and it’s 2020 energy efficiency target, and show that,
depending on the accounting method used, renewable energy contributes very
differently to the energy efficiency targets. Ligtfoot [225] also recognised the
different accounting methods and concluded that primary energy values from
various organisations are not comparable and the IPCC has insufficiently addressed
this issue. In a comprehensive review Macknick [226] analysed discrepancies
between data sources and recognised the differences resulting from different
accounting methods. Also various reports from consultancies [227], governmental
bodies [228] and other independent organisations [229, 230] including the IPCC
[218] highlight the difficulty of comparing data from sources that use different
accounting methods. To overcome these problems the United Nations in 2011
have published the International Recommendations for Energy Statistics [219]
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but universal implementation of these recommendations is far from reality.
Building on these long-recognised concerns of energy accounting, in this article
these problems are put in the context of the fundamental dynamics of the global
energy transition. We highlight statistical artefacts of the various (recommended)
accounting methods that should be of concern to those that work with these
metrics. We show how these developments relate to the architecture of climate
change negations, and show how expected future developments will increase these
problems. We furthermore make the connection between various energy metrics
that are affected and show how set policy targets can interfere with international
agreed goals to limit global warming.
This analysis is relevant as the consequences of these identified problems can
be large. Many international regulations and targets depend on these metrics (e.g.
European Directives [231, 232] and NDCs [208]): Thirty-five countries have set
their NDC targets for climate change mitigation in terms of energy metrics [233].
For example, China, the singles largest emitter in the world [210] has set it’s NDC
in terms of TPE, India, the third largest contributor, has set its target in terms
of EGC. Moreover, 143 of the 162 submitted NDCs mention energy efficiency
[233]. In addition, many NDC targets are set relative to a baseline scenario.
Which bring us to energy scenarios; although comparisons from different sources
gives depth to the discussion on the different assumptions in these scenarios and
to the robustness of results, comparing scenarios has become a near impossible.
Together the in-transparency of documentation and unfamiliarity with this issue
can lead to misinformed arguments and misguided policy choices. An assessment
of an adequate set of metrics therefore becomes increasingly important.
We argue that the complex transition of the energy system, will need a
diverse set of metrics to represent the system and build policy upon. However,
adverse effects of accounting artefacts have to be prevented. Therefore, whereas
previously energy scenarios focused on resource availability and thus on TPE
within such as set, we propose to focus on Total Final Consumption instead as we
will show that this metric gives a better representation of the current and future
system, is more relevant with regards to policy targets and most importantly, thus
not faces the issues of un-representativeness of TPE.
The organisation of this article is as follows, the use of Total Primary Energy
and its related indicators Energy Efficiency and Energy Intensity will be discussed
in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 Electricity Generation Capacity will be discussed.





4.2 The use of Total Primary Energy
To introduce the different ways to represent the energy system let’s look at the
main metrics of energy scenarios. Energy scenarios are composed of three main
metrics:
Energy Services (ES): The demand for a particular energy service such as
passenger kilometres, tonnes of steel etc.,
Total Final Consumption (TFC): The consumption of energy carriers such as
solid, liquid or gaseous fuels and electricity to fulfil this service demand
Total Primary Energy (TPE): the primary energy required to produce these
energy carriers.
These three metrics are connected subsequently by the energy service efficiency
and the production efficiency, see Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 – Primary energy metrics and efficiency indicators. Energy services by sector
need to be supplied by energy carriers which need to be produced from energy sources.
TPE has long been central to energy scenarios as the availability of energy
resources was of main concern to policy makers and business decision makers.
During the last decades in which the energy system was dominated by the use
of combustible resources such as fossil fuels and biomass, its definition was
relatively straightforward: "energy that has not been subjected to any conversion
or transformation process" [234]. This was supported by the fact that the primary
energy content for combustible resources such as fossil fuels and biomass, is easily
measured and commonly tracked.
Calculating the primary energy equivalent for non-combustible resources
such as wind, solar photovoltaic (PV), nuclear, hydro and other marine-based
technologies, is not self-evident because it’s primary energy equivalent is not
consistently defined and not widely measured. Figure 4.2 shows the different
energy sources and how they can be differentiated over renewable versus non-
renewable energy sources, and combustible versus non-combustible sources. The
dark grey area indicates sources that produce electricity; the lighter grey area
indicate sources that produce heat as an intermediate step.
Different organisations use different approaches to calculate the primary
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Figure 4.2 – Primary energy sources. Light grey areas indicates sources with heat as
conversion step. Dark grey indicates sources that directly produce electricity. Marine
includes wave and tidal energy, Wind includes off- and on-shore wind, Solar PV (Solar
Photovoltaic).
energy equivalent of non-combustible energy sources, but in general four
approaches can be distinguished (see Table 4.1).
Partial Substitution Method (PSM); EIA, WEC, IIASA, BP. With this
method the primary energy equivalent for non-combustible energy sources that
produce electricity, is defined by the hypothetical amount of energy it would
require, on average, to produce an equivalent amount of electricity in a thermal
power station using combustible resources. In practice this means that a
representative efficiency of thermal power stations is used to calculate the primary
energy equivalent for non-combustible resources. This method is widely used by
for example BP [106] the World Energy Council [235] and IIASA [213]. The
fundamental difficulty with the partial substitution method is that it does not
have a physical basis, does not represent any real market quantity and assumes a
hypothetical and arbitrary defined conversion loss. This method is even more
problematic when renewables begin to displace other renewables (instead of
fossil fuels). Moreover, in energy system that are dominated by renewables,
(e.g. hydro-electricity dominated countries such as Norway), this method gives
a distorted view on the reality of the system as its representation is based on




system is based on non-combustible sources.
Direct Equivalent Method (DEM); UN, IPCC. With this method the primary
energy for non-combustible energy sources is set equal to the energy contained
in the produced electricity. This approach excludes the production efficiency of
conversion technologies such as solar panels (from solar radiation to electricity)
or wind turbines (from wind to electricity) and implies that the conversion of
non-combustible renewable energy is 100% efficient. This method is also often
used, for example by the United Nations Statistical Bureau [217] and in IPCC
reports [218]. The problem that arises from the use of this method is that a
statistical defined 100% efficient production efficiencies makes primary energy
for these sources a statistical artefact. It does not measure a characteristic of
reality, but gives a statistical representation of reality to be able to add up the
many different sources the energy system relies upon.
Physical Energy Content Method (PECM); IEA, OECD, Eurostat This
method differentiates the non-combustible resources in resources that produce
heat as intermediate step (i.e. nuclear, solar thermal and geothermal energy
sources) and those that do not (wind, photovolataic), see Figure 4.2. For
technologies that produce electricity directly, the method accounts for the
generated electricity while for technologies that produce heat it accounts for
the produced heat. Again, this method is widely used by various organisation,
for example the OECD, IEA [236] and Eurostat [237] and is the basis of the
International Recommendations of Energy Statistics [219]. This method can
be confusing: for some technologies (i.e. solar PV, wind and hydro) the
production efficiency is set to an arbitrary 100%, while for others (i.e. solar
thermal, geothermal and nuclear) much lower efficiencies (as low as 10%) are
used although both are based on renewable resources that produce electricity.
Additionally, for resources with an 100% production efficiency the same difficulties
hold as described in the Direct Equivalent Method. Moreover, in this approach the
share of renewable technologies that produces heat is over-emphasised as their
primary energy equivalent is multiplied by their production efficiency and estimated
at, in the case of solar thermal (i.e. concentrated solar power), ten times its
electricity output. The same problem holds for electricity from nuclear for which
primary energy equivalent is set at three times its electricity output. For some
resources (i.e. wind, solar and hydro) this accounting method downplays their
share in Total Primary Energy and an argument could be made that renewables
may not be mature enough to deploy on larger scale.
Incident energy method (IEM) With this method the primary energy for
non-combustible energy sources is defined as the energy that enters an energy
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conversion device. For solar this would be the energy that enters the surface of
the photovoltaic panel or mirror, for wind the energy that passes the rotor disc, or
in the case of geothermal, the energy contained in the hot fluid at the surface of
the bored well. The difficulty with the incident energy approach is that renewable
energy plants almost exclusively track electricity output and therefore this metric
is not widely reported by organisations that produce energy balances.
Table 4.1 – Production efficiencies of non-combustible energy sources. Data from
[106, 229, 210, 217, 216]
To illustrate the effect of these diverse definitions, Figure 4.3 shows the
development of total primary energy under a single energy transition scenario but
under different accounting methods, PSM, DEM and PECM. It’s base scenario
is Sky, Shell latest energy transition scenario [7] (compatible with the Paris
Agreement). It is based on the World Energy Model [238] which uses IEA
standards of measurement for all energy sources and carriers, and thus follows
the PECM.
The figure shows that, although differences today are relatively modest, these
differences are expected to increase in the future as increasing electrification and
decarbonisation of the energy system make non-combustible zero-emission energy
sources more prominent.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the effect on a country level. The figure shows the TPE
figures for three countries with different energy system structures; France, The
Netherlands and Norway. France in 2015 was dominated by nuclear energy (see
pie charts), while The Netherlands was dominated by fossil fuels and Norway
was dominated by renewables (especially hydro). The Figure shows that there
are large differences between TPE figures, which also effects the relative share




Figure 4.3 – Total primary energy of Shell’s Sky scenario under different accounting
methods. Comparison is made with production efficiencies from Table 4.1. Data from
[7]
and Norway. Of course these differences originate from the different production
efficiencies given in Table 4.1.
Figure 4.4 – Total Primary Energy by selected country by accounting method in 2015.
Data from [31]
4.2.1 Direct effect
From this analysis we conclude that different TPE definitions lead to increasing
ambiguity because of the following six reasons.
1. The use of production efficiencies of 100% for non-combustible energy
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resources by many organisations makes primary energy for these sources a
statistical artefact. It does not measure a characteristic of reality, but gives
a statistical representation of reality to be able to add up the many different
sources the energy system relies upon.
2. Now that abundant renewable resources are replacing finite fossil resources,
the primary energy demand becomes increasingly less relevant.
3. TPE values depend largely on the applied accounting method which all face
difficulties.
4. Within these approaches, organisations use various figures that are likely to
change over time with technology improvement and system integration.
5. These problems are expected to increase over time as decarbonisation
and electrification of the energy system will ensure that non-combustible
resources will increase their share in the energy mix.
6. Climate change mitigation targets expressed as a reduction of TPE can
result in an increase of GHG emissions under certain accounting methods
(PECM) while they don’t incentivise the use of renewable resources in
others (PSM). Under PECM, an TPE reduction target would disincentivise
the replacement of fossil generation by low efficiency, zero-emissions
alternatives (i.e. replacing geothermal, solar thermal or nuclear with fossil
generation).
The difficulty of defining TPE unambiguously makes it a misleading metric
now that the energy transition progresses and stakeholders can choose an
accounting method that is most attractive to them. This has significant adverse
effect on the value of ability to set quantitative targets and the ability to compare
them. Together this makes appreciations of targets, ambitions and progress
defined in TPE difficult. Specifically, difficulty with comparisons arise with respect
to the following:
1. Scenarios become difficult to compare when each scenario uses a different
accounting method. This makes the discussion on underlying assumptions
and narratives near impossible which impairs one of its main purposes;
communication with and between stakeholders.
2. Comparing the efforts and targets of countries and the progress towards
them becomes difficult as countries with a particular dominant energy
source (e.g Norway with hydro) can be very differently represented under
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with other countries depended on the used accounting method. As
comparing countries becomes difficult, comparing policy targets such as
NDCs also becomes difficult when different accounting methods are used.
Ultimately this hinders progress on international climate negotiations.
3. The comparison of different technologies also becomes difficult. Various
production efficiencies across technologies in the different account methods
make the share of these technologies in the energy mix dependent on the
accounting method. For example, TPE figures for concentrated solar power
(solar thermal) using PECM or PSM give these technologies a much larger
share compared to solar PV then if one would use the DEM. This can
have consequences as targets set on TPE can lead to policy incentivising
deployment of technologies based on a superficial representation of reality.
From a climate-based policy target in general it us undesirable that one
zero-emission technology will be promoted over another zero-emission
technology solely based on accounting artefacts.
The number of different approaches combined with the expected increase
of difficulties each approach faces, shows that TPE is at best an irrelevant and
potentially a misleading metric to represent the energy system given the expected
decarbonisation and electrification of the energy system.
4.2.2 Indirect effects on related indicators: Energy Efficiency
& Energy Intensity
The consequence of the inconsistent definition of TPE is that related indicators,
specifically, Energy Efficiency and Energy Intensity are also affected. This has
consequences as EE and EI are both indicators that are widely reported, intensively
studied and subject to various policy targets and business considerations. As
mentioned in Section 4.1, almost 90% of the submitted NDCs mention energy
efficiency [239].
Energy efficiency





Now that TPE becomes ambiguous, the indicator energy efficiency now also
becomes difficult to appreciate. This becomes evident when the energy efficiency
of a normal gasoline car is compared with an electric vehicle driving on electricity
derived from non-combustible energy sources. Changing the supply of the energy
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service (in this case vehicle kilometres driven) from using a thermal power train to
one without heat conversion can make relatively small differences (using a fossil
equivalent efficiency for the production of renewable-based electricity via PSM)
or dramatically increase the efficiency (using a 100% production efficiency of the
renewable-based electricity via PECM & DEM). The same holds for electrifying
heat demand in buildings (e.g through heat pumps); depending on the accounting
method this can dramatically increase (using PECM & DEM) or barely change
(PSM) energy efficiency of the building. In a general context this is relevant as
efficiency targets are more or less easy to reach depending on the used accounting
method.
Energy Intensity
The same argument holds for the indicator Energy Intensity. It measures the





The energy intensity of a country can differ substantially depending on what
accounting method is used. Iceland for example, is a leader in several energy
savings programs but its energy intensity remains high in energy balances that
use the PECM [240]. This can be explained by understanding that in PECM
the production efficiency of electricity generation from geothermal sources which
are increasingly deployed in Iceland, is relatively low (10%). Using a different,
much higher production efficiency of up to 100% in DEM would lower its energy
intensity dramatically.
Let’s us consider again the three cases discussed in Section 4.2, France, The
Netherlands and Norway. Figure 4.5 shows the energy intensity figures for these
three countries in 2015. It shows that comparing these three countries, three
different conclusions could be possible, dependent on the accounting method
used. Either France, or The Netherlands or Norway has the worst energy intensity.
In the next section we will argue that EI based on Total Final Consumption instead
of Total Primary Energy is a better expression of energy intensity which is shown
on the right-hand three columns in Figure 4.5.
4.2.3 Recommendations on the use of TPE, EE and EI
Given the shift of focus from resource use to climate change impact, policy targets
have changed. To address climate change impact, a complex and comprehensive
system transformation that covers many sectors and locations will be required.




Figure 4.5 – Energy Intensity by selected country by accounting method in 2015. Data
from [31, 241]
will require a diverse set of metrics. Based on the above considerations the
following set of recommendations for the use of TPE, EE and EI can be made:
1. As a minimum, when TPE targets are set, data are supplied or scenarios
are displayed, the energy accounting method should be explicitly given.
Preferably, it should also highlight possible consequences of the used
approach on the interpretation of the reader such that conclusions based
on statistical artefacts are prevented.
2. Although climate related policy targets set with regards to energy metrics
can make these policy targets more concrete, they should be subsidiary and
serviceable to the target of lowering GHG emissions. Therefore, targets set
relative to TPE, EE and EI should include an additional premise to prevent
interference with GHG reduction.
3. Given the difficulties surrounding TPE, together with ongoing developments
that decreases it significance and the shift of focus from resource availability
to the impact of consumption, we would recommend, to focus on Total
Final Consumption. TFC, being the energy as used (consumed) is free of
definitional ambiguity: it is the sum of the Joules as consumed. Shifting
from TPE to TFC would mean that the indicators energy efficiency and
energy intensity would also be better expressed in terms of consumption.
This would mean that energy efficiency would in practice be equal to energy
service efficiency, i.e. the energy consumption needed to deliver a certain
kind of service, see Equation 4.3. This can be expressed as passenger km /
GJ for personal transport, tonne km / GJ for freight transport, heating and
lighting requirement per GJ for the building sector etc. The same holds
for Energy Intensity, which would be better expressed in TFC to prevent
the mentioned problems with TPE, see Equation 4.4. Figure 4.5 shows the
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The disadvantage of the use of TFC is of course that some information
is lost as the efficiency of production of non-renewable energy carriers is
neglected in this metric. However, now that the energy transition unfolds,
focus has shifted from the availability of primary energy resources to the
effect of consumption of these resources. Moreover, since the renewable-
share of the energy mix is expected to increase as the energy transition
unfolds, this problem, in comparison to the ambiguities surrounding TPE is
expected to decrease.
4.3 The use of Electricity Generation Capacity
Next to primary energy and its related indicators, another important metric of
which the meaning changes and becomes increasingly ambiguous with increasing
shares of renewable resources, is electricity generation capacity (EGC). EGC
figures are widely reported to show e.g. how much generation capacity a
specific country has added or will be adding from a specific technology. In
general, organisations report this metric to show the development of the electricity
generation capacity mix, accompanied by headlines such as renewables accounted
for almost two-thirds of net new power capacity around the world in 2016
[242, 243] Moreover, India has framed one of its targets in these terms: “To
achieve about 40 percent cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-
fossil fuel based energy resources by 2030” [208].
Whereas TPE has become difficult to appreciate because the focus of
stakeholders has changed from total resource availability to the impact of energy
consumption, the interpretation of EGC has become difficult for a different
reason. Whereas previously the total resource availability was of concern (i.e.
oil, gas or coal reserves), now the momentary resource availability is of concern,
i.e. solar radiation and wind. The intermittent character of these renewable
resources make the availability of these resources on a second to second scale
relevant. Capacity factors, the ratio of the average actually power production
over the maximum power production, expresses this intermittent character of
technologies (see Figure 4.6).
Previously the actual production of dispatchable thermal generation depended




Figure 4.6 – Relationship between investments, capacity factors and actual production.
referred to their actual achievable maximum capacity. The production of
renewable power generation however is predominantly depended on the availability
of resources. This is illustrated with Table 4.2. It gives an overview of capacity
factors reported by the IRENA [244] and EIA [245]. It shows that a similar
sized electricity generator that is used for base-load electricity can have capacity
factors of ca 90%, while solar PV panels have an average capacity factor of ca
20% (although very dependable on geographical location of the plant). Table
4.2 also shows how much capacity would need to be added to produce a similar
amount of electricity around the year.
Since these capacity factor differ across (renewable) technologies, the
metric EGC becomes technology dependent and its aggregate value becomes
meaningless, as does comparison between technologies. Appreciation of progress
on climate related policy targets is impossible from the reporting of bare EGC
numbers. Moreover, targets set on (renewable) EGC, by all means do not
guarantee to decrease the impact of the energy system on climate change; if
electricity demand increases faster than the expected production from renewable
EGC (multiplying EGC with the associated capacity factors per technology),
emissions can de facto increase.
Table 4.2 – Average capacity factors of renewable generators in 2017, rounded to one
decimal. Data from IRENA [244] and EIA [245]
4.3.1 Recommendations on the use of EGC
If one wants to establish an appreciation of the renewable power industry or define
targets in NDCs, newly added EGC does not give an un-ambiguous representation
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4.3.1 Recommendations on the use of EGC
If one wants to establish an appreciation of the renewable power industry or define
targets in NDCs, newly added EGC does not give an un-ambiguous representation
of the target or industry. Therefore, we would give the users of this metrics the
following three recommendations:
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1. Reporting EGC accompanied by the expected capacity factor would
improvement the appreciation of the reported development as it would show
how much product (electricity) actually would be expected to be produced.
2. Next to EGC the size of the involved investment would provide relevant
information to assess the development of the industry (see Figure 4.6).
As the world is moving from a world where the value of energy is
embedded in the resource to a world where the technology is essentially
the resource, additionally reporting on the associated investment gives a
better representation of the system.
3. Targets set on (renewable) EGC should be avoided as policy interference is
difficult to prevent. Targets set on the share of actual electricity production
from renewable, zero-carbon resources using a similar production efficiency
across these resources would already be an improvement.
In conclusion, appreciating EGC gives severe difficulties as referring to EGC
in solitude gives a distorted view on the reality of the energy system. These
difficulties can be overcome by simultaneously reporting other relevant and related
metrics e.g. capacity factor, investment size.
4.4 Reflection on findings and consequences for
policy design
It has been shown that appreciation of TPE and its related indicators EE and EI
as well as the metric EGC becomes increasingly difficult now that the energy
transition progresses. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that various policy targets,
generally used in NDCs, can potentially steer investments based on statistical
artefacts.
Table 4.3 shows a qualitative assessment of the effect of policy targets set
in terms of TPE (in the different accounting methods) on the attractiveness of
a specific energy resources. The table indicates that although replacement of a
fossil resource with one of the listed sources in reality reduces CO2, in various
superficial accounting realities they do not. Minuses indicate that a specific
resource is less attractive than a fossil alternative when policy is steered on the
mentioned targets.
Policy targets set in EGC give similar difficulties. Policy design aimed at
increasing the share of renewable power capacity in reality is an in-effective policy
tool to steer investment. Table 4.4 gives a qualitative assessment of the effect
of a policy target combined with the deployment of a specific technology on the




Table 4.3 – Qualitative assessment of the effect of policy targets set in TPE or related
indicators (in the different accounting methods) on the attractiveness of a specific energy
resource relative to the use of a fossil equivalent.
EGC with a specific resource is lower than that of a fossil, thermal power station
and plus signs vice versa. Table shows that with a given electricity demand,
increasing the share of renewable capacity with, relative to fossil resources [246],
low capacity factors, actually leads to an increased use of fossil resources.
Table 4.4 – Qualitative assessment of the effect of policy targets set in EGC on the
reduction of climate change impact relative to the use of an fossil equivalent.
In general it undesirable that energy related policy targets interfere with the
overarching climate related policy targets. Moreover, it is undesirable that one
zero-emission technology will be promoted over another zero-emission technology
solely based on accounting artefacts.
Based on these considerations, and the recommendations stated in Section
4.2.3 and 4.3.1 we would argue that climate policy targets such as the National
Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted as part of the process initiated
by the Conference of Parties in Paris 2016, should be set in terms of CO2 to
prevent policy interference. These targets could subsequently be supported by
energy-related measures, which as we have argued are best expressed in terms of
consumption (Total Final Consumption).
4.5 Conclusion
Now that climate policies focus more and more on the deployment of renewable,
non-combustible energy sources (e.g. wind and solar radiation) the way these non-
combustible energy sources are represented in energy data becomes increasingly
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important. Especially now that international climate negotiations are based on
National Determined Contributions (NDCs), the appreciation and monitoring of
progress on these targets needs transparent and consistently defined metrics.
However, as has been shown, key metrics often used in these NDCs, (Total
Primary Energy and its related indicator Energy Efficiency and Energy Intensity
as well as Electricity Generation Capacity) are becoming unrepresentative with
large scale electrification and decarbonisation of the electricity system. Given
the inconsistencies of the various accounting rules these metrics at best become
confusing and at worst are derailing climate mitigation efforts.
In this paper it has been shown that these inconsistencies matter. Metrics
influence outcomes of scientific research, political decisions and investment by
private parties. Unfamiliarity of these inconsistencies on the part of policy makers
or the general public can lead to adverse effects. It can potentially steer climate
policy and investment decisions based on statistical artefacts, rather than a valid
representation of the energy system.
Therefore, we argued, that both for policy development as well as for
monitoring, a different set of energy metric is needed. As the overall objective of
climate policy is to decrease greenhouse gas emissions, policy targets should be
expressed in metrics that support this target.
Therefore, we recommend to have a clear overall target set in terms of
emissions. For energy policy targets in support of these, we recommend to
shift from Total Primary Energy to Total Final Consumption. Although not a
panacea, we have argued that, as policy concern has shifted from total resource
availability to the impact of resources, Total Final Consumption is a more relevant
energy metric to track the development of the energy transition. With regards
to renewable electricity we recommend focus on a broader set of metrics and not
on EGC in solitude.
Our advice for energy modellers would be to be explicit about assumptions
going into the energy scenarios. This holds especially on the definition of TPE
as we have argued that a clear mentioning of this accounting issue, and its
potential effect on the interpretation of these scenarios, would greatly improve
understanding.
Building effective policy, making investment decisions and studying the energy
transition, requires clear understanding of the building blocks of such analyses.
This paper has given business decision makers, scientific researchers and policy
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Understanding the possible transition pathways of the energy system requires
the integration of human behaviour in energy system models. In order to
model the influence of actor behaviour we have developed ACT (Agent-Based
Model of Critical Transitions), an agent-based model inspired by an existing
conceptualisation of critical transitions. ACT allows us to depart from the
current mean-field approach and explicitly explore the effects of heterogeneity,
leaders, and networks on the transition. Two key finding are (1) the importance
of local communities and (2) leaders can both encourage and discourage the
energy transition; a finding that nuances existing literature on critical transitions.
We conclude with a reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of our modelling
approach.
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5.1 Introduction
Energy system models and their resulting scenarios are used to understand the
transformation of the energy system. They offer us a possibility to meaningful
assess future developments, facilitate experimentation, promote rigorous analyses
and provide a tool to communication about findings [247, 248, 46, 249]. We
observe that most energy models designed to analyse the energy system are
techno-economic in their nature [56] and that conceptual models that focus on
societal elements [250] are heavily criticised [251].
5.1.1 Modelling the role of human behaviour in the energy
transition
Internationally agreed goals to limit climate change by decarbonisation of the
energy system require that the world will have to engage in transformative
change of the system; an energy transition [252]. Although there is scientific
consensus on the severity of climate change, it is uncertain whether society will
act accordingly. A better understanding of the role of human behaviour in the
transition of the energy system is therefore of vital importance to improve our
understanding of this transition. [253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258]
Traditionally, energy system models are dominated by techno-economic
considerations and are generally based on neo-classical economics, equilibria,
and the assumption of rationality of decision making agents (which are not
explicitly modelled). These models are not able to capture the change in energy
system structure and dynamics of disruption, innovation and non-linear change
in human behaviour [79]. This has led to the recognition of the importance
of simulating the more realistic behaviour and interaction of different actors
(companies, governments, consumers) [56, 252, 259].
At the same time, the field of sociology and psychology has produced a wealth
of knowledge about the decision-making process of groups and individuals which
led economists already in the 1950’s to conclude that the core assumptions of
neo-classical economics (perfectly informed and perfectly rational agents) has
its limitations as basis of systems modelling and analysis. This resulted in
efforts to increase the realism of economic theory by incorporating findings from
psychology in what we now know as behaviour economics [61]. In sociology,
the increase in computer power and tools to encompass social behaviour led to
the development of social simulation with agent-based models (ABMs). The
development of the complex adaptive system perspective has bundled these
findings in a general system perspective that focuses on actor behaviour which




5.1.2 The role of simulation models
In the broad spectrum of modelling approaches for the simulation of energy
transitions, we can distinguish two types of simulation models, empirical models
and conceptual models. Empirical models of the energy transition often focus
on a specific case, e.g. a relatively small-scale transition in specific industries
(e.g. [260, 261, 262, 263, 264]). These empirical models have shown important
insights and have highlighted the importance of simulation of realistic actor
behaviour to explain historical transitions and future concerns [41, 265].
Although global energy transitions have occurred in the past [266], the scale
of dealing with global warming makes the world move into uncharted territory.
The global energy transition under the influence of global warming therefore
has little empirical evidence to relate to. Conceptual models, i.e. those not
necessarily fitted to empirical data but based on general concepts and theories and
frameworks [267] that capture relevant parts of the energy transition dynamics
can help to give insight. These conceptual models are based on metaphors,
narratives and images that provide insight and are important instruments that
engage public and politicians and bridge different disciplines.
The combination of these qualitative story-lines (narratives) and quantified
models is a way to come to grips with a understanding of how this energy
transition will unfold [268]. This process is known as scenario development [269].
The scenarios developed by Royal Dutch Shell are a well-known example of this
scenario practice [95, 32]. In these studies, scenarios (combinations of narratives
and quantification of these narratives) are used to communicate results of energy
models. The combination of qualitative narratives and quantifications of these
narratives strengthens the communication about the transitions. The continuous
interaction between the quantitative model and the qualitative narrative increases
the fundamental understanding of the system at hand.
We recognise the tension between conceptual models that can be character-
ised as following a KISS (Keep It Simple) approach [42] versus more complicated
models following a KIDS approach (Keep It Descriptive) [70, 42]. However,
large-scale complex simulation models, following a KIDS approach, that describe
the system in more detail, suffer from the subsequent large parameter space
for which values cannot be determined within a reasonable amount of time,
if measurable at all. A common solution is to fit the model predictions to
empirical data which often lead to impressively good results [62]. However, a
good fit does not guarantee any realism of parameter values or model structure.
True validation of these large simulation models, some argue, is therefore simply
impossible [62, 63, 64]. Based on this argumentation, this paper will take a KISS
approach but deliberately includes descriptive relevant actor behaviour.
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5.1.3 Research objective and structure of the paper
The importance of the integration of human behaviour in simulation models
(as discussed in Section 5.1.1), combined with the drive for conceptual models
with a quantitative basis (as discussed in Section 5.1.2), brings the concept of
critical transitions [250] into focus. This concept, which we will explore in more
detail in Section 5.2, gives us the possibility to integrate relevant aspects of
human behaviour in a conceptual model with quantitative basis. With an agent-
based modelling approach we studied the question what the concept of critical
transitions can tell us about the influence of relevant behavioural dynamics of
actors in the energy transition.
Before we develop such a agent-based model, we must explore the key
dynamics of the energy transition in the light of the concept of critical transitions
focusing on the role of human behaviour. This we will do in the next section,
Section 5.2. In the subsequent section, Section 5.3, we present the model design
followed by a presentation of the model results in Section 5.4. We then discuss
the model results in Section 5.5. To put our modelling approach and results in
context, we reflected on our modelling approach in Section 5.6. Specifically, we
discuss whether this approach is suited not just to gain understanding, but also
to communicate about the challenges of the energy transition. In Section 5.7 we
lay out our main conclusions.
5.2 Critical transitions
5.2.1 The energy transition and critical transitions
Historically, the energy system has undergone several shifts of dominant energy
sources (e.g. from wood to coal and from coal to oil) [266]. Understanding
the timescales of these historical transition [270, 271] as well as possible
future transitions pathways have resulted in the study of regime shifts [163],
critical transitions [250] and several other closely-related fields of research (e.g.
[35, 36, 272, 273]). Currently, the most pressing question is the pace of the
transition from non-renewable CO2 energy sources to renewable, decarbonised
energy sources in the coming decades [270]. Why is society slow in its response to
climate change, and will the required energy transition consist of a fast structural
change or will it follow a more gradual and smooth trajectory? These questions
on system transition types can be related to the concept of critical transitions
and more general to bifurcation theory [274, 250].
The concept of critical transitions [250] explores which system characteristics




catastrophe fold; when external condition change, a bifurcation point can be
passed that makes a previously stable system show a critical transition to another
system state (see Figure 5.1.
Scheffer et al. [250] show several aspects of actor behaviour that are relevant
to the analysis of critical transitions. Social aspects such as peer pressure,
the absence of leaders, the complexity of the problem and homogeneity of the
population can decrease the pace in which society acts to a certain problem (see
Section 5.1). Because of its focus on actor behaviour in transitions this concept
is relevant to address the point we made in Section 5.1.1: the importance of
including actor behaviour in models of the energy transition.
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behaviour by using a mean-field approach. Throughout this paper we will refer
to this mean-field approach by Scheffer et al. as existing or original model.
The acronym for mean-field-approach, MFA, has been added to these references
to increase transparency on what model has been meant. A complementation
of this conceptualisation that focuses on relevant actor behaviour would give a
richer understanding on the role of human behaviour in the energy transition. But
what is the relevant actor behaviour from which the different types of the energy
transition emerges? This we will explore in the next section, Section 5.2.2.
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5.2.2 Relevant actor behaviour in the energy transition
The relevant actor behaviour to be captured by a model is determined by the
context in which we want to study this actor behaviour. In this case we are
interested in what actor behaviour can lead to different types of transitions in the
context of the energy transition.
The ability of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases can be understood
as a common pool resource dilemma [112, 272]. Common pool resources (CPRs)
are defined as open resources for which the physical exclusion of potential users
of the resource is difficult (low excludability), while the increased consumption
of a user implies that less resource is available for others (high substractability /
rivalry).
The relevant actor behaviour is thus decision-making process in CPR-
dilemmas. Work of Elinor Ostrom [275] has highlighted conditions under which
a Tragedy of the Commons [108] can be overcome without requiring top-down
regulation. Two key aspects that can be distinguished from these conditions and
which we will use as model requirements are the following:
1. Actor interaction. Reciprocal cooperation can be used to overcome social
dilemmas. Because groups of people who can identify one another are more
likely than groups of strangers to overcome CPR dilemmas, the existence
and type of social or physical networks via which actor interaction can take
place is of importance. The same holds for the influence of actors being
thought of as being trustworthy.
2. Heterogeneity. The ability of a society to overcome the CPR dilemma
is closely related to the heterogeneity between actors managing a CPR.
Heterogeneity is related to their willingness to act and to the perceived
severity of the problem, especially in cases where the common pool is a
global common such as the problem of climate change. The latter has
mainly to do with the fact that actors have incomplete information about
the state of the resource.
Closely related to the analysis of CPR dilemmas is the analysis of regime shifts
and (critical) transitions, our system behaviour of interest. Often the successful
management of CPRs requires a transition to sustainable manage the CPR. It
is therefore not surprising that climate change and the related necessary energy
transition are framed as both a CPR dilemma and (critical) transition.
5.2.3 Modelling critical transitions
Phase transitions in physics, critical transitions in ecology, non-marginal change




change, often with a perceived sense of abruptness [276]. Although these
concepts are discussed in different contexts with different vocabulary, the models
that study these dynamics are closely related to each other.
While researchers are usually aware of the limitations, there is a long tradition
in applying insights from these different fields of research to structural change
in response to societal problems. As a first approximation, Ball [277] showed
with examples ranging from ecology, social choice, to (business) economics and
political science, that modelling these systems from the viewpoint of statistical
physics does seem capable of capturing some of the important features of these
social systems.
Several ecologists have applied concepts from ecology to study structural
change in socio-ecological systems [278, 250, 279, 280]. One of these, Scheffer
and his colleagues, presented the concept of critical transitions and devised a
mathematically simple but conceptual rich model of the dynamics of opinion in a
society. This concept has been the subject of several influential studies [250, 281,
282, 62, 283, 284] and has been applied in various other fields such as finance
and medicine [285, 286]. Although the model is based on ecological dynamics
and there is recognition of the difference between societal systems and ecological
systems, Scheffer et al. argue that fundamentally these dynamics are similar to
processes that determine the character of societal transitions.
Scheffer et al. characterise three types of transitions in the relationship
between public attitude about the need to take action against a problem and
the perceived severity of the problem: i) an almost linearly responding system,
ii) a non-linear but continuous response of public attitude and iii) an abruptly,
discontinuous shift to a predominantly active attitude when the perceived severity
of the problem has grown sufficiently to reach a critical point and engages in
a critical transition. Scheffer et al. distinguish four properties of society that
determine what kind of transition takes place: peer pressure, absence of leaders,
complexity of the problem and homogeneity of the population.
All these models are based on an application of bifurcation theory, [274] which
has its foundation in mathematics. They also share the same sort of conclusion;
the reaction of system to its changing external conditions can be slow, resulting
in hysteresis, a discontinuous shift from one regime to another [277, 250].
These conceptual models have been criticised in various reviews stating that
these kinds of models “impose over-simple behaviour ... and don’t validate
strongly against unseen data. Thus, whilst such models may have interesting
behaviour there is little reason to suppose that they do in fact represent observed
social behaviour.” [287] and that “the problem is that they treat social influence
in a trivial way” [288].
Although we recognise that conceptual models simplify the complex reality
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of human behaviour, in standard (techno-economic) energy models they are not
treated at all. In Section 5.6 we will come back to this discussion, discuss critiques
in more detail and reflect whether these models can be possibly valued differently.
For now we will show in the next section how an existing conceptualisation (MFA)
of the concept of critical transitions that focuses on overall system dynamics can
be extended and enhanced by incorporating relevant actor behaviour.
5.3 Methods
Inspired by the existing conceptualisation (MFA) of the concept of critical
transitions by Scheffer et al. [250] and the requirements identified in Section
5.2 we developed ACT: Agent-based model of Critical Transitions. With ACT,
we altered, extended and implemented, the existing conceptualisation (MFA) to
develop an actor approach of the concept of critical transitions. It is conceptual
in nature; it is not focused on a specific location, situation or isolated case but is
centererd around a conceptual framework (the concept of critical transitions) to
reason about the role of human behaviour in the energy transition.
To include this actor behaviour, we designed ACT as an agent-based
model. Agent-based modelling (ABM) is a modelling method with which actors,
agents in a particular system, can be modelled. In these systems the overall
system behaviour emerges from the behaviour and interaction of constituent
heterogeneous agents. By applying ABM we could include the relevant actor
behaviour and study its influence on the overall system dynamics. [96] With ACT
we could depart from the mean-field approach (the assumption that the average
attitude of all individual agents influences the action-level of the individual) by
simulating more realistic and relevant actor behaviour.
The model is written in the software environment of Netlogo and is accessible
online1 together with a more detailed model description following the ODD
protocol [71, 72].
5.3.1 Model conceptualisation
In ACT agents represent actors in the energy system that face the problem of
climate change. The relevant actor behaviour with which we extended the existing
model conceptualisation (MFA) is based on the described actor behaviour which
we deduced from actor behaviour in global CPR dilemmas as described in Section
5.2. This relevant actor behaviour was conceptualised as follows:
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Table 5.1 – The relationship between the energy transition and elements with which
ACT was extended in comparison with the model developed by Scheffer et al.
on aspects that differentiates ACT from the original model (MFA) and apply it
to the problem of climate change. Details on the original model design (MFA)
can be found in [62], how we applied this original model (MFA) to the problem
of climate change is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 – Application of mean-field model to the energy transition in ACT.
ACT consists of individuals (agents) that can have two action levels (a) with
regards to climate change; an agent i , can either be active and engage in the
energy transition (a = +1) or passive (a = −1) and do nothing. (In the non-
binary action level experiment a neutral action level as been introduced (a = 0))
Whether an agent becomes active of passive, depends on its preference Vi of
being either active or passive. We assume that this preference of an individual
agent depends on three factors; their current concern about climate change Ui(t),
the average concern of its peers (Ai(t)), and the cost c that scales the costs of
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agents and their interaction via social and physical networks. In this way we could
model actors in the energy system which are not (only) influenced by the average
public action-level, but (also) by their individual peers; be it via social or physical
networks.
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity in ACT consists of two elements:
1. Perceived severity. Actors in the energy system have a heterogeneous view
of the severity of the problem climate change and the corresponding need
to transition the energy system. In ACT the heterogeneity of agents is
modelled explicitly by giving agents a uniform distribution of the perceived
severity of the problem.
2. Influence. In the energy system we can see the effect of different types
of leaders in the world. Political leaders, business leaders, and influencers
all have their effect on the energy transition. Although Scheffer et al.
predict the effects of heterogeneity of individuals to influence the transition
trajectory, it is not explicitly modelled in their model. Therefore, in ACT
leaders are explicitly modelled as agents with more influence over their peers.
These leaders are randomly distributed in the system and have a larger
influence on the mean field interaction of the agents. They act in the
public arena and in this way, influence all agents evenly, but with a larger
weight factor than normal agents do. Leaders themselves are influenced
by their constituency and thus change over time. By explicitly modelling
leaders, the effect of leaders can be analysed and checked for consistency
between model results. This gives the opportunity to translate these results
into an analysis of the effects of leaders.
Non-binary action-level The original model (MFA) assumes that individuals
have a binary action level regarding a problem; they are either active or passive.
Arguably real individuals have a more continuous distribution of action-level.
Therefore, ACT does also have the option of a neutral attitude. Although
we don’t claim to represent all complexities of human behaviour, it is a closer
representation of reality.
These model elements are well suited to represent relevant elements in the
energy system. Table 5.1 shows how the mentioned elements subsequently are
related to the energy transition, the mean-field approach and ACT.
5.3.2 Model design
The conceptualisation translated in the following model design. Discussing this
model design we stay close to the original model (MFA) description, and focus
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of climate change is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 – Application of mean-field model to the energy transition in ACT.
ACT consists of individuals (agents) that can have two action levels (a) with
regards to climate change; an agent i , can either be active and engage in the
energy transition (a = +1) or passive (a = −1) and do nothing. (In the non-
binary action level experiment a neutral action level as been introduced (a = 0))
Whether an agent becomes active of passive, depends on its preference Vi of
being either active or passive. We assume that this preference of an individual
agent depends on three factors; their current concern about climate change Ui(t),
the average concern of its peers (Ai(t)), and the cost c that scales the costs of
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agents and their interaction via social and physical networks. In this way we could
model actors in the energy system which are not (only) influenced by the average
public action-level, but (also) by their individual peers; be it via social or physical
networks.
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity in ACT consists of two elements:
1. Perceived severity. Actors in the energy system have a heterogeneous view
of the severity of the problem climate change and the corresponding need
to transition the energy system. In ACT the heterogeneity of agents is
modelled explicitly by giving agents a uniform distribution of the perceived
severity of the problem.
2. Influence. In the energy system we can see the effect of different types
of leaders in the world. Political leaders, business leaders, and influencers
all have their effect on the energy transition. Although Scheffer et al.
predict the effects of heterogeneity of individuals to influence the transition
trajectory, it is not explicitly modelled in their model. Therefore, in ACT
leaders are explicitly modelled as agents with more influence over their peers.
These leaders are randomly distributed in the system and have a larger
influence on the mean field interaction of the agents. They act in the
public arena and in this way, influence all agents evenly, but with a larger
weight factor than normal agents do. Leaders themselves are influenced
by their constituency and thus change over time. By explicitly modelling
leaders, the effect of leaders can be analysed and checked for consistency
between model results. This gives the opportunity to translate these results
into an analysis of the effects of leaders.
Non-binary action-level The original model (MFA) assumes that individuals
have a binary action level regarding a problem; they are either active or passive.
Arguably real individuals have a more continuous distribution of action-level.
Therefore, ACT does also have the option of a neutral attitude. Although
we don’t claim to represent all complexities of human behaviour, it is a closer
representation of reality.
These model elements are well suited to represent relevant elements in the
energy system. Table 5.1 shows how the mentioned elements subsequently are
related to the energy transition, the mean-field approach and ACT.
5.3.2 odel design
The conceptualisation translated in the following model design. Discussing this
model design we stay close to the original model (MFA) description, and focus
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deviating from this average concern following Equation 5.1.
V (ai) = U(ai(t))− c(ai(t)− Ai(t))2 (5.1)
In the mean-field approach, agents are influenced by the average public
opinion, A(t); the overall tendency for action. When we introduce interaction via
networks, A(t) becomes an individual attribute Ai(t) and agents are influenced by
the average opinion of their connections. The network that has been implemented
and has been experimented with is the nearest neighbour network with different
radii r , simulating energy communities as physical neighbourhoods.
To explore the effect of leaders, we introduced leaders which action level is
determined by its constituency; the agents in its area of influence determined
by radius r . Subsequently these leaders have a larger influence li then normal
individuals on the overall system expressed in the weight factor wi . Their own
action level thus depends on their connected agents while they influence other
agents by influencing the overall action level of the system A(t).
When networks or leaders are introduced, the overall influence of agents is
normalised following Equation 5.2 in which n is the number of agents within an
exogenous determined radius r of the agent (i.e. r = ∞ for mean-field) and the




aj ∗ wi j (5.2)
Following Scheffer et al. [250] the probability P of an agent becoming either











The perceived severity of climate change ht defines the action level of an agent
when it is either active or passive; U(+1) and U(−1). This parameter follows an
exogenously set scenario (linear increase or decrease), reflecting the concern by





In the original model (MFA) a parameter s was defined to incorporate hetero-
geneity on the perceived severity of the problem. In ACT heterogeneity has been
modelled directly via a uniform distribution on h with bandwidth bh to explore
the effect of heterogeneity in the perceptions on the severity of climate change
(in Equation 5.3, s = 1). By substituting the current action level of an agent
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(U(a)) with its individual preference of being either active or passive (which is
partly based on its peers (V (ai)) in Equation 5.3, the average tendency for action






Then solving Equation 5.5 for Asystem,t = Asystem,t−1; giving all the agents
the possibility to balance their own concerns with that of their peers, gives the
equilibrium overall tendency for action as a function of the severity of climate
change h(t). Figure 5.2 shows a graphical representation of the model structure.
Figure 5.2 – Model structure. The chance (P (a)) of an agent becoming active or passive
depends on their current concern about the climate (Ui(t)), the perceived severity of
climate change (h), the average tendency of its peers (Ai(t)) and c, an factor that
scales social aspects. Each agent makes a choice to be become active or passive which
results in a new equilibrium Asystem(t)
5.4 Experiments & results
With ACT several experiments have been conducted with regards to the described
relevant actor behaviour. Experiments were conducted with the parameter setting
given by Table 5.3.
Results from these experiments are depicted in Figure 5.3. In the three rows
of figures, the peer pressure c between agents has been increased. Figures show
the results of 30 model runs. The experimentation of a selection of experiments
with 100 runs showed that the experimentation with 30 runs was sufficiently
representative with regards to the median and standard deviation of the model
outcomes. Depicted are the first and second quartile on both sides of the median
(shaded) while the thick lines show the median. Figures were obtained with
two scenarios to show the hysteresis of the system behaviour; the perceived




Table 5.3 – Experimental design
0.05, from -1 to 1 and subsequently decreased back to -1, waiting for 20 ticks to
reach equilibrium.
Figure 5.3 – Results of the ACT model. The most left column shows the replication
of the mean-field experiment. Subsequently the results for network interaction,
heterogeneity, leaders and non-binary action level experiment are depicted.
Table 5.4 gives a quantification of the difference between the original mean-
field approach and the experimental results. In this table we compared the
experimental results (for all h) with the mean-field approach, and show the value
of c (in steps of 0.05) at which σe is minimal following Equation 5.6 in which





(Asystem,mf − Asystem,e)2 (5.6)
Mean-field Our first results showed that with ACT, in which we paramet-
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Table 5.4 – Comparison between mean-field experiment and subsequent experimental
results
erised the actor interaction as a mean-field, we could replicate the results from the
original conceptualisation (MFA) as described by Scheffer’s [250]. With ACT we
could explore the effect of additional elements that will be subsequently discussed.
Network interaction A key element we distinguished in Section 5.2.2 is
actor interaction. Departing from mean-field interaction, we experimented with
nearest neighbour interaction (n = 4) as this network is the largest deviation
from the MFA with regards to the number of connected agents. The weight-
factor wi normalised the influence, simulating energy communities as physical
neighbourhoods. Results show the system reacts faster and that a critical
transition is less likely but is still possible. Similar results were obtained when
experimenting with interaction within the small-world network.
Heterogeneity Experiments have been carried out with regards to heterogen-
eity in the perceived severity of the problem. Agents were given an individual
perceived severity of the problem h, based on a uniform distribution with
bandwidth bh. Results from these experiments show that heterogeneity of agent
opinions has an influence on model outcomes if we compare those results with
the mean-field experiment. Heterogeneity makes the system react faster to a
worsening problem and a critical transition is less likely but still possible. This
reflect the fact that allowing for a larger heterogeneity, actors are included that
change relatively early from inactive to active (or vice versa).
Influence of leaders The second aspect of heterogeneity we explored is the
influence of leaders. We experimented with the heterogeneous influence li of
agents in the system which were normalised with the weight factor wi (see Table
5.3). Results show the experiment where 10% of agents are leaders with 5 times
(li = 5) as much influence as normal agents. These results show that leaders
cause inertia; a critical transition is then more likely. This result contradicts
existing literature on the effect of leaders with regards to critical transitions
concept. This is due to a difference in conceptualisation of leaders. We will
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Non-binary action level To explore the effect of the restriction to a binary
action level, we experimented with the possibility for a non-binary action level by
allowing for a third option a = 0. Results show that if we allow for a neutral
action-level the critical transition disappears completely.
5.5 Reflection on model results
The concept of critical transitions highlights several aspects of the energy
transition. It argues why society so far has been slow to respond to the dangers
of climate change and highlights aspects we should keep an eye on as they can
trigger a future critical transition. The model results as they have been presented
in Section 5.4 give rise for the following observations:
Complexity of the problem Scheffer et al. argue that the increased complexity
of a problem decreases the pace in which society will take action. When a problem
is very complex, the perception of individuals of that problem is diffuse and the
perceived effectiveness of action is low. This makes that individual’s opinion
will depend more on the opinion of its peers and authorities [250]. Modelling
the increase of complexity thus boils down to modelling an increase in peer
pressure. Increasing peer pressure in ACT confirms this view; a slow response
to an increasing worsening of the problem and a higher change for a critical
transition.
Influence of leaders Scheffer et al. [250] argue that in highly centralised
/ more authoritarian decision-making structures, leaders are a positive driving
force for the prevention of a critical transition. Our research however nuances
this view. With the use of a richer model, results show that the “real world”
emergence of champions of change will naturally bring forth champions of status
quo representing vested interests. Either leaders can be understood as actors
that initiate action (as Scheffer et al. argue, “once the central authority is
convinced of the need for change”), or as simply more influential actors that
can possibly represent vested interests and can obstruct action. We therefore
conclude that when the role of leaders in the energy transition is discussed, an
clearer understanding of the role of leaders is necessary.
Collective action problem and the importance of energy communities
Model results from our network experiments confirm insights from economists
[275] and game theoretic modellers (e.g. [42]) that address the collective action
problem. They distinguish noticeability as important aspects to promote action
in groups. This also relates to observability of innovations, as Rogers [289]
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suggests that “the observability of an innovation as perceived by members of a
social system, is positively related to its rate of adoption”. Our model results are in
line with this thinking; decreasing the radius of peer-influence increases the ability
of the whole system to take early action. In societies where decision making power
is decentralised the existence and action readiness of local communities therefore
become a critical element [290]. Relating this to an observed practise in the
energy transition we have seen that in Germany local communities triggered the
German Energiewende [291, 163, 292, 293, 294]. Copying this success has shown
to be difficult [295] but has highlighted the importance of specific aimed policies
[296] and the need for time to build up momentum [291]. This is recognised in the
concept of critical transitions; it highlights the problem of slow response of society
to the problem of climate change. In decentralised systems, local communities
however, have proven to be able to initiate a positive shift to a more sustainable
system [297, 298, 294].
Polarization Several key players (i.e. the United States and Western Europe)
in the energy transition have shown increased polarization of their society not in
the least on the issue of global warming and climate change [299, 300]. It can
be argued that polarizing societies will have less heterogeneity of opinions, the
result of which we showed in experiments looking at heterogeneity. Decreased
heterogeneity can lead to group-think. The effect of group-think in problems
such as climate change has been explained as cognitive dissonance; the tendency
to ignore contradictory information from an individual’s own opinion [301, 257].
Our results confirm the idea that polarised societies will decrease their ability to
act upon problems such climate change and the need for an energy transition.
5.5.1 Modelling critical transitions
Modelling non-linearity in the energy system We distinguish three sources
of non-linearity in the energy system. Firstly, there is the cost decline of
technology due to technical progress and economies of scale. This leads to so-
called tipping points where new technologies outperform incumbent technologies,
leading to accelerated (non-linear) change. Secondly, there are ’events’ that
change – in colloquial terms – the rules of the game, i.e. from one moment
to the next the actor’s outlooks have changed as do (consequently) behaviours.
Related to climate change, such events are for instance (climate induced) natural
disasters and pivotal political moments (the signing of the Paris accord might
be a candidate). Thirdly, there is the iterative bi-directional interplay between
system elements such as actors. Simulating the non-linear character of the energy




Modelling of ’events’ is illusive; this can only be brought in exogenously, and
must be supported by a narrative. The second element is outside of the scope
of this paper. But our model and the concept of critical transition gives us the
mathematical as well as qualitative construct to simulate the last point: how
iterative actor interaction influences their behaviour, changing over time as the
external environment develops. This goes a long way to model the emergent
behaviour in this complex system.
Energy scenarios The results of such experiments and the experiments in this
paper can be related to energy scenario studies. In the latest New Lens Scenarios
[32], earlier described as example of scenario development studies, a qualitative
story line is shown to which we can relate to with ACT. The study presented
two possible pathway lenses: Room to Manoeuvre where an early crisis leads
to punctuated reform, and a Trapped Transition where no action is taken until
an existential crisis leads to either ’write-off reset’ or ’decay/collapse’. These
abstract narratives were the basis for the two scenarios Mountains and Oceans
that apply these narratives to assumptions on the possible evolution of the energy
system. Figure 5.4 shows a summary of the results of the experiments and how
the critical transition theory would be applicable to the Shell’s pathway lenses.
Figure 5.4 – Summary of results and comparison with the Shell Scenarios. Figure
a. shows relationship between average public attitude ((At), the perceived seriousness
of the problem (h) and social aspects described by the parameter c. Figure shows
relationship between critical transition theory and Shells “Pathway Lenses” (Figure b) as
building blocks for energy scenarios (adapted from [32])
5.6 Reflection on modelling approach
The energy system is a multi-dimensional complex system that consists of many
interacting subsystems. ACT on the other hand is a simple conceptual model
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which is hard to validate and in some aspects, as we have seen, contradicts
existing conclusions from a similar simple model. A thorough reflection of our
modelling approach is therefore needed. What are the strength and weaknesses of
such an approach? To do this, a more broad reflection on conceptual modelling is
necessary to see the role these kinds of models can play. Therefore, in this section
we will try to use this generic insight to put our modelling results in perspective.
We then see whether this reasoning is applicable to our modelling approach.
To formulate an answer to that question, let’s for a brief moment look at the
discussion around one of the first and maybe the most criticised global energy
system modelling study: The Limits to Growth (LtG) [302]. The (compared to its
scope) relatively simple model was used to support a narrative on the limitations
of a finite planet and its consequence for population and economic growth and in
this way illustrated an argumentation that the authors of LtG had about the world
and its future development. The LtG study is a part of a broad tradition of energy
system models. As we argued earlier (Section 5.1.2), the scenario development
process of Shell and many other scenario studies can also be seen in this context.
Since the publication of the LtG study four decades ago, it has been the
subject of wide range of criticism and even recently has been used as an example
of over-hyping model success [251]. Although various categorisations of critique
exist [303], we will focus on two main types, technical and epistemological, in
order to later reflect on the results we deduced from ACT.
The technical criticism that dominated the first years after publications
disputed the model assumptions. Mainly the assumption regarding the role
of technology in the energy system has been subject of debate ranging from
technology-optimist to technology-pessimists. We would argue that this is
a legitimate debate that can been used to come to grips with the problem
that modelling studies such as LtG try to address. This does however require
transparency of the model and its assumption from the researchers involved in
the modelling study which cannot be taken for granted.
The epistemological criticism has focused on whether anything can be learned
from highly aggregated and abstract models. Edmonds [251] has characterised
LtG as an analogical way of modelling that is not scientific as it made the
impression of being predictive while unsupported by evidence. Although the
authors of LtG themselves were aware of these limitations2, the model has been
perceived by the general public as a prediction.
This epistemological criticism shows the danger of this type of modelling which
2Quoting LtG [302]: “ Can anything be learned from a highly aggregated model? Can its
output be considered meaningful . . . The data we have to work with are certainly not sufficient
for such forecasts, even if it were our purpose to make them” And stating that the outputs
“are not predictions of the values of the variables at any particular year in the future. They are
indications of the systems behavioral tendencies only.”
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can be brought down to its duality of means: i) convince with a particular line of
argumentation formulated in a narrative and ii) illustrate with a quantification
by the use of a model and its outputs. Although LtG was published with
unpretentiousness with regards to its quantification, its purpose with regards to
its narrative was to convince the general public about the limits to growth. Critics
however, focused on the weakest link, namely the quantification, and interpreted
it as a detailed forecast. This is an often-seen reaction to scenarios; quoting
Michael Liebreich: “[I]f it looks like a forecast, swims like a forecast and quacks
like a forecast, it is a forecast... And if that is not the intention, why publish it
at all?” [304]
Similar to Edmonds [251], Ehrenfeld [305] distinguishes analogical modelling
and the use of metaphors. Ehrenfeld argues that whereas metaphors are figures
of speech and suggestive, an analogy is a practical notion that compares two
cases and suggests an alternative way of addressing the situation based on
the presumption that they share similar properties and dynamics. However,
completely different mechanisms may be at play. Therefore, while a metaphor
can never be wrong (although it usefulness can be questioned), an analogy can
be objectively be false.
Ehrenfeld observes that often a metaphor is used as a useful starting point of
analysis. When the system understanding comes from the source of the metaphor
’learning by analogy’ has occurred. Learning by analogy is different from the
normal scientific method (as shown in Figure 5.5) and has been disputed as
Ehrenfeld argues that learning by analogy is not necessary as the rules can be
invented by independent observation and deduction of the system at hand. The
application of the concept of critical transitions to a societal system is an example
of learning by analogy; originally applied to analyse ecological systems a metaphor
has been deduced which was applied to construct a model of society.
The usefulness of these conceptual models based on analogies is in doubt.
Some researchers claim that although they “are extremely useful things ... this is
not scientific knowledge ... reliable conclusions have to be based on evidence so
they can be relied upon” [251]. This reflects the thought that science is supposed
to be about exact reasoning, leading to certainty. This scientific method requires
falsification [306]; and thus, the process of validation. The process of learning
by analogy can therefore be classified as non-scientific as the argument that a
certain analogy is appropriate is a subjective qualification.
However, in cases where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes are high
and decisions urgent, scientists have argued that traditional science as puzzle-
solving is “at best irrelevant and at worst a diversion” [307]. Falsification in these
cases can only be done on subjective grounds, as there are no objectives grounds
to falsify on. (Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between a normal scientific
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Figure 5.5 – Learning by analogy. Left-hand figure shows a methodology that can be
qualified as scientific where data informs a model which can be validated and falsified.
Right-hand figure shows learning by analogy where insights can be generated but where
the falsification is done on subjective grounds.
modelling study and what the role is of metaphors, analogies and falsification on
subjective grounds.) In fact, Ehrenfeld [305] recognises that this “unknowability”
demands a whole different kind of science and decision-making process.
Researchers therefore have advocated the use of post-normal science [308,
309]. They argue that, as the future is fundamentally unknowable especially on
longer time scales, scientific models can be used as having a metaphorical function
[310, 311], designed to teach us about ourselves and our perspectives under the
guise of describing and predicting the future state of the planet. Although this
approach is different from the traditional understanding of scientific knowledge,
it can help science to adapt and being useful for sustainability challenges in a
complex world.
We would agree with both Ehrenfeld and Edmonds that any model used
against the background of analogical thinking (or equivalently learning by analogy)
could be disputed. However, when we enter the space of unknowability, such as
the future of the energy system, models based on metaphors can give insights.
However, explicit unpretentiousness and humility in model design and use is
essential. Even then when modellers take that stance, they have to be aware
that stakeholders (politicians, media, general population, etc.) will interpret their
results as exact forecasts. Therefore, we would argue that an conceptual approach
that explicitly does not make quantitative prediction about the future (like this





Based on this argumentation and reflecting on this modelling study we
therefore, would argue that the application of the concept of critical transitions,
our newly developed model ACT and conceptual modelling in general has a role to
play in understanding, discussing and communicating about the energy transition.
We must realise that in reality equilibria and tipping points (bifurcations) do not
exist in strict sense. They are mathematical constructs which help us make sense
of the world. The concept of critical transitions in that sense can reveal some
fundamental features of reality that would otherwise be hard to comprehend [62].
5.7 Conclusion
In this study we have used the concept of critical transitions to explore how
human behaviour with regards to energy transition influences this transition. We
integrated relevant actor behaviour derived from the conceptualisation of the
energy transition as common pool resource dilemma into our model. By doing so
we could depart from the conventional mean-field approach and could integrate
actor interaction and heterogeneity in a newly developed agent-based model of
the concept of critical transitions (ACT).
Results show the effect of five elements we explored: i) network interaction,
ii) heterogeneity with regards to the perceived severity of the problem, iii) the
influence of leaders, iv) influence of departing from a binary action level. We
showed that the effect of leaders is more nuanced that what is assumed in existing
literature on critical transitions; leaders can encourage a transition but can also try
to stall any development till a critical transition is inevitable. Furthermore, model
results suggest that the polarization of society decreases the pace of societal
action while energy communities have an important role to play as they can
increase this pace.
Reflecting on our modelling approach we recognised that conceptual models
such as ACT are part of a long transition of models that are relatively simple
regarding their scope. We have argued, based on an analysis of the criticism on
The Limits to Growth report, that the correct valuation of these models needs a
different perspective than the traditional science perspective. This perspective is
offered by post-normal science that shows that when facts are uncertain, values
are in dispute, stakes are high and decisions urgent, we should recognise that
falsification of models can only be done on subjective grounds. Looking at ACT
from this perspective shows us that these models and ACT specifically are meant
to facilitate discussion on the possible evolution of the energy system between
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different perspective than the traditional science perspective. This perspective is
offered by post-normal science that shows that when facts are uncertain, values
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falsification of models can only be done on subjective grounds. Looking at ACT
from this perspective shows us that these models and ACT specifically are meant
to facilitate discussion on the possible evolution of the energy system between
different stakeholders, and can be used to develop building blocks of narratives of
the energy transition.
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Valuing the models such as ACT however does put two requirements onto
researchers. First and most important is that researchers are clear about the
purpose of their model. Researchers should emphasize (even more) that these
models cannot be used as forecasts and thus should resist to answer wrong or de
facto political questions. Secondly, researchers need to be transparent about their
models to be able to facilitate a legitimate and useful debate about their model
assumptions. We have argued that with ACT we have met these requirements.
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Now that renewable technologies are both technically and commercially mature,
the imperfect rational behaviour of investors becomes a critical factor in the
future success of the energy transition. Here, we take an agent-based approach
to model investor decision making in the electricity sector by modelling investors
as actors with different (heterogeneous) anticipations of the future. With only
a limited set of assumptions, this generic model replicates the dynamics of the
liberalised electricity market of the last decades and points out dynamics that are
to be expected as the energy transition progresses. Importantly, these dynamics
are emergent properties of the evolving electricity system resulting from actor
(investor) behaviour. We have experimented with varying carbon price scenarios
and find that incorporating heterogeneous investor behaviour results in a large
bandwidth of possible transition pathways, and that the depth of renewables
penetration is correlated with the variability of their power generation pattern.
Furthermore, a counter-intuitive trend was observed, namely that average profits
of investors are seen to increase with carbon prices. These results are a vivid and
generic illustration that outcome-based policy cannot be solely based on market
instruments that rely on perfectly rational and perfectly informed agents.
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6.1 Introduction
The energy transition is gaining momentum in the last several years, due to
rapidly falling prices of renewable energy technology and substantial institutional
consensus on climate change created at the Conference of Parties in Paris in
December 2015 [5]. The electricity sector is expected to take a leading role
in the decarbonisation of the energy sector as it is crucial for a low-carbon
energy system. The energy transition will therefore, have a large influence on the
electricity system, as it entails a transition from the centralised and homogeneous
fossil fuel-based system to a much more distributed and heterogeneous system
based on intermittent renewable sources [312, 16, 233, 313].
Furthermore, the need for instantaneous balancing and limited storability
of electricity, in combination with the intermittent nature of renewables will
further increase the complexity of the electricity system. The liberalisation of the
electricity system in many countries [314] has led to entry of investors, further
increasing the complexity of the system as these new actors are now expected to
play a key role in the transition.
Liberalised electricity markets are designed on the assumption that dispatch-
able electricity generation with a range of positive marginal costs can be ranked,
which is the case for thermal generators such as coal or gas fuelled power
generation assets [315]. This merit order in which the electricity price is set
ensures economic efficient allocation of resources. With massive deployment of
renewable energy sources, the market assumptions are undermined as renewable
power generators cannot be dispatched and have zero marginal costs [316].
In electricity markets designed as ‘energy-only market’, electricity generators
receive revenues for selling electricity but not for providing capacities [317, 318].
In theory these energy-only markets in which electricity prices should be covering
capital investment, guarantee security of supply [319]. In practice, market
imperfections and inadequate regulation can lead to ‘the missing money problem’,
the problem that insufficient investments can lead to concerns around the security
of supply [316, 317].
6.1.1 Modelling electricity markets
Modelling the development of the electricity mix within energy-only markets can
give insight in the mechanisms taking place during the energy transition [56, 46,
247]. Many techno-economic studies on the energy transition have been carried
out that can be classified in optimisation, equilibrium and simulation models [320,
321, 322, 323, 324, 325].




pathways of the energy transition (e.g. [324, 326, 327]) and answer the question
of ‘what should be’ [328]. Results from these studies are useful to depict
an ‘ideal’ world in which a central actor with control power must be active
that implements these multi-decade systems to achieve cost-optimal pathways.
Western democracies however have deliberately moved away from centralised
planning with the liberalisation of (electricity) markets. If we want to increase
our understanding of these systems, we therefore, should focus more on the
incorporation of heterogeneous actors with bounded rationality and imperfect
information.
Whereas optimisation models rely on detailed bottom-up technologies,
equilibrium models (e.g. [329, 330, 331]) try to model the overall market
behaviour top-down with algebraic and/or differential equations (e.g. Worldscan
[332]). However, when the problem under consideration is too complex to
be addressed within a formal equilibrium framework, simulation models are an
alternative to equilibrium models [320].
These and other neoclassical models that depend on economic rational
behaviour have provided key insights for business decisions and policy makers
[12]. Literature and simple observation of the real world suggest however, that
these assumptions do not hold and that decision makers in the system are
heterogeneous and exhibit bounded rationality in their decision-making behaviour
[333, 334, 97]. Including bounded rationality relaxes the assumptions of perfect
foresight and maximising utility [126]. Modelling these aspects requires different
tools [328, 97, 34].
6.1.2 An agent-based approach to electricity sector invest-
ment
Agent-based modelling (ABM) can be used to simulate complex adaptive systems
(CAS) such as the electricity system and is well suited to model adaptive
heterogeneous actors (agents) such as investors that can be part of emergent
system behaviour. Modelling the energy transition this way is therefore expected
to give important new insights that complements the insights obtained from more
traditional energy systems modelling.
Several large-scale ABM studies have been looking at the transition of the
electricity system, focusing on the role of consumers (e.g. [335, 86]) and investors
[336]. In these studies, the added value of modelling the role of investors in
the energy transition and more specifically in the electricity system has been
recognised (e.g. [337, 338, 339], for an overview: [56, 340]). Because previous
ABM studies on the role of investors mainly focus on detailed behaviour (see e.g.
[341] on detailed improvements to the EU Emission Trading System), there is a
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gap in the understanding of the impacts of investor behaviour on the fundamental
dynamics of the electricity system in transition.
The goal of this study is thus to elucidate the fundamental processes that
underline the transition of the electricity system. We have taken a conceptual
approach aimed at identifying the minimum set of agent-types, behaviour rules
and assumptions that could replicate the fundamental dynamics of the first phase
of the transition and show possible concerns for the future. This approach has
strengthened the transparency, tractability and reproducibility of model results as
these are three fundamental challenges in ABM studies [342, 67].
We will focus on exploring the emergence of the deep decarbonisation of the
electricity sector based on the interactions and individual investment decisions of
heterogeneous bounded rational investors in the electricity market. The model
represents a typical liberalised Western European electricity market designed as
energy-only market [233] such as The Netherlands [343]. As this is a common
feature of modern electricity markets, conclusions are potentially generalisable.
The organisation of this paper is as follows: in Section 6.2 the starting set
of assumptions are discussed. The conceptualisation of our model is described
in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we describe our results and in Section 6.5 we
reflect on recent developments and present our main observations. We conclude
in Section 6.6 with a reflection on our modelling approach.
6.2 Investment decisions in an evolving electricity
system
Our model focuses on the role of investors and assesses the influence of their
behaviour on the dynamics that drive the development of the electricity system.
To avoid the trap of an over-parameterised model we aimed to keep our model
as simple as possible. We argue that a reasonable starting set of assumptions for
an investor-focused agent-based model, is the following:
1. Future electricity market prices, fuel prices and technology learning rates
are unknowable.
2. Investors make investment decisions based on heterogeneous expectations
about the future.
3. Past performance of investors affects their investment capacity (and may
colour their outlook) but there is the possibility of new investors entering
the market.




to the energy resource, capital lay-out, running cost (including fuel) and
CO2 intensity.
Since our interest lies in the evolving electricity sector as ever more intermittent
renewables enter the generation mix, an additional assumption is:
5. Renewable power generation assets have seasonal variable supply and there
is no seasonal storage solution.
Finally, we make one additional assumption which is only true in specific liberalised
markets, namely that:
6. The electricity market is as an energy-only market.
We will discuss these assumptions in more detail in the next sections.
Investors’ heterogeneous view on the future and their investment decisions
To elaborate on the first assumption; because, (i) the future is fundamentally
unknowable and inherently and irreducibly uncertain, (ii) the pace of the
transition is unknown, (iii) the preferred technology options are unknown (because
future costs and performance are unknown), and (iv) the future price-setting
mechanisms in the market are unknown, one naturally expects different investors
to have different expectations about the future (assumption 2). This can be
understood as investors with different corporate strategies and different risk
appetites. This leads to a heterogeneity of views on the development of the
electricity market and the business environment which influences investment
decisions.
Investors’ expectations are related to capital providers that assess these
expectations companies have. Besides this external component, investors also
have an internal component that expresses their required return on capital
invested. This internal component is also heterogeneous among investors; while
incumbent investors may require a high return on capital invested for new projects,
other investors may require a lower rate.
All investors evaluate opportunities by assessing the discounted cash flows
in relationship with the size of the investment. The combination of the
heterogeneous external expectations and internal requirements investors have,
determines the discount rate with which they evaluate these cash flows.
Influence of past performance on new investment decisions
Because investors assess future investments heterogeneously, they will make
different investment decisions. Their performance, based on the development
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of the electricity market and the choices investors have made, is reflected in the
average profitability of the assets an investor owns and influences future decisions
(assumption 3).
Although the electricity market is composed by a limited number of existing
power producers, there is a possibility of new investors that can enter the market
(e.g. Qurrent in The Netherlands [344]). We assume they are able to raise
capital not based on past performance (which is non-existent), but on the basis
of a business vision that is sufficiently new and appealing [345]. For the case at
hand that means that renewable power companies can enter the market which
are unburdened by a fossil legacy portfolio.
6.2.1 Power generation assets
The electricity system in most European countries is predominantly based on
thermal power generation fueled by fossil resources. However, new, scalable
renewable technologies have become available which produce electricity from
intermittent resources (assumption 4). These renewable assets, (offshore) wind
parks or solar PV-farms, have near-zero operating costs and near-zero CO2-
emissions but are variable on different scales; seasonal, day to day and second to
second. The variability of electricity output from these renewable assets depends
on the regional location, weather conditions and the mix of PV and wind turbine
capacity. Especially the variability of these resources on a seasonal scale is of
importance as there is limited possibility for large scale seasonal storage [346]
(assumption 5).
Learning rate of renewable technology
The capital lay-out mentioned in assumption 5 with regards to renewable energy
technology is especially relevant as renewable energy technology have shown large
cost reductions in the last decades [16]. This reduction in turnkey costs can be
explained by learning by doing which is a common process; unit costs follow
learning curves and go down over cumulative investment. Internationally onshore
wind power generators have shown a learning rate of 9% [16] while solar PV-
panels have shown learning rate of around 20% percent per year [312, 16]. In
Section 6.4 details can be found of the learning curves for our experiments.
6.2.2 Electricity markets and the incentive to invest
Assumption 6 treats the electricity market design. We will first discuss the




Pro-market reforms in the electricity sector that took place in the 1980’s
and 1990’s resulted in liberalised electricity markets, both in OECD and non-
OECD countries and regions [318]. In these liberalised electricity markets, power
generators offer different quantities of electricity at various prices that are ranked
from the lowest to the highest Short Run Marginal Costs (SRMC). The market-
clearing price is set by the SRMC of the marginal producer. The SRMC of an
asset consists of the fuel and other variable operation and maintenance costs
(OPEX) but excludes the costs of capital. The margin for electricity producers
is defined by the inframarginal rent, the difference between the SRMC of the
marginal producer and their own SRMC. Via this infra-marginal rent, investors
need to regain their investment costs.
Energy-only markets and the scarcity rent
In energy-only markets, marginal producers at peak demand can use their market
power to increase prices. This is caused by the fact that in electricity markets
power buyers accept price premiums (scarcity rents) to prevent black-outs. The
marginal producer at peak demand recovers its capital costs via this premium.
This pricing mechanism therefore, creates an incentive to invest in the marginal
producer at peak demand.
The scarcity rent is the quantification of the market power of the marginal
producer when capacity is scarce and is crucial to maintain security of supply in
an energy-only market. This market power has been observed in reality and its
effect has been studied in several studies e.g. [316]. Because of this scarcity
rent in electricity markets, electricity wholesale prices spike at moments of scarce
capacity. In most western countries, consumers are protected against these price
spikes but as smart meters are rolled out, there is discussion between policy
makers if these prices spike should be fed back to consumers. For example, the
Netherlands has chosen for an energy-only market [343, 347], while in Germany
and the United Kingdom elements of a capacity market are being introduced.
6.3 Conceptualisation
The agent-based model in this study is developed by applying the 10-step
framework as proposed by Van Dam et al. [96] and is written in the software
environment of Netlogo [90]. Literature research combined with semi-structured
interviews with experts at Shell and The Copernicus Institute of Sustainable
Development have led to the conceptualisation of the model. The model has been
extensively verified and has been validated with recording and tracking behaviour,
single-agent testing and multi-agent testing [96]. The model, as well as the
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(OPEX) but excludes the costs of capital. The margin for electricity producers
is defined by the inframarginal rent, the difference between the SRMC of the
marginal producer and their own SRMC. Via this infra-marginal rent, investors
need to regain their investment costs.
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power buyers accept price premiums (scarcity rents) to prevent black-outs. The
marginal producer at peak demand recovers its capital costs via this premium.
This pricing mechanism therefore, creates an incentive to invest in the marginal
producer at peak demand.
The scarcity rent is the quantification of the market power of the marginal
producer when capacity is scarce and is crucial to maintain security of supply in
an energy-only market. This market power has been observed in reality and its
effect has been studied in several studies e.g. [316]. Because of this scarcity
rent in electricity markets, electricity wholesale prices spike at moments of scarce
capacity. In most western countries, consumers are protected against these price
spikes but as smart meters are rolled out, there is discussion between policy
makers if these prices spike should be fed back to consumers. For example, the
Netherlands has chosen for an energy-only market [343, 347], while in Germany
and the United Kingdom elements of a capacity market are being introduced.
6.3 Conceptualisation
The agent-based model in this study is developed by applying the 10-step
framework as proposed by Van Dam et al. [96] and is written in the software
environment of Netlogo [90]. Literature research combined with semi-structured
interviews with experts at Shell and The Copernicus Institute of Sustainable
Development have led to the conceptualisation of the model. The model has been
extensively verified and has been validated with recording and tracking behaviour,
single-agent testing and multi-agent testing [96]. The model, as well as the
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description, is open source and is published on openabm.org. 1 The software
package R has been used for analysis [348]. During the model development best
practices for scientific computing have been pursued [349]. For the mentioned
detailed description of the model, the ODD protocol is followed [71, 72].
Based on our understanding of the electricity market and investor behaviour
we developed the conceptualization of our model. Figure 6.1 shows our
conceptualisation which will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Figure 6.1 – Model description. Investors invest in power generation units based on
market information and their heterogeneous discount rate. These assets are part of
the electricity market. Investors and assets are initialised with agent attributes (grey).
Other inputs and outputs of the model are depicted (white).
6.3.1 Investors
In the model investors use Net Present Value (NPV) as the key metric in the
evaluation of investment opportunities in power generation assets of different
types. An NPV in excess of zero triggers investment action. The fact that
investors have differing (i.e. heterogeneous) views about the future is expressed
through a discount rate in the NPV calculations. These different discount rates
are given to investors at initialisation. Additionally, at initialisation, investors are
given an existing portfolio of gas and coal assets.
There also is the possibility for new ‘green’ investors not burdened by a legacy
portfolio of fossil assets to enter the market; these are initialised with a random
discount rate, and have no existing portfolio of assets. It is a priori not clear if
this is an attractive business model, or that it adds anything to the dynamics of
the transformation. But it is obviously of importance to at least be open to it,
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The adaptivity of investors is expressed in the model by making the discount
rate of each individual investor dynamic. That is: each investor will see its
discount rate increase or decrease over time, based on the profitability of its
asset portfolio. During the model run, the discount rate an investor applies
reflects therefore its expectations about the future, expressed by the discount
rate at initialisation and its performance during the model run. This adjustment
is made once a year after investments decisions have been made.
A visual representation of the decision-making process of investors is given in
Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2 – Decision-making process of investors.
6.3.2 Assets
At initialisation assets have a heterogeneous age and efficiency within threshold 
values. Gas and coal assets have a constant dispatchable production, renewable 
assets have a variable supply on a seasonal scale.
For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we assume that investors can 
invest in assets of one GW-name-plate capacity. In our model, we have three types 
of assets: gas-fired power stations, coal-fired power stations, and renewable 
assets. These three asset-types have different properties with regards to their 
investment costs, their SRMC (based on the fuel costs), and the CO2-intensity
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of the resource they are using. These properties (such as cost and efficiency)
may drift over time, reflecting technology learning. The attributes of renewable
assets can vary so as to reflect a particular mix of solar and wind assets. At
initialisation, assets have a heterogeneous age and efficiency.
In the specific runs discussed in this paper, gas and coal assets have constant
dispatchable production. Renewable assets have a variable supply on a seasonal
scale modelled as a variation of a cosine function, based on empirical data [350,
351, 352, 353]. In the present case, we look at seasonal variation of renewables
and accordingly use time slicing with 10 slices in the year, thus representing
‘months’.2 Also, in this paper we keep the unit cost of gas and coal assets
constant; the unit costs of renewable assets decrease over time as a function
of the cumulative investment in the technology. These costs follow a standard
learning curve of the form given in Equation 6.1, where C(t) is the cost of a
renewable asset at time t, C0 is the cost of renewable asset at initialisation, n is
the number of renewable power generation assets of 1 GWp and l is the learning
rate.




In the electricity market, during a year, assets produce electricity that satisfies
the electricity demand. As said, the electricity market is modelled as energy-only
market. In this paper, we are interested in the supply side and have assumed
demand to be constant over time.
In our model, the electricity price is set by the merit-order, the actual market
price is the SRMC of the marginal producer, plus a mark-up for generation scarcity,
the “scarcity rent”. This scarcity rent, S(t), is taken to be a function of the excess
capacity-factor as defined in Equation 6.2, where S(t) is the scarcity rent at time
t, Smin is the minimum scarcity rent, Smax is the maximum scarcity rent and α
is the scarcity rent variable that determines curvature (see Figure 6.3).
S(t) =
Smax − Smin
α− 1 ∗ α
1/e(t) + Smin −
Smax − Smin
α− 1 (6.2)
The time-dependent excess capacity, e(t), is defined in Equation 6.3 as the
potential power generation of all the assets in the system, i.e. the summation of
the nameplate capacity of the coal and gas assets (1 GW) and the momentary
power from renewable assets, relative to the (momentary, but here constant)
demand. In Equation 6.3, D represents the (constant) demand D and G(t)i the
2Note that there is no loss of generality. By going from 12 time slices in the year to 365
one would model days, by going to 8670 hours etc.
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Figure 6.3 – Relationship between scarcity rent and excess capacity factor, where S(t)
is the scarcity rent at time t, Smin is the minimum scarcity rent, Smax is the maximum
scarcity rent and α is the scarcity rent variable that determines curvature. The time-
dependent excess capacity, e(t), is defined as the potential power generation of all the
assets in the system divided by demand D.
potential production at time t of all assets with resource i , including the variability
of renewable assets G(t)ren. Note that the excess capacity as we define it here is
related to what in the power sector is called the “adequacy margin”. The adequacy










The scarcity rent approaches zero when enough capacity is available and no
market player can use their market power to raise the price about the SRMC. On
the other hand, the scarcity rent will be high at moments capacity is scare (low
e(t)) to incentivise investment. The maximum electricity price, including the
maximum scarcity rent, reflects the value of lost load (VOLL). We have chosen
the functional form and parameterisation of the relation between the scarcity rent
and the excess capacity factor such that outages do not occur.
6.3.4 Model narrative
Our model describes the time-evolution of the power system over years and
decades. Within each year, the ‘clock tick’ of the model (the shortest time
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step in an ABM) is a month. Every month electricity prices are calculated based
on existing assets. After a year has passed, the following steps are followed:
Investors calculate their profitability Based on production and the monthly
electricity price, investors calculate their income from each of the assets in their
portfolio. The profitability of investors’ assets determines whether their discount
rate will increase (low profitability) or decrease (high profitability). If the discount
rate rises above a threshold, the investor goes bankrupt.
Investors evaluate new investment opportunities Investors make NPV
calculations based on their individual expectations about the profits an investor
can anticipate to make from a new asset. This profit will depend on the place
of that investment in the (future) merit order. Although coal- and gas-based
electricity production is mature technology, new units will have a slightly higher
efficiency than older units. Thus, a new unit, with a slightly higher efficiency, will
be ahead of the currently most profitable unit (of the same type, gas or coal) in
the merit order. After evaluating all the options, investors decide to invest in an
asset with the highest positive NPV (provided there is one). These assets are
then placed in the system instantaneously and will generate power (and income)
from that same year on. (That is, for the sake of simplicity we ignore investment
lead times.)
New investors New investors can enter the market when an investment
opportunity has a positive NPV. New investors are initialised with a random
discount rate within threshold values. Because only a limited number of investors
in the world can raise the capital needed to invest in these large-scale electricity
production units, only one new investor can enter the market each year. Finally,
assets may be taken out of operation and removed from the system:
Asset elimination Finally, assets may be taken out of operation and removed
from the system when their lifetime is reached.
6.4 Experimental setup and results
In this section, we describe the setup of the various experiments we conducted
with the model and we give a brief overview of the results these experiments have
produced.
6.4.1 Experimental setup
Four experiments have been carried out around the key exogenous parameters of




• Carbon price development.
• Heterogeneity of investors.
• Variable production patterns of renewable power generation.
• Cost decline of renewable power technology.
We have setup the model to represents the Dutch electricity system, with
approximate Dutch generation capacity (20 GW) and demand (15 GW), with
5 investors (the utility companies), and a representative age distribution of assets
and resource mix. Power plant efficiencies, resource prices and investment prices
of a 1 GW asset are based on order of magnitude numbers from literature and
experts (see Table 6.1). The model runs for 780 months representing the years
2000-2065, a realistic time frame for the transition of the electricity system.
Carbon prices are modelled to historic prices of the EU-ETS between 2000 and
2015. Power generation by renewables is modelled to realistic power generation by
a mix of wind and solar assets (see Section 6.4.2). The learning rate for renewable
assets is assumed to be 20% (see Section 6.4.2). In all our experiments we have
initialised the model to represent the Dutch electricity system in 2000 [354]. An
overview of the most important values at initialisation are given in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 – Variables of parameters at initialisation
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6.4.2 Results
Results of four experiments are discussed in the following sections. Graphs in
these sections show results from 30 model runs in each of the scenarios; shaded
areas show the first quartile on both sides of the median while the thick lines
show the median.
Carbon price
Figure 6.4 shows the development of the electricity mix under two carbon price
scenarios. In the left graph the carbon price has been kept constant at 6
e/tonneCO2, the approximate carbon price in the EU ETS program between
2010 and 2015 [63]. In the right graph, we linearly increased the carbon price
from 6 e/tonneCO2 after 15 years with 2 e/tonneCO2 to 34 e/tonneCO2 in
2030. After thirty years, the carbon price remains constant till the end of the
model run. This carbon price scenario will be our “base case (BC)”.
Figure 6.4 – Electricity production in percentage by resource with two carbon price
scenarios. Carbon price starts at 6 e/tonneCO2 at initialisation and is after 15 years,
either constant (left) or 15 years linearly increased till 34 e/tonneCO2, our base case
(BC) (right). Graphs show that with an increased carbon price, the variation of
outcomes percentages in 2060 is substantially reduced. Model runs represent the years
between 2000 and 2065.
Because we are interested in the decarbonisation of the electricity system
from the current mix towards a renewable-based energy system and prevent a
near-technicality with regards to run-up effects of initialisation, three outcomes
parameters are depicted. The blue colour depicts the traditional fossil generation
mix as installed at initialisation and shows whether the current mix is sustained
during the model run. The red colour depicts the percentage of production
delivered by the extra only-gas assets that are added, which contribute to the
decarbonisation because of their lower emission intensity. The green colour




Firstly, comparing the two graphs we see that with an increased carbon price,
the variation of renewable generation percentages in 2060 is substantially reduced
compared to the scenario with no further increase of the carbon price. However,
although an increased carbon price reduces the bandwidth of possible pathways
from 2050 onwards, there is a very large range of possible pathways in the
intermediate period. This is mainly due to the distribution and development of
discount rates that the (relatively few) investors use in their financial evaluation
and that heavily impacts on the start of the learning curves of renewables.
Secondly, we see in the right graph (with the increased CO2 price), that
the penetration of renewable power generation stalls before full conversion to
renewables (the stalling point is at ca. 87%). This emerging ‘penetration limit’
is higher with an increased carbon price.
Thirdly, the choice between gas and coal assets is based on their relative
investment and fuel costs and their subsequent performance in the last year. In
all carbon price scenarios, these costs are related to their relative carbon intensity.
This is shown by Equation 6.4, where pgas is the profitability of a gas asset, pcoal
is the profitability of a coal asset, Pgas is the price of gas (e/MWh), Pcoal is
the price of coal (e/MWh), ηgas is the carbon intensity of gas (kgCO2/m3) and
ηcoal is the carbon intensity coal (kgCO2/kg).
pgas = pcoal ←→ Pgas − Pcoal = PCO2(ηcoal − ηgas) (6.4)
Fourthly, if we increase the yearly carbon price, renewables enter the market
earlier. Gas can come back into the system if carbon prices are further increased
and electricity from gas assets becomes cheaper than electricity from coal assets.
In Table 6.2 and Figure 6.5 results of our model are compared with two
influential scenario studies about The Netherlands: Scenarios for the Dutch
Electricity Supply System (SDESS) by Frontier Economics commissioned by
the minister of Economic Affairs [355], and “Nationale Energieverkenning 2016”
(NEV) by major governmental related organisations (Energie Centrum Nederland
(ECN), Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) and Plan Bureau voor de
Leefomgeving (PBL) [356]).
The comparison of our model results with mentioned conventional scenario
studies shows that results from these studies are in the range of our results.
Although these conventional modelling studies show sensitivity analyses in their
reports, a notable difference is the large bandwidth of possible pathways in our
results.
The average electricity price in Figure 6.5 shows the effect of the penetration
of renewable power generation on the average electricity prices over the year.
Because renewable assets have near-zero SRMC they decrease the electricity price
on average. The increased carbon price however increases the price of electricity
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Table 6.2 – Comparison of scenarios of the Dutch Electricity system: Scenarios for the
Dutch electricity supply system (SDESS) [355], “Nationale Energieverkenning 2016”
(NEV) [356] and Current model, Increased carbon price
from fossil assets. Therefore, with variable supply by renewables, electricity prices
decrease when renewables produce and increase when they don’t produce. The
combined effect makes electricity prices more volatile during the year. With
further penetration of renewables between 2040 and 2060, the decreasing effect
becomes stronger than the effect of the carbon price and therefore electricity
prices on average go down.
If we define the price volatility as the difference between the minimum and
maximum electricity price over the period and compare the price volatility in this
study with the SSDES study, the bottom graph in Figure 6.5 shows that this price
volatility increases with the penetration of renewable power. (The price volatility
in the NEV- scenario study is not publicly available.) These results are in line with
conventional scenario studies, although with our ABM-approach we can show the
bandwidth of possible pathways.
Heterogeneity of investors
To explore the effect of heterogeneity of investors on our model results in Fig.
6 the effect of this heterogeneity on the development of the electricity mix is
depicted. While in model runs that are depicted in the right graph all investors
have a discount rate of 10%, in the left graph, investors have a heterogeneous
discount rate with a uniform distribution between 4% and 20%. In both scenarios,
the low carbon price scenario is used as depicted.
The left graph shows that the electricity mix stays constant over time if we
assume homogeneous investors: with the given discount rate (at initialisation)
and carbon price, investors will not invest in renewable or gas assets. The main
difference in the outcome of the model runs is caused by the initialisation of the




Figure 6.5 – Comparison between current study and two other scenario studies, SDESS
and NEV. Graphs depict Renewable power production percentage, Installed capacity,
Average electricity prices, and Price volatility in the period 2000-2065. Price volatility
is defined as the difference between maximum and minimum electricity prices in a year.
Graphs show conventional scenario studies are in range of outcomes of our agent-based
model but the current study shows large bandwidth of possible pathway.
due to the heterogeneity of investors, different pathways are taken. If we exclude




Figure 6.5 – Comparison between current study and two other scenario studies, SDESS
and NEV. Graphs depict Renewable power production percentage, Installed capacity,
Average electricity prices, and Price volatility in the period 2000-2065. Price volatility
is defined as the difference between maximum and minimum electricity prices in a year.
Graphs show conventional scenario studies are in range of outcomes of our agent-based
model but the current study shows large bandwidth of possible pathway.
due to the heterogeneity of investors, different pathways are taken. If we exclude
this heterogeneity, investors will make the same decisions and will basically behave
as one.
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Figure 6.6 – The effect of heterogeneity of investors on the electricity mix. Right
graph shows possible pathways with heterogeneous investors, while in the right graph
all investors are initiated with the same discount rate.
Variability of renewable energy sources
To explore the effect of the variability of renewable energy sources in our model,
we experimented with three electricity generation (load factor) patterns (based
on empirical data [350, 351, 352, 353]).
Three power generation patterns are tested: a scenario (i) with no variability
and constant production, (ii) with solar variability patterns associated with only
renewable solar assets and (iii) with a realistic combination of wind and solar
assets (i.e. 70% wind and 30% solar).
Figure 6.7 shows the development of the electricity mix with three different
renewable power generation patterns. The left graph shows that renewable
electricity is favourable over other sources if it would be able to produce constant
over time since they are in front of the merit-order. The middle graphs show
the development of the electricity mix if renewable assets would have a full
intermittent load factor pattern. This would be the case if all renewable capacity
would be supplied by solar assets, as their minimum power output goes to zero
in winter. In this case fossil back-up power generation capacity is necessary to
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Figure 6.7 – Electricity mix with varying power generation from renewable generation.
Left graph shows mix when renewables have no seasonal variability, middle graph shows
mix when only renewable generation is only provided by solar (i.e. when electricity
production is full intermittent) and right graphs shows mix with realistic production
pattern, our base case (BC). Small graphs indicate load-factor pattern.
Substantial cost decline of renewable power generation assets
Steep learning curves of renewable assets in the last decades, has had a large
influence on the development of the electricity system. In Section 6.4 we saw
that the fact that production does not go to zero over the year suggests that
renewable power generation could supply full demand when enough renewable
capacity is build. Therefore, we tested if a full renewable system can emerge if
we assume that renewable power generation technology will continue to decrease
in price.
Figure 6.8 shows three renewable power generation costs curves with three
different stabilisation levels, 1 e/W (our base case); 0.75 e/W and 0.25 e/W,
which are based on empirical data and scenario studies [312, 352].
Figure 6.9 shows that with substantial further cost reduction of renewable
assets, the penetration of renewable electricity mix can be increased. The left-
hand graph shows that even a full renewable electricity mix can emerge when
costs are reduced sufficiently. This would however require a substantial renewable
capacity instalment of ca. 6.5 times the peak load incorporating the load factor
pattern of our base case
Profitability of investors
The effect of this penetration of renewable power generation on the profitability
of investors is shown in Figure 6.10. The figure shows the average discount rate
of investors in the model in 30 model runs with different linear increasing carbon
price scenarios. What we see is that increasing the carbon price gradient beyond
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Figure 6.8 – Three scenarios for the cost development of a renewable power generation
asset with a one GW name-plate capacity.
Figure 6.9 – Electricity mix by source with varying technology learning curves. The right
graphs show our base case (BC). If, due to technological learning, the investment size of
renewable power generation assets decreases substantially, they would be able to supply
100% of power demand. This would require substantial investment in renewable power
generation capacity as depicted (in blue).
the technical limit, increases the profitability of investors on average.
6.5 Validation and discussion on model results
6.5.1 Qualitative validation
With our conceptual, simple model we have simulated the development of
the electricity mix in the period 2000 till 2065. Because of the high-level,
abstract nature of our approach, validation of the model is qualitative and semi-
quantitative.We validated our model against the developments in the Netherlands
electricity sector between 2000 and 2015.
This period saw an increase in electricity generation by wind and solar from less
than 1% in 2000 to 8% 2015 [357], similar to the transition in other Northern
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Figure 6.10 – Figure shows the average discount rate of investors over time in the model
in 30 model runs with different linear increasing carbon price scenarios. What we see
is that increasing the carbon price gradient beyond the technical limit, increases the
profitability of investors on average.
Europe countries. Although we are aware that governmental incentives have
influenced these developments we argue that we can relate model results to the
following historical dynamics: (i) the increase of the share of coal in the electricity
mix and gas fuelled power stations being dismantled [321, 358], (ii) on average
decreasing electricity prices [359], (iii) increased electricity price volatility [317,
347], and (iv) decrease of the profitability expressed by the Moody rating of large
incumbent utilities [360]. Our investor-based model of the electricity sector was
able to reproduce these trends as reported in the literature (e.g. [361, 362]).
6.5.2 Discussion on first phase dynamics
A well-known development that we observed in the first phase, which we define
here as the phase till approximately 10% of renewables in the energy mix, is the
merit-order effect [340, 363, 364]. When coal is cheaper than gas, it will go
in front of gas in the merit order which leads to coal assets being profitable and
gas assets ultimately being dismantled. The introduction of renewables reinforces
this development in two ways; more capacity is added leading to overcapacity, and
renewables capacity has a low SRMC and therefore, pushes gas assets further up
the merit order [341, 364, 365]. This development causes electricity prices to
fall, and volatility to increase. Furthermore, we saw that in the first phase of
the transition where renewables enter the market, profitability of existing assets
decrease. This caused profitability of incumbent investors to decreases and their
discount rate to increase which relates to their Moody ranking.
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6.5.3 Discussion on later phase dynamics
Developments that emerge in our model in later phases (in systems with more than
10% renewables in the electricity mix) of the transition lead us to the following
observations:
The end-point of the transition is fully determined by the renewable
resource. In the absence of storage, the transition is necessarily incomplete as
fossil back-up remains needed; a renewable penetration limit of ca. 87% emerges
under the assumption that renewable assets consist of a mix between wind and
solar power generation (Section 6.4.2). This penetration depth of renewables is
correlated with the variability of their generation pattern and by the ‘ultimate’ cost
level of renewables. Only with low or moderate seasonal intermittency (typical
of wind) and very low cost (more typical of future PV) do renewables without
fossil back-up or storage reach 100% penetration, but then only at the expense
of significant curtailment.
Market incentives are inept tools for outcome-based policy. While
conventional modelling methods show a limited number of possible pathways,
our results show that incorporating more realistic investor behaviour results in
a large bandwidth of possible outcomes. Therefore, caution should be taken
in interpreting conventional techno-economic analyses as we have shown that
incorporating heterogeneity and bounded rational behaviour of investors has a
large influence on the probability distribution of outcomes (Section 6.4.2). In
the current market design, the mere setting of a carbon price will not always
result in delivering on decarbonisation goals, to which governments have signed
up. Therefore, we conclude that outcome-based policy cannot be solely based on
market instruments that rely on perfect rational and perfectly informed agents.
Only with a very large cost decrease of renewable power generation can the
electricity system be fully decarbonised and this is only possible with very
high overcapacity. Full decarbonisation is possible if a mix between wind and
solar assets is used but that would require substantial investment in (over)capacity
of renewable power generation assets which is only attractive for investors if the
investment size for renewable assets is substantially decreased (Section 6.4.2).
The profitability for investors increases with the carbon price. This is a new
and non-intuitive result which we attribute to the effect of the carbon price on
the electricity price and inframarginal rents investors receive. It follows logically
from the reasoning that if we increase the carbon price, electricity prices increase
in periods were fossil generations set the price. Therefore, infra-marginal rents




Energy-only markets become increasingly volatile. The implementation of
energy-only markets requires political courage to allow price spike to occur to
ensure enough investments are made. Such volatility increases with renewables
penetration, making the market system, while theoretically “efficient”, increasingly
unappealing to electricity consumers, both corporate and private; a further
reason why liberalized, energy-only markets are unattractive to policy makers
and politicians.
Scarcity rent is not a technology neutral mechanism. Because only fossil
assets are dispatchable they can use market power to supply demand when supply
is scarce. As renewables power generation is non-dispatchable, it cannot use
this market power and therefore, the scarcity rent is not a technology neutral
mechanism.
6.5.4 Discussion on conceptualisation of decision making
process
The conceptualisation of the decision-making process in an agent-based model
is key. For this conceptualisation we have deliberately followed a keep-it-simple
approach. For now (i.e. the present paper) that meant taking the long-term view
(expressed by their heterogeneous discount rate) as sole differentiator between
investors; the discount rate is the numeric pars pro toto of the investor’s long-
term outlook.
We realise fully well that investor behaviour is more complex and that a vast
variety of factors contribute to the investor’s appetite for new investment [334,
365]. We could think of factors such as preference for types of assets, previous
experiences (i.e. company history), outlook for governmental intervention, risk
appetite amongst others.
However, we argue that our simplification is justified, given the purpose of
our model, since these factors would be impossible to quantify and extremely
uncertain, even more so if we look at investment decisions decades from now.
Therefore, we have decided not to do so, and solely refer to their long-term view
with which we incorporate the mentioned factors.
6.5.5 Comparison to literature
The field of electricity market modelling is an active and fast-growing field of
research. In Section 4 we showed how our results compare with influential
conventional scenario studies. In general, there is lively discussion on the role
of government and markets in the design of electricity markets [315, 317, 319,
324, 336, 338, 341, 362, 366]. What we argue here is that increasing reality in
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electricity market models (with agent behaviour), has implications for scenario
studies and market design.
Some of these issues have been raised in earlier agent-based model studies.
Increased volatility is a well-known phenomenon which has been reported earlier
(e.g. [365, 367, 319]). Our result that profitability of investors increases with
carbon prices has been reported once before but in a different context, i.e. carbon-
trading [366].
Moreover, to our knowledge and based on a review of previous literature, there
has been no other modelling effort that incorporated the endogenous investment
in renewable generation and learning curve dynamics. Secondly, although market
power has been analysed previously [316], this study goes further in analysing the
effect of market power in energy-only markets.
To summarise, we would argue that within this complex field of research this
modelling study has shown a novel conceptualisation which resulted in conclusions
that could be supported with a comparatively simple and transparent approach.
6.6 Conclusion
We have shown that an agent-based model of investor behaviour is able to
simulate the transition of the electricity system with only a very limited set of
assumptions. The simulations bring out key challenges of the transition and
link them back to the fundamental parameters of the technologies and investor
behaviours.
With this approach - which is transparent, tractable and reproducible - we have
been able to simulate the influence of heterogeneous investors in the electricity
market. This approach has shown great additional value to conventional techno-
economic energy scenarios as it has given us a natural way to think about
investors, their decision-making process and its effect on the system behaviour.
In future research, we will extend this approach to include storage to resolve the
intermittency problem.
Finally, we want to stress the importance of ABM in giving modellers a natural
way to think about actors and actor behaviour. The great advantage of the ’keep-
it-simple’-approach to agent-based model that we practiced in this paper is that
it allows a wide range of stakeholders (not just scientist-modellers) to be actively
engaged in the conceptualization of the model and in the discussion of its results.
It thereby does full justice to the power of ABM, which is that modellers have
a natural way to structure their thoughts about assumed agent behaviour, by
allowing meaningful discussion of the agent assumptions with the agents or their
representatives. This, we have found, is never a fully straightforward, one-way




way, ABM can give insights on problems related to complex adaptive systems
such as the energy system as it gives us a tool to encompass essential features
of these systems.
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Full decarbonisation of the electricity system is one of the key elements to 
limit global warming. As this transition takes place, the electricity system must 
maintain system adequacy and remain affordable to consumers. In liberalised 
electricity markets investors are seen as key actors driving this transition.
Due to the intermittent character of renewable assets, such as wind or solar 
parks, electricity systems with large shares of renewable electricity will need 
to become increasingly flexible. Evaluating whether specific market designs 
provide the right incentives to invest in flexibility, requires the simulation of 
realistic investor behaviour. Agent-based modelling provides the means to explore 
heterogeneous, imperfectly informed and bounded rational investor behaviour 
within different electricity market design.
We evaluated two market designs; “energy-only” markets and markets with 
a Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM). We conclude that energy-only 
markets, even with strong carbon pricing, do not incentivise investors to deliver a 
fully renewable, reliable and affordable energy system. Therefore, policy makers  
should focus on developing CRMs which can work in combination with market 
incentives to reach a fully renewable, reliable and affordable electricity system in 
the second half of the century.
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Why fully liberalised electricity markets will fail to meet deep decarbonisation
targets even with strong carbon pricing
7.1 Introduction
The electricity system will play a key role in the energy transition now that
zero-carbon energy technologies are becoming attractive to market players [16].
Although often policy makers that try to encourage this transition focus on
reaching intermediate goals [368], major scenario studies [210, 15, 7] expect
that in the long run a fully renewable electricity system will be key to limit
climate warming to less than two degree. This transition has to take place while
maintaining the affordability and reliability of the electricity system – the energy
trilemma [369].
Meeting these three requirements (renewable, affordable and reliable) will be
challenging; ongoing electrification is likely to introduce large peaks in electricity
demand while the increasing share of variable, non-dispatchable renewables will
bring additional challenges in supply [370]. It will also bring opportunities
for businesses and investors. Technological progress, learning by doing and
deployment subsidies have made renewable power generation an increasingly
interesting investment opportunity for investors [16].
Investors look increasingly into developing wind and solar assets as other
options face various constraints: In many regions the potential for hydro-power
has largely been exploited [210], nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage
lack societal support and the use of biomass is constrained by resource needs,
environmental impact and sustainability concerns [371]. Moreover, the limited
resource base for biomass [181] combined with its potential to fulfil other more
difficult to decarbonise energy service demands, makes biomass for the electricity
system a non-favourable option.
To integrate ever larger shares of intermittent renewable assets in the supply
mix, the electricity system will need to become more flexible [372, 373, 374]. Next
to increased transmission and demand response, this flexibility can be provided by
storing excess supply, profiting from price differences (arbitrage). As battery costs
have been steadily decreasing, utility scale storage becomes a realistic investment
opportunity [375] and various studies have shown circumstances under which
storage investments would be profitable [376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383].
7.1.1 Three challenges for liberalised electricity markets
Since the 1990’s many electricity markets have been liberalised around the world
[384]. These liberalised electricity markets are set up to ensure that supply meets
demand continuously at least costs [385]. Now that ambitious decarbonisation
targets are set, the market design of these markets will need to incentivise




decarbonisation of the electricity system however poses three challenges to the
design of these markets. The first is that wind and solar energy have negligible
Short Run Marginal Costs (SRMC) while the current market designs assumes
that power generators can be ranked based on their marginal costs in the merit
order. Second, current market designs assume that the majority of the generators
to be dispatchable, which renewables are clearly not. Third, policy makers try to
serve two masters with conflicting needs. On the one hand, they try to offer
a fair playing field to producers and consumers, and on the other hand they
try to persuade these players towards certain choices in order to achieve desired
policy targets. While the market liberalisation has resulted in a fair playing field,
now that ambitious targets are set it is unclear whether specific market designs,
constructed to accommodate the liberalisation are compatible with set targets.
7.1.2 Electricity market design
In “energy-only” markets investors are only compensated for the electricity they
actually produce. The electricity price is set by the bid from the last dispatched
generator in the merit order (the marginal costs of the marginal producer).
Producers are compensated for fixed costs by the infra-marginal rent they receive
when they are in merit. For the marginal producer, the infra-marginal rent equates
to zero, but they may be able to raise prices when electricity production is scarce.
This ensures system adequacy [386]: when electricity is scarce, higher prices
give investors an incentive to invest in new capacity. If, however, electricity
prices are regulated and/or capped, this can result in the well-known “missing
money problem” [371], where marginal producers do not earn back their initial
investment.
While scarcity pricing in theory should ensure system adequacy [387, 388,
389, 369, 385, 390], internalising the social cost of carbon emissions within
full liberalised electricity markets is often seen as a cost-effective means for the
decarbonisation of the electricity market [391]. This would entail that internalising
these costs would incentivise investors to invest in the flexibility of the electricity
system, necessary to integrate ever larger shares of non-flexible sources. This
necessary flexibility is argued [385] to arise automatically as market forces will
incentivise investors to invest in demand response, increased transmission, and/or
electricity storage. This assumes that in a decarbonised electricity system “the
market” accommodates the required flexibility to ensure sufficient electricity is
supplied to meet demand at all times.
While some researchers and policy makers advocate the effectiveness of
energy-only markets [369, 392], in practice we have seen other market designs
being proposed and implemented around the world (especially in Western Europe
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[393]). These alternative designs aim to ensure system adequacy while integrating
larger shares of intermittent capacity [394, 395, 396, 397, 398], and incorporate
various types of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs) in which operators
also receive compensation for their capacity and not only for produced electricity
[399, 400, 401, 402, 403].
To evaluate whether a) energy-only markets or b) markets with an CRM
deliver on set targets, we focus on the question whether these market designs
will incentivise investors to develop a fully sustainable (i.e. reliable, affordable
and renewable) electricity system. Although we are aware different CRM have
been developed and analysed, in this study we study CRMs in general, under the
assumption it is functioning effectively.
Reaching this target would require investors to invest in flexibility of the
system. Although different technical solutions are possible to accommodate
this flexibility, here we focus on utility scale electricity storage. Therefore, we
evaluate the mentioned two market designs based on the question: Are investors
incentivised to invest in the required mix of renewable and storage assets to reach
a fully renewable electricity system in the period 2070 to 2100, while maintaining
system adequacy and affordability?
This paper is organised as follows; in Section 7.2 we shortly discuss the
literature on electricity market modelling and give more background into agent-
based modelling and the way this tool has been used to study electricity
markets. In Section 7.3 we describe our methodology. Here we discuss
our system conceptualisation, the rationale of decision making structures and
subsequently how this conceptualisation has been implemented. Section 7.4
discusses the experimental setup, the KPIs (reliability, affordability and renewable)
and the hypotheses for the different experiments. Results from experiments are
presented in Section 7.5 and discussed in Section 7.6. Conclusions and policy
recommendations are given in Section 7.7.
7.2 Background
7.2.1 Modelling electricity markets
There are various modelling techniques to analyse electricity markets [56, 320,
404, 405, 323]. Most dominant are optimisation models that have proven to
be successful by showing policy makers cost-optimal pathways of the energy
transition based on assumptions of rational actors and neoclassical economics
[406, 407, 408], often focused on a 100% renewable target [409, 410] and/or
utility scale storage [411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416].




agents is broadly sufficient, in designing electricity markets for the achievement
of a specific purpose, analysing of specific market designs needs simulation
of more realistic behaviour of investors subject to these rules. To provide
effective legislation, policy makers therefore, should also consider how issues like
heterogeneity of investors, market power, imperfect information, and bounded
rationality of players play-out. Policy options would therefore, need to be
evaluated by simulating how different policies will affect the more realistic
expected behaviour of investors. Agent-based modelling is a simulation method
with which these behavioural drives can be implemented and analysed (e.g.
[338, 66, 340])
7.2.2 Agent-based modelling of electricity markets: storage
and market power
Agent-based modelling is to mode the electricity system from the complex 
adaptive systems perspective. This system perspective enables us to come to 
grips with the emerging behaviour of systems such as the electricity system, 
that are composed by interrelated and heterogeneous actors. [417, 418, 419].
With regards to the modelling of electricity markets, agent-based modelling is 
well suited to model heterogeneous investors that, with their investment decisions, 
shape the emerging system behaviour in terms of carbon emissions, electricity 
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weakened if the system is more flexible. They also conclude that flexibility options
(demand response and electrical energy storage) may significantly reduce the risk
of shortages in an energy-only market even if investment decisions are myopic.
However, while we consider renewable power generation and flexibility of the
system to emerge endogenously from investors decisions, Khan et al. considered
renewable power generation as exogenously put into the system. Moreover, where
Khan et al. focused on system adequacy, we evaluated market design on its
ability to deliver to long-term targets on sustainability (renewable, affordable and
reliable).
7.3 Methodology
Building on the vast knowledge base in the field of agent-based electricity
market modelling, our modelling approach differentiates itself in five areas: i)
our conceptualisation with endogenous investment in renewables and flexibility,
ii) the focus on the long-term dynamics in electricity markets with simulations of
the system to 2100, iii) our choice of key performance indicators, focusing on a
fully sustainable electricity system in 2070, vi) our conceptual approach combining
several building blocks (investor behaviour, market design, flexibility market), into
a coherent model and finally v) the focus on transparency, reproducibility and
tractability by modelling from a minimum set of assumptions.
To address this last point, because transparency, reproducibility and tractab-
ility are three of the fundamental challenges of agent-based modelling [66, 417],
our approach has been based on a minimum set of assumptions that would still
adequately encapsulated system behaviours to be able to evaluate policy options.
This paper is based on an extension of an existing agent-based model of
investors in the electricity market [429], augmenting it with the possibility to
invest in utility-scale storage. For a detailed description of the previously model
we refer the reader to [429].
7.3.1 System conceptualisation
Investors in the electricity market & flexibility as investment option
Our system conceptualisation starts with the assumption that investors are profit
maximising and they evaluate investment opportunities on that basis. How much
revenue they expect to gain from an asset is determined by the future electricity
price that in turn depends on the emerging power generation portfolio in the
lifetime of the asset. This electricity price is set by the bid of the marginal
producer. Rationally they will bid their Short Run Marginal Costs (SRMC) and




profits then consist of the difference between the SRMC of the marginal producer
and their own SRMC.
However, because electricity consumers are willing to pay a much higher price
then the SRMC of the marginal producer to prevent a black-out (up to the
value-of-lost-load (VOLL)), market players can increase their bids when electricity
is scarce. The margin with which producers can raise prices when supply is
scarce, the scarcity rent, reflects a combination of true scarcity and market power
investors can employ. Wilson [430] discusses the relation between scarcity rent
and market power in more detail.
This scarcity rent incentivises investors to invest in generation capacity as
profit margins and the expected profitability of new assets in these moments
increase. In short, the profit an asset makes is made up by the infra-marginal rent,
i.e. the difference between their SRMC and SRMC of the marginal producer, plus
an possible scarcity rent when electricity is scarce.
These scarcity rents tend to follow a curve [385] as depicted in Figure 7.1 and
given in Equation 7.1
S(t) =
Smax − Smin
α− 1 ∗ α
1/es (t) + Smin −
Smax − Smin
α− 1 (7.1)
In Figure 7.1 the horizontal axes indicates the inverse ratio of potential power
generation over demand, given by es(t) the excess capacity factor, following
Equation 7.2. Gp(t) depicts the potential power generation at time t and D(t)
depicts electricity demand at time t. Gp(t) depends on the potential power
generation of the coal assets (Gc), the gas assets Gg and the (intermittent)
potential power generation of the renewable assets Gr (t). The potential power
generation is equal to the sum of the potential power generation of all assets,
including the variability of renewable power generating assets, see Equation 7.3.












When there is enough spare capacity no market power can be employed
(Smin = 0) but when demand matches maximum supply (and es reaches 1)
the electricity price can go up the maximum price consumers are willing to pay to
avoid a contingency (Smax) which is equal to the value of lost load (VOLL). α in
this figure is a system variable and will depend on the installed capacity mix and
the system adequacy (or avoided contingency risk) consumers are willing to pay
for. An efficient system would zigzag around in the grey area; higher scarcity rent
levels incentivises investments which decreases possible market power vice versa.
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With the target of a fully renewable electricity mix in mind, we need to consider
how this system will work with increasing shares of renewables.
Figure 7.1 – Scarcity rent. Figure shows the development of the scarcity rent (S(t))
with regards to the excess capacity factor (es), i.e. the supply/demand ratio given in
Equation 7.2. α determines the curvature of the curve, Smin and Smax determine the
minimum and maximum value of the scarcity rent subsequently.
Functioning of an energy-only market with increasing shares of renewables
As renewables can produce for zero marginal costs, they are in front of the merit-
order and thus gain the largest rents (infra-marginal & scarcity). With decreasing
investment costs, these renewable assets therefore, get increasingly competitive.
However, deploying more renewables is self-cannibalising, as the merit-order effect
depresses prices when they produce. Moreover, as they are non-dispatchable and
tend to produce at the same time, they cannot exercise market power. If we
want to use intermittent sources at moments they are not available and supply is
higher than demand, this excess power could be stored. This stored energy then
could be used at other moments in time. This would add a term Gs(t) to Gp,










Storing excess power and selling it in a later point in time could be a business
opportunity for investors. This brings us to the evaluation of the business case of
a storage asset. First of all, we need to realise that storage assets don’t produce
power but only provide flexibility. Although we are aware storage operates can




their business case depends on the price difference between buying and selling
power; arbitrage. Further, we assume that storage assets can only store excess
renewable power.
But how and what will they pay for this excess power? In case of excess supply,
the electricity price is near zero, so storage assets could go on the market and
store for near zero. However, when there is more storage capacity than excess
supply, storage assets will be willing to pay for this surplus as they suspect to be
able to sell for a higher price, when renewable don’t produce and conventional
units with non-zero SRMC set prices. We argue that the price which storage
assets are willing to pay, the floor price, will follow a similar curve as the scarcity
rent curve, depicted in Figure 7.2 and given in functional from in Equation 7.5.
The horizontal axes in this figure depicts the fraction of excess renewable power
Er supply over storage capacity Cs given by ef in Equation 7.6.
F (t) =
Fmax − Fmin
α− 1 ∗ α








Figure 7.2 – Floor price. Development of the floor price (F (t)) with regards to the ratio
of available storage capacity and excess renewable production (ef ). β determines the
curvature, Fmin and Fmax determine the minimum and maximum floor price subsequently.
When this inverse of ef is small, a case with ample excess of renewable
power but small storage capacity, storage assets will pay a near zero premium.
However, when renewable excess power is scarce, and the fraction approaches
1, the maximum premium they are willing to pay is equal to the price they can
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sell for minus their OPEX. This sell-price depends on the capacity mix because
possibly they can use their market power when they sell in the case electricity is
scarce. Fmax therefore, is calculated with the relationship shown in Figure 7.1.
Fmax is equal to the VOLL when no conventional thermal units are left in the
system because if the excess power wouldn’t be stored, then a contingency would
occur for which consumers would be willing to pay the VOLL to prevent.
The curvature of this curve is determined by the value of β. It is determined
by the renewable excess power capacity to fill the storage assets. The floor price
is necessary for renewable assets to regain their fixed costs, even when power
is in excess. Otherwise incentive to create excess capacity is lacking while it is
necessary to fulfil demand in a fully renewable electricity system.
Scarcity rent and floor price with high shares of renewables
Fully liberalised systems without governmental interference would in theory ensure
system adequacy and with a high enough carbon price, meet set targets (see
Section 7.2). However, in a system with increasing shares of renewables, α as
well as β decrease dramatically, thereby removing incentives for investment in
storage as well as renewable assets.
Let’s assume that somehow, miraculously, we have a system that meets the
set targets, only producing from renewable and storage assets, with precisely
enough excess power supply to supply the precisely large enough storage capacity
to fulfil demand in scarce-hours (i.e. 1/es = 1 and F (t) = Fmax). This would
be the most cost-effective system with regards to renewables and storage, with
theoretically the best return on capital employed. What would the value of α and
β need to be for the system to be sustainable with healthy profits for investors
while maintaining system adequacy?
To analyse the required values of α and β, let us start with the extreme
cases, assuming that 1/es = 1 and F (t) = Fmax . With ample conventional
thermal power generation capacity in the system (i.e. 1/ef ≈ 0), the maximum
price storage assets are willing to pay for excess renewable power, Fmax is equal
to the scarcity rent which approaches zero, see Figure 7.1. In the other extreme
case, when no conventional power generation in the system, the ratio ef (t) is
equal to 1 which makes Fmax equal to Smax . However, what is the value of the
scarcity rent and floor price when the ratios are just below 1? That’s the moment
that investment would need to be incentivised, otherwise the ratios will rise even
further and contingencies are expected.
At that moment, with only marginal conventional thermal power generation
left in the system, the scarcity rent and floor price approach zero. The scarcity




renewable power supply than storage capacity (i.e. 1/ef is just below 1), storage
assets will not be willing to pay for excess power. If they would, they end up
at the end of the merit-order and will not sell their power. This would mean α
and β go to zero with increasing renewable power generation in the mix and both
functions will become a step-function, see Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3 – Scarcity rent and floor price development with increasing shares of renewable
power production. Figure shows that the curvature of the scarcity rent and floor price
increases with larger shares of renewable power production.
This means that when the system is in its ideal state (ef = 1), the business
case for conventional power generators disappears and thermal power generating
assets will be removed from the system, either actively or when their lifetime is
exceeded. This drives the inverse of es to 1. In this process, incentives for new
investment are given at the point that contingencies cannot be prevented because
of the delay between the opening up of an investment opportunity and the actual
power production.
We infer that this system would not be acceptable from a policy perspective.
To compensate for this market failure, α and β need to increased. Various policy
alternatives have been proposed to do just that. Essentially, they are various
forms of CRM. The main point here is that only the presence of back-up capacity
(ensuring that S(t) > 0 when es is just below 1), will increase the price for which
storage assets can sell which will be just below the SRMC of the back-up capacity.
The presence of a flexibility market in which storage operators are able to pay for
excess renewables would be a prerequisite.
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A business innovation: storage-backed-renewables
To circumvent this flexibility market, investors could consider to invest in a asset
with a combination of renewable power generation and electricity storage. Given
the right mix of asset types, this could provide firm capacity (i.e. dispatchable
capacity). Excess power in that case would not be sold to the market, but would
be stored in the storage asset. As this asset class is not depending on the market
to store its electricity, it will only sell electricity if it can regain its investment costs.
Therefore, our assumption is that it will bid its Long Run Marginal Costs (LRMC)
into the market; if the market price is under its LRMC, it is more profitable to
store electricity than to sell to the market.
7.3.2 Model conceptualisation
To integrate the system conceptualisation in the model, we extended the existing
model conceptualisation with two asset classes; storage and storage-backed-
renewables. The model and its extension are written in the software environment
Netlogo, following best practices for scientific computing [349]. For the model
description, the ODD protocol [72, 71] has been followed. The model is open
source and can be found on-line together with the ODD protocol1. The model is
extensively verified through single-agent testing, recording and tracking behaviour
and multi-agent testing [96]. Here we first briefly discuss the existing model and
then describe its extension.
Existing model
The current model describes the time-evolution of the electricity system over
decades. It consists of heterogeneous investors and various types of electricity
generating assets; coal-fired, gas-fired and renewable-based assets. In the model,
investors evaluate investment based on economic criteria (Net Present Values).
The expected profits from an asset type are based on the historical returns of the
same asset type. The heterogeneous discount rates investors apply in the financial
opportunity evaluation is the numeric pars pro toto of the investors long-term
outlook. This outlook will colour future decisions and is dynamic: Investors will
see their discount rate in- or decrease over time based on the average profitability
of their asset portfolio.
Investors own assets that produce electricity. Assets have one GW name-plate
capacity and have different properties with regards to their investment costs, CO2
intensity, SRMC (based on fuel costs), lifetime and efficiency. Where coal and
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in this paper, renewable assets have a variable supply on daily scale, modelled as
a cosines function.
In the electricity market, assets produce electricity that satisfies the in-elastic
and constant electricity demand. The electricity price is set by the SRMC of the
marginal producer plus the scarcity rent discussed in Section 7.3.1.
Model extension: Storage
To integrate the possibility to invest in assets providing flexibility, the asset-type
storage has been implemented. Distinctive from a normal power generation asset,
a storage asset can only produce electricity if it has stored it previously. It has
a certain energy storage capacity and flux-capacity. Just as normal assets it has
a lifetime and efficiency. Its SRMC depends on the average price of electricity it
had to pay to charge, weighted to the amount of electricity stored for that price.
The SRMC together with the time depended electricity generation capacity of
the storage unit is incorporated in the merit order.
Because of the distinctive properties of electricity storage versus electric
generation capacity, the electricity market algorithm of the existing model [429]
has been modified to be able to integrate storage as asset type. As described in
Section 7.3.1, Gp would need to include the capacity the storage asset has (with
its limits of energy capacity and flux capacity).
To facilitate the storage and selling of electricity, a flexibility-market was setup
in which the price is determined that storage operators are willing to pay electricity
generators. It has been implemented following the conceptualisation described in
Section 7.3.1.
Model extension: Storage-backed-renewables
An additional asset class that has been implemented is the asset class storage-
backed renewables. This asset-class has a constant potential production of 1 GW.
To deliver this power this asset is an integration of two conventional renewable
assets of 1 GW each and one storage asset of 1 GW each. Its investment costs are
based on the required mix of renewable and storage assets and include integration
costs. This asset-class is implemented following the description in Section 7.3.1.
7.4 Experimental setup and hypotheses
To answer the question whether in specific market designs a sustainable electricity
system emerges, we conducted experiments and determined the value of three
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) capturing reliability, affordability and the
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percentage of renewables in the electricity mix. With these three KPIs we then
could draw a final conclusion on the sustainability of the system.
We varied four elements in a full-factorial fashion and designed hypotheses of
the extent to which the KPIs will be met. These sixteen experiments are grouped
in four groups of four and based on the experiment-tree given in Figure 7.4. Here
the overall success requirement was defined as a fully sustainable (i.e. reliable,
renewable and affordable) electricity system in the period 2070 to 2100.
These three KPIs are:
Reliability This parameter measures whether the system meets the require-
ments on system adequacy. The average reliability over the period 2070 - 2100,





365 ∗ 24 ∗ 30 (7.7)
with O(y) the number of hours without outage in year y divided over the total
number of hours in the 30 year time period. Success on this parameter is defined
as Reliability being larger than 0.975 over the 30 year period.
Affordability This parameter measures whether the system is affordable
relative to a reference system. This parameter, described by the total capital
employed, is measured by summing the capital employed per asset-class (i.e. the
investment size of the asset in a specific class times the number of assets in
that asset class) in a specific year and averaged over the period 2070-2100. The
reference system is a fully renewable system with similar load factor as the system
at initialisation (75%). The average affordability over the period 2070 - 2100, A









with C(y) the average capital employed in year y divided over the reference capital
employed (Cr ). Success on this parameter is defined as being smaller than 1.75.
Renewable This parameter measures whether the system reaches the 100%
renewable target. Average renewable power production, Ren, is determined by
summing the power generation from renewable assets, storage-backed renewables













with R(y) the average daily renewable-based electricity production in year y
divided by the average daily power demand D. Success on this parameter is
defined as Renewable being larger than 0.975 over the 30 year period.
Results from the first part of this experiment tree were presented in a previous
paper based on this model [429]. Here we analysed that an insufficient CO2 price
would not lead to success as to little incentive would be in place to invest in
renewable power generation. Other factors that would limit the system to meet
the set target, are a limiting price cap that would lead to the missing money
problem (see Section 7.2) and lack of investment possibilities for flexibility, i.e.
storage to be able to integrate intermittent renewables while meeting demand.
These finding have been replicated in this study (see Fig 7.10) and further our
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7.4.1 Agents: Ideal versus Realistic
In the first experiment we differentiate between ideal and more realistic agent 
behaviour. Ideal agents will invest whenever an NPV is larger than zero and 
assets that do not require a build-time and would immediately be active in the 
electricity market. They are also myopic as they do not have full information but 
react on signals from the market. More realistic agents will only invest if the NPV 
of an investment options is positive for a longer period of time parametrised to 
three years. Furthermore, assets have a specific build-time before they become 
active, parametrized to seven years.
Our hypothesis is that, with erratic investment signals from an energy-only 
market under previously discussed conditions, realistic behaviour of investors and 
assets would severely affect the reliability of the overall system due to insufficient 
investments.
7.4.2 Market Design: Energy only versus Market with CRM
The second element in which experiments differ is whether a CRM is implemented. 
Specifically, this means that in an energy-only market the slopes of curves (α 
and β) in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 are dynamic, and linearly depended on the 
percentage renewables in the system as depicted in Figure 7.3. In experiments 
where markets have a CRM, α and β are static. The value of α is determined 
under the assumption that outages cannot occur and is set at the minimum level 
that meets that requirement. β is set at the minimum value at which enough 
excess renewables emerge to match the residual load, i.e. the demand minus the 
renewable production. This market design can be understood of as a simulation 
of a capacity market as explained in Section 7.3.1.
We expect the investment signal to become discontinuously and ultimately 
binary, making energy-only markets behave erratically, especially when more 
renewables enter the electricity system. In non-energy-only markets however, 
the investment signal will follow a more continuous curve. We expect that, given 
that storage operates will pay for excess renewables, β will ensure enough excess 
renewable will be produced to meet the residual load, and α will ensure the 
reliability requirement will be met. With an adequate carbon price this system 
should be able to meet our overall success requirement.
7.4.3 Flexibility market: Presence of flexibility market versus
absence of flexibility market
Thirdly, we run simulations with and without a flexibility-market in place. The




renewable power. In the absence of such a market, storage operates will not pay
for excess renewables and will just go to the regular electricity market.
Our hypothesis is that when renewable operators mainly produce when the
electricity price is near zero, and will not gain financial compensation for their
excess production, the incentive to build renewable assets strongly decreases.
This will lead to insufficient excess renewable power to store and supply the
residual load.
7.4.4 Storage-backed renewables: Presence of asset-class
versus absence of asset-class
In this last experiment-differentiation, we differentiated experiments in which
investors, besides the possibility to invest in storage, also have the possibility
to invest in the asset class storage-backed renewables as described in Section
7.3.1.
Our hypothesis is that storage-backed renewables will be attractive for
investors as the market-uncertainty of the interaction between storage and
renewables is removed. From a system perspective however, we expect this option
to be less efficient and affordable as centralised storage would be more capital-
efficient than separate storage assets that can only store for a local renewable
asset.
7.4.5 General experimental setup
The model has been parametrized to represent the Dutch electricity system as
pars pro toto for the European Electricity market. The starting point is the
year 2000. The model has been initialised with 20 GW capacity and 15 GW
demand, with 5 initial investors, representing the utility companies active in The
Netherlands. The model has granularity of hours and runs for 100 years, the
time frame of interest for the transition of the electricity system. Carbon prices
between 2000 and 2015 are based on historic prices of the EU-ETS. Carbon
prices beyond 2015 are based on a carbon price scenario. This carbon price
scenario brings the carbon price from 2015 to a pre-set carbon price level in 2050,
see Figure 7.5. The default carbon price level is set at 200 e/tCO2, a carbon
price level that would be sufficient to reach climate goals [7]. Renewable power
generation is modelled to represent a utility-scale solar farm and modelled as
cosine with a 24 hour period. Experiments are run 30 times for each experiment.
The experimentation of a selection of experiments with 100 runs showed that the
experimentation with 30 runs was sufficiently representative with regards to the
average and standard deviation of the model outcomes. The Table 7.1 gives an
overview of the important values at initialisation.
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Figure 7.5 – Carbon price scenario. Figure shows the reference CO2 scenario. In
subsequent experiments the Maximum Carbon Price has been varied but the reference
year of 2050 is kept the same (see Section 7.5.1).
7.5 Results
The results from the sixteen experiments as discussed in Section 7.4 are outlined
in Figure 7.6. The experiment-tree is on the left and the results of the experiments
are summarized in the table on the right. In the table the three KPIs are given, i)
reliability (green), ii) affordability (blue) and iii) renewable (black). Numbers are
the average values over 30 model runs, meeting the success criterion described
in 7.4 is denoted with green for yes and red for no. The column on the far right
shows the experiment result measured against the overall success criterion.
The table in Figure 7.6 shows that most experiments fail on one or several
criteria. Only one experiment meets the overall success criterion, experiment 4.1
which will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.5.1
From the experiment-tree, three experiments have been selected to develop
three scenarios. The first scenario,“Ideal E-O market” is a scenario with ideal
agents; rational risk-taking investors and instantaneous asset development that
act within an energy-only market. The second scenario, “Realistic energy-only
market” shows how the more realistic agent behaviour influences the development
of an energy-only market. Because this scenario does not meet our success
criterion, a third scenario was explored. This third scenarios “Realistic market
with CRM” shows how the success criterion can be met with an CRM.
7.5.1 Three scenarios
To further explore the three scenarios, these scenarios will be discussed




Table 7.1 – Values of variables of parameters at initialisation
the three selected scenarios, namely: i). Renewable, the percentage renewable
electricity generation in the energy mix in black (left y-axis), ii). Reliable, the
reliability percentage in green (right y-axis), and iii) Affordable, the total capital
employed in blue (right y-axis). The shaded areas show the first quartile on both
sides of the median while the thick lines show the median.
Energy-only market with ideal agents
This scenario explores the effect of ideal agents in an energy-only market
and corresponds with the most upward going path in the experiment-tree.
Results are depicted in Figure 7.7. The erratic behaviour corresponds with our
hypothesis given in Section 7.4.2. Since agents, investors as well as assets,
behave ideally, i.e. respond immediately to investment signals that create assets
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Figure 7.6 – Results from experiments. The top-branch (dark) of the experiment-tree
depicts the experiments with ideal agents, while the lower branch (light-grey) depicts
the experiments with “realistic” agents. Table shows the average results of the three
outcome criteria (reliable, affordable, renewable) over the model runs. Colours depicts
whether or not they met the success criterion (red = no, green = yes) based on the
defined success criteria. Far right hand column shows result for the overall success
criterion: a fully sustainable electricity system in the period 2070 to 2100. Experiment
1.1, 3.1 and 4.1 are treated more extensively in Section 7.5.1 and subsequently in Figure
7.7, 7.8 and 7.9.
instantaneously, reliability is not a concern. While in this scenario a fully renewable
system is reached the fastest, due to the erratic investment signals and myopic
investors, investment cycles emerges; when there is an incentive to invest, agents
immediately invest and remove the investment incentive vice versa. These market
fluctuations represent a major element of uncertainty and results in inefficiencies.
Energy-only market with realistic agents
This scenario explores the emerging electricity system in an energy-only market
in which (more) realistic investor make investment decisions. Figure 7.8 shows
a fully renewable electricity system does not emerge in this scenario. Reliability
is of (minor) concern in line with our hypothesis expressed in Section 7.4.1 that
realistic agents need time to respond to investment signals. However, this scenario
mainly fails on delivering a renewable electricity system. This scenario shows that
an energy-only market, with its erratic investment signals when renewables deeply
penetrate the electricity mix, does not give the right mix of investment signals to




Figure 7.7 – Ideal energy - only market. Figure shows under ideal circumstances and
unrealistic assumptions on investors behaviour, targets can be met but investment cycles
emerge. The shaded areas show the first quartile on both sides of the median while the
thick lines show the median. Figure is based on experiment 1.1.
Figure 7.8 – Realistic energy-only market. Figure shows that renewable target cannot
be reached in this scenario. The shaded areas show the first quartile on both sides of
the median while the thick lines show the median. Figure is based on experiment 3.1.
Market with realistic agents and CRM
Figure 7.9 shows that in markets with a successful implemented CRM a fully
renewable energy system can emerge while meeting requirements on reliability
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Figure 7.8 – Realistic energy-only market. Figure shows that renewable target cannot
be reached in this scenario. The shaded areas show the first quartile on both sides of
the median while the thick lines show the median. Figure is based on experiment 3.1.
Market with realistic agents and CRM
Figure 7.9 shows that in markets with a successful implemented CRM a fully
renewable energy system can emerge while meeting requirements on reliability
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and affordability if a set of conditions are met. These conditions include:
• No price cap
• Strong CO2 pricing
• Existence of storage investment possibility
• Existence of flexibility market in which storage operators can pay for excess
renewable electricity
Essentially a CRM has the effect of smoothening the curves in Figure 7.3,
giving a more consistent investment signal with a varying supply-demand ratio.
With a strong carbon price, a fully renewable, reliable and affordable electricity
system can emerge.
In the next section (Section 7.5.1) several CO2 scenarios are explored to see
at what point in time this sustainable system emerges and to test robustness of
results of the three scenarios against different carbon price scenarios.
Figure 7.9 – Realistic market with CRM. Figure shows that this scenario can reach the
set target on all three KPI, showing it can attain a fully sustainable electricity system
in the period 2070-2100. The shaded areas show the first quartile on both sides of the
median while the thick lines show the median. Figure is based on experiment 4.1.
Sensitivity to carbon price scenarios
To further test these three scenarios, we explored them under different carbon




is varied for each experiment. The average KPIs (in the period 2070 - 2100) over
all model runs with the specific carbon price scenario are depicted.
Figure 7.10.a shows that in a realistic energy-only market, even with a doubling
of carbon prices compared to the experiments depicted in figure 7.6, a fully
renewable energy system does not emerge. This suggest that an energy-only
market cannot deliver a sustainable electricity system.
A fully renewable electricity system can emerge from a market with a
successful implemented CRM. It would however require a substantial increase
from current carbon price, to > 200 e/tCO2. Furthermore, we see that an “ideal”
energy-only market needs the lowest carbon price to reach its maximum renewable
fraction but because of the investment cycles in this scenario, its average over
the 30-year time period is less than 100%.
Figure 7.10.b shows that reliability requirements can be met in markets with
a CRM, while especially in realistic energy-only markets, reliability is of concern.
Figure 7.10.c shows that a realistic market with CRM would require a larger
investment than realistic energy-only markets, but at the dispense of a lower
renewable fraction (Figure 7.10.a).
7.5.2 Additional observed trends in the experiments
Other general trends we observed in the experiments are:
• Without a flexibility market, a market in which storage operators can pay
for excess renewables, there is not enough investment in renewable power
generation to cover the residual load. The storage capacity size is not the
limiting factor, the availability of excess renewables is.
• In the majority of scenarios in which storage-backed renewables emerge,
the overall system becomes inefficient as the affordability (i.e. total capital
employed), becomes impaired. This is can be understood by considering
that market-based storage assets can be more efficiently operated than a
storage asset that can only store electricity from the connected renewable
asset.
• With deep penetration of renewables in the electricity mix, the required
reliability margin needed to sustain a fully reliable electricity system over
long periods becomes larger.
• Total capital employed in all scenarios grows substantially across the
modelled time-period. This illustrates the fact that the cost of the system
are increasingly internalised; while the current system heavily depends
on fossil resources with low capital/fuel cost ratios, a renewable-based
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Figure 7.10 – Sensitivity to carbon price scenarios: a. Renewable fraction; b. Reliability;
c. Relative Investment. Graphs show that a CO2 price in the excess of 200 e/tCO2
is necessary to reach a fully renewable energy system in scenario “Realistic market with
CRM”. Graphs also shows that results from the Realistic energy-only market are robust
against higher carbon price scenarios; these fully liberalised markets will fail to deliver a
fully sustainable electricity system even with strong carbon pricing.
electricity system fully rely on invested capital. A sustainable electricity
system will, therefore, have substantial higher capital requirement relative
to today.
7.6 Discussion
Here we discuss how different choices on four critical elements have affected
our modelling results and how further research could address identified relevant
further questions. These four elements are: i) the chosen market designs, ii) the
included technologies, iii) the agent behaviour and vi) the chosen model approach.
7.6.1 Market design
In our model we focused on two market designs: markets with CRM and fully




emerged. These includes, amongst others, power purchase agreements, feed-
in-tariffs, investment subsidies etc. There is also a wide variety of capacity
remuneration mechanisms; different types of capacity markets, strategic reserves
etc. To assess these market designs would need detailed modelling of these policy
measures.
We argue that all of these measures are some form of institutional intervention
and deviations from fully liberalised energy-only markets. Given our conclusions a
further evaluation of these market designs would be a logical follow-up for further
research. As we have seen that institutional intervention would be needed to
reach set targets and evaluating policies would need simulation of more realistic
agent-behaviour, an agent-based approach for this future research would be the
logical next step.
7.6.2 Technologies
This research considered only one type of variable, renewable technology (solar
PV) and one type of flexibility technology (electricity storage). Therefore, we
only considered daily variability. In reality, these technologies are also variable
on longer time scales which leads to concerns about seasonal variability and rare
weather events.
We would expect however, that inclusion of these dynamics would confirm
our model results. As both are relatively uncommon (being “seasonal”/“rare”),
we would expect that in fully liberalised markets, the investment signal to be
deficient for large-scale investments by investors. Therefore, to reach set targets,
the successful implementation of CRM would be more challenging. It would put
more strain on the design of these CRMs with regards to costs and efficiency but
if successfully, based in our results, we would expect these CRMs to be able to
give sufficient investment signals.
Moreover, other carbon-neutral technologies such as nuclear, biomass, carbon
capture and storage (CCS) and pumped hydro were not considered to be
investable for investors as they face constrains with regards to regulatory risk,
high capital costs, infrastructural requirements and sustainability concerns (as
explained in Section 7.1). Investing in these technologies, we would argue, would
need strong governmental support apart from higher CO2 prices, supporting our
conclusions.
7.6.3 Agent behaviour
In our model we distinguished two types of agents; investors and assets which
conceptualisation has been based on a minimum set of assumptions, resulting in a
relatively simple behavioural algorithm. We realise that investor behaviour is more
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complex and that in reality a large variety of factors contribute to an investor’s
decision to invest. However, incorporating additional factors such as preference
for types of assets, previous experiences (i.e. company history), outlook for
governmental intervention, risk appetite amongst others, is beyond the scope
of this paper [334]. Moreover, we are convinced that our conceptualisation is
justified, given the purpose of the model and the balance of model detail over
the model elements. Even more so because meaningful quantification of these
extremely uncertain factors would be impossible, especially looking at decades
from now.
7.6.4 Modelling approach
Electricity markets are subject to an active field of scientific research fuelling
the policy discussion on their most effective design. In last decades agent-based
approaches to the evaluation of these market design clearly have grown from its
infancy to a mature field of research [66].
In the broad spectrum of agent-based approaches, our modelling approach
has been relatively conceptual to be able to combine several buildings blocks of
the electricity system (investors, market design, flexibility) into a coherent model
that has preserved the balance of model detail over the different model elements.
Details matter, especially in complex systems such as the electricity system, but
one cannot circumvent the fundamental dynamics of these markets.
This agent-based modelling approach has given us a natural way to think
about the behaviour of investors and its consequence for the emerging electricity
market. The great benefit of our approach is that it has allowed us to engage
stakeholders (also non-scientific-modellers) actively in the conceptualisation of
the model doing full justice to the power of an agent-based approach.
7.7 Conclusions and policy implications
7.7.1 Conclusions
In this study we explored whether a fully sustainable electricity market, i.e.
one that is renewable, reliable and affordable, can emerge from fully liberalised
electricity markets. We introduced a model that incorporates more realistic
behaviour of investors acting on limited information, heterogeneous outlooks and
decision times and whose decisions take effect only after a realistic asset building
time. Using an agent-based model, we explored the interplay between these key
characteristics of investors and investments and two market designs: i) a fully




electricity produced and ii) a market with a capacity remuneration mechanism
(CRM) in which the capacity requirement of the system is institutionalised.
We conclude that a fully liberalised energy-only market will not lead to
investments in an efficient mix of renewables and storage assets, even with strong
CO2 pricing. We showed that under a carbon price scenario running up to 200
e/tCO2, these markets give insufficient stable investment signals for realistic
investors to invest in a sustainable electricity system. Our sensitivity analysis
shows that these results are robust under even higher CO2 prices of up to 400
e/tCO2.
We also show a possible solution direction and have listed what would be
needed to attain a fully sustainable electricity system: i) Price caps would
need to be removed ii) a 2500% higher CO2 from today’s levels would need
to be imposed iii) a flexibility market in which storage operators can pay for
excess renewable power would need to be created, and finally iv) an capacity
remuneration mechanism would need to be successfully implemented. However
currently, price caps have strong political support, decades of discussion on CO2
pricing has not resulted in a strong carbon price, a flexibility market has yet to
emerge, and the implementation of capacity remuneration mechanisms are far
from obvious and in general are widely criticised.
This shows there are substantial challenges to overcome. However, the good
news is that technological development in the last decades has given us the
buildings blocks (solar PV, wind and electricity storage) for a sustainable system.
The challenge has thereby moved from the technical realm to the policy realm:
creating the right market incentives that allows the technologies to be deployed.
Methodologically, this study illustrates that the evaluation of electricity
market designs in the light of specific policy targets (in this case sustainability
concerns), requires the incorporation of agent behaviour. We have shown that
modelling relatively simple, yet realistic agents can deliver strategic insights
in the working of electricity markets in the future. It is our experiences in
communicating with stakeholders that suggests that this form of modelling
supports communication with policy makers and business decision makers as it
allows for joint understanding of complex analysis.
7.7.2 Policy implications
The policy implications from this study are three-fold. Firstly, this study shows
that policy makers will need to shift their focus from the improvement of energy-
only markets to developing appropriate capacity remuneration mechanisms in
order to facilitate and ultimately enable this transition to a fully renewable
electricity system in the coming decades.
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that policy makers will need to shift their focus from the improvement of energy-
only markets to developing appropriate capacity remuneration mechanisms in
order to facilitate and ultimately enable this transition to a fully renewable
electricity system in the coming decades.
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Secondly, flexibility markets, in which storage operators are able to pay for 
excess renewable power generation would need to be facilitated. This will give 
investors the incentive to generate excess renewable power which can be stored 
to use at other times.
Thirdly, policy makers will need to make use of models that explicitly incorporate 
investor behaviour, and limit over reliance on models that assume perfect 
information, perfect rationality, homogeneous actors and focus on lowest (system) 
costs. This study shows that embracing the complexities of electricity markets 
gives a different and richer perspective on the discussion around investor dynamics. 
Traditionally, the discussion on electricity market design has been framed by the 
choice between developing a perfect market under ideal agent assumptions, or 
requiring a central planner to develop an efficient market. We encourage policy 
makers to evaluate their design by incorporating realistic agent behaviour. They 
will need to work with the market and accept the complexities that these markets 
bring.
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Conclusions, Recommendations & Reflection
8.1 Research context, focus and approach
This dissertation contains a number of different approaches aimed to further our
understanding of the unfolding energy transition. In this chapter the conclusions
of more than four years of my research endeavours on the emergence of the
energy transition are brought together. We will present the main conclusions in
Section 8.2 and give recommendations for policy makers in Section 8.3 and for
business decision makers in Section 8.4. We also will reflect on our findings in
Section 8.5. Before we describe our conclusion we will shortly recap the research
context, focus and our research approach in Section 8.1.
8.1.1 Research context and focus
Climate change is one of the largest challenges facing humanity. As the energy
system is the single largest contributor to the emissions of greenhouse gases,
predominantly the result of burning fossil fuels, the world’s society will have to
engage in a transformative change of the energy system; an energy transition.
This transition will need to emerge from the interaction between social actors,
the economy, technologies and the ecosystem. This makes the transition of the
energy system a complex problem and an intellectual challenge. Against this
background this thesis has explored the question:
How do individual incentives and their interaction influence the path and
the pace of emergence of the energy transition?
We can never hope to answer this question in its full form but this question
did guide our research endeavours and results have provided insight into various
aspects of this question. Our analysis of the the nature of the problem of climate
change and the identified relevant frameworks in this context (see Chapter 2)
has led to a sequence of more specific questions which have been addressed in
Chapter 3 to 7, see Table 8.1.
Simulating interacting actors as computer entities, “agents”, has given us the
means to explore the dynamics of actor interactions. The application of a relative
new modelling method “agent-based modelling” with which these agents can be
simulated, has given additional tooling for the quantification of narratives of the
energy transition; agent-based modelling facilitates the interplay between two key
aspects of scenario making: story telling and quantitative modelling.
Insights obtained by simulating realistic actor behaviour have provided insight
in the dynamics between individual incentives and collective action. Model results
have provided new insights that can be used to put current, and possible future




Table 8.1 – Research questions by chapter. Right-hand column indicates the used
research method.
insights from these studies can be used to support strategic decisions making
by public as well as private actors and to anticipate the consequences of their
(future) decisions.
8.1.2 Research approach
Given the complex nature of the problem of climate change, our research
approach was required to accommodate several aspects: i) the scale and nature
of the problem of climate change (with regards to time and space), ii) facilitate
stakeholder engagement, iii) tackle the challenges of agent-based modelling and
iv) bridge the gap between story tellers and modellers, between scientist and
politicians and between scientists and decision makers in business.
This has lead us to our general research approach that has focused on finding
a minimal representation of the relevant system elements with a minimum set
of assumptions that still did right to the complexities of the problem. Trying
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to understand how the energy transition will emerge brings us to the border of
science as uncertainties are large, decisions stakes are high, choices have to be
made and values are in dispute. Therefore, this research approach can be seen
as example of post-normal science. It has given us a perspective with which we
could explore the added value of agent-based modelling.
8.2 Conclusions
Conclusions from our research endeavours were generated in research projects
that covered various aspects of our research question. Presented models and
analysis were based on the theoretical background and intellectual framings which
were presented in Chapter 2. In this chapter we presented specifically selected
frameworks relevant to our research question. These frameworks guided the
conceptualisation of actor behaviour in agent-based models. Perspectives from
economics, psychology and ecology gave background to the dynamics between
individual incentives and collective action.
Especially the common pool resource dilemma has been shown to effectively
highlight the conflict between individual incentives and collective action in the
context of climate change. The dilemma is in the case of climate change however
especially challenging because of three aspects; the intergenerational time scale,
international scale and the unpredictability’s of the consequences of climate
change. Insights from psychology and sociology have shown several elements
that separate human behaviour from the assumptions of neo-classical economics;
education, world views and bounded rational behaviours led to insights into the
decision-making structures of realistic actors that were used in several simulation
models.
Insights generated in the various research projects, ordered by chapter, will be
discussed subsequently:
Chapter 3: Optimistic assumptions on technology development of solar fuels
open a new narrative of how the demand for fuels with net zero emissions
can be met. But at the same time that is a risky bet. Two narratives
of the energy transition gave us a new perspective on the possible pathways
of the energy transition across the century. All Renewable and Balancing Act
show which possibilities society has to tackle climate change while supplying an
increasing energy demand. Both narratives start from the notion that today
the energy transition progresses with increased energy efficiency, the build-out of
electric renewables and sector electrification. However, these developments will
run into limits as there are sectors that are hard to electrify (aviation, shipping,




demand for hydro-carbon based fuels will persist. That demand could either be
met by balancing remaining emissions with negative emissions or by producing a
new type of renewables-based fuel, a Solar Fuel.
This chapter showed what would be necessary for these options to become
reality. In Balancing Act, the world’s society would need to overcome
the collective action problems currently keeping (bio-energy) carbon capture
and storage from large scale deployment and large new distribution and
transmissions infrastructures from roll-out. However, a bet on technology
alone will ultimately lead to a bet on the development and production of solar
fuels. These hydrocarbon fuels require air-abstracted CO2, renewable electricity,
water electrolysis (producing hydrogen), CO2 activation, and finally synthesis
of the hydrogen and activated CO2. If optimistic assumptions on technology
development become reality, these net-zero CO2 emitting fuels, could become
affordable (at a price of 200$/bbl) which could lead to large-scale market-led
deployment. The fact that individual (commercial) incentives would stimulate
the development of these solar fuels, sets All Renewables aside from Balancing
Act which would require more government involvement to overcome the collective
action problems associated with Balancing Act.
Chapter 4: As energy generated from renewable and non-combustible
resources gains a significant share of the energy mix, Total Primary Energy
and Electricity Generation Capacity, key metrics for energy policy, have
become ambiguous and potentially misleading. Designing policy and
building models of the energy transition requires thorough understanding of
energy metrics, the building blocks of policy targets and energy scenarios. The
ongoing decarbonisation has caused energy derived from renewable and non-
combustible resources to become more prominent. This has caused shares
of resources with abundant availability but limited instantaneous availability to
increase. This chapter showed that the ongoing electrification of the energy
system combined with the decarbonisation of the electricity system has caused
the current set of energy scenario metrics to become unrepresentative. Two key
primary energy metrics are affected: Total Primary Energy and related indicators
Energy Efficiency and Energy Intensity, and Electricity Generation Capacity.
The primary energy equivalent for non-combustible energy sources such as
wind and solar are not widely measured and not consistently defined. The resulting
various statistical representations of their primary energy equivalent with the use
of accounting methods results in ambiguity. Similarly, intermittent renewable
power generation has various capacity factors which makes interpretation and
steering on Electricity Generation Capacity ambiguous.
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Taken together we conclude that these metrics have become unrepresentative,
difficult to interpret and ultimately misleading. This is problematic as we showed
that these metrics can steer climate policy and investment decisions based on
statistical artefacts, rather than valid representation of the energy system.
To overcome these problems modellers are recommended to be explicit and
transparent on their accounting method to calculate the primary energy equivalent
for non-combustible energy sources and to highlight possible consequences of
the used approach such that conclusions based on statistical artefacts are
prevented. Further recommendations include the suggestion to focus on Total
Final Consumption as this metric is free of the mentioned definitional ambiguity.
With regards to Electricity Generation Capacity the recommendation is given to
put them in perspective by accompanying them with the expected capacity factor
or involved size of the investment. This would help putting this figures in context
and facilitate a more profound understanding.
Chapter 5: The societal dynamics of climate change and the energy
transition suggests that the energy transition can be seen as a critical
transition. With the application of agent-based modelling the influence of
the societal dynamics on the pace of the energy transition can be usefully
explored. Critical transitions are transition in which fast and rapid system
changes are triggered by relatively small changes in external conditions. In this
chapter the concept of critical transitions is applied to the energy transition to
explore how social dynamics around the energy system influence the pace of its
transition. We integrated the concept in an agent-based model and explored
various social aspects of complex problems such as the effect of leaders, the
heterogeneity of actors, and networks that form local communities.
The two key findings; i) the importance of local communities and ii)
leaders can both encourage and discourage the energy transition; a finding that
nuances existing literature on critical transitions. A reflection of the chosen
approach, revealed general notions about conceptual models: these models
provide useful tools to discuss the dynamics between individual incentives and
collective behaviour.
Chapter 6: Effective policy design to decarbonise the electricity system
requires the design and evaluation of these policies based on the realistic
behaviour of agents. This is enabled by agent-based modelling. The
transition of the electricity system will be key to the transition of the energy
system as a whole. In this chapter the influence of the design of the liberalised
electricity market on the emerging electricity mix is shown by simulating realistic




The chapter showed that simulating the “realistic behaviour” of agents helps
designing and evaluating policy for a specific (non-economic) target, in this
case decarbonisation of the electricity system. Agent-based modelling gives an
additional tool for this policy development process. It gives policy makers the
chance to design and evaluate the effect of their policies based on simulations of
the realistic behaviour of agents subject to these policies. Chapter 7 has shown
examples of the insights that can be obtained by using this method.
Chapter 7: Fully liberalised electricity markets will fail to meet deep decar-
bonisation targets even with strong carbon pricing. The full decarbonisation
of the electricity system will require increased flexibility to incorporate increasing
shares of intermittent, non-dispatchable electricity generation such as electricity
derived from wind and solar radiation. By simulating investor behaviour and
building on findings presented in Chapter 6, this chapter explored whether current
electricity markets designed as liberalised markets in combination with strong
carbon pricing will incentivise investors to invest in the required mix of storage
and renewable electricity generation assets to attain a full renewable, reliable and
affordable energy system in the second half of the century.
We conclude that a fully liberalised “energy-only” market will not lead to
investments in an efficient mix of renewables and storage assets, even with
strong CO2 pricing. We showed that under a carbon price scenario running up to
200 e/tCO2 (and even further to 400 e/tCO2), these markets give insufficient
stable investment signals for realistic investors to invest in a sustainable electricity
system. Possible alternatives for these fully liberalised markets, in which the
capacity requirement of the system is institutionalised via capacity remuneration
mechanisms, have been explored and we conclude that they provide a credible
solution direction.
8.3 Recommendations for policy makers
Research presented in this dissertation has had several implications for policy
design.
Firstly, policy makers should be aware of the nature of the problem of climate
change. The problem of climate change is a common pool resource dilemma
that is especially challenging because the consequences of climate change are
unpredictable over time (intergenerational) and space (global). This makes
studying the emergence of the energy transition an example of post-normal
science. In this perspective on science it is an illusion that scientists can speak
truth to power. The fact that scientists can’t give a definitive answer to policy
makers, makes that these decisions are de facto political decisions (for which
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politicians should not shy away). To make these decisions as well informed as
they can, various perspectives should be incorporated in policy design discussions.
In this dissertation agent-based modelling is presented as an additional tool for
scenario development as it complements insights from other methodologies.
Policy makers need to balance providing the most efficient, cost optimal
market design structure based on a fair set of rules for all actors in liberalised
markets with achieving a specific outcome. In the case of climate change this
is not solely e.g. cost minimisation based on rational agents, but should be
related to total carbon emissions and realistic actor behaviour. Therefore, policy
makers should increasingly rely on the simulation of realistic actor behaviours to
evaluate the outcome of specific policy measures. This means that policy makers
should increasingly focus on models that explicitly incorporate realistic behaviour
of agents, and limit over-reliance on models that focus on lowest (system) costs,
assume perfect information, perfect rationality and homogeneous actors. This
dissertation shows that embracing these complexities of the energy transitions
gives a different and richer perspective on the possible development trajectories
of the energy system.
Our perspective highlighted the following specific policy design recommenda-
tions:
Carbon-neutral fuels need to be considered Although the share of electricity
in the energy mix will rise substantially (from the current 20 % to approximately
60%), demand for carbon-based fuels will persist. How can that demand be
met while eliminating the associated emissions? The traditional narrative of the
major outlooks (such as the IPCC) relies on the policy enforced deployment of
large scale carbon capture and sequestration, often in combination biomass. But
recent technology developments have opened a new narrative. This narrative
relies on the integration and further development of new technologies, one of
which is Direct Air Capture of CO2. This could lead to market-led production
of a zero-carbon fuel, a solar fuel. Given these two pathways of the energy
transition it would be prudent policy to stimulate the traditional narrative of
trying to overcome the collective action problems as well as stimulate market
development of solar fuel production. (Chapter 3).
Effective climate change policy design requires focusing on the right
(energy) metrics As the overall objective of climate policy is to decrease
greenhouse gas emissions, policy targets should be expressed in metrics that
support this target. Moreover, policy makers should be aware of the different
accounting issues surrounding the key energy metrics Total Primary Energy,




goals which are based on statistical artefact should be prevented and therefore we
recommend to shift focus from primary energy (Total Primary Energy) to energy
consumption (Total Final Consumption). (Chapter 4).
Social dynamics influence the pace of the energy transition Policy makers
should be aware that actors in the real world are bounded rational and may react
differently to policy measures than rational, idealised actors would do. Their social
dynamics influence policy outcomes and therefore policies should be developed
around these insights. Moreover, these insights can be used in policy design,
often referred to as nudging. (Chapter 5).
Electricity markets need a re-design Electricity markets need to fully
decarbonise to meet internationally agreed goals to global warming. To facilitate
this full decarbonisation while maintaining affordability and reliability, policy
makers will have two tasks. Firstly, they need to shift their focus from the
improvement of energy-only markets to developing appropriate capacity remu-
neration mechanisms. Effectively designed capacity remuneration mechanisms
can give investors the right incentives to invest in the combination of renewable
electricity generation and flexibilisation of the electricity system to be able to
absorb these intermittent sources. Secondly, flexibility markets, in which storage
operators are able to pay for excess renewable power generation, would need to
be facilitated. This will give investors the incentive to generate excess renewable
power which can be stored to use at other times. (Chapter 6 and 7).
8.4 Recommendations for business decision makers
Research presented in this dissertation has had several implications for business
decision makers:
Support strategic decision making with model development. Model
development should be an essential part of the business decision making process.
Although it is easy to criticise models and their outcomes as they will always only
reflect a part of reality, model development as part of strategic decision making,
forces stakeholders to engage in a structures approach and critically evaluate
assumptions and outcomes.
Be involved in the model development process. Similar to policy makers,
business decision makers from time to time find themselves in situations where
the stakes are high, values in dispute and decisions urgent. In those cases, it
is easy to outsource the process of decision making to a modelling team that
has to come up with an answer. However, our experience has shown that the
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insights from modelling studies often are generated in the model development
process. Therefore, to create the most value from modelling studies in general,
is to engage in this modelling process.
Create an environment that enables transdisciplinary knowledge sharing.
For stakeholders to be able to engage in this modelling process requires a
transdisciplinary environment. Our experience is that agent-based modelling
in general, and our modelling approach especially, is well suited to enable
this transdisciplinary environment and bridge the gap between modellers and
stakeholders. Agent-based modelling gives a natural way to think about actors,
their interactions and the system emerging dynamics and an approach focused
on a minimal representation of these agents enables stakeholder engagement,
transparency, reproducibility and tractability.
Apply agent-based modelling to support strategic decision making. Many
corporate models used in day-to-day business are optimisation models, think of
supply-chain optimisation, logistics optimisation, operation optimisation etc. Also
in scenario planning, scenario developers tend to focus on technological and
economic developments and base their analysis on learning curves and empirical
validated relationships between key drivers. Strategic decision making however,
involves developing a plan to achieve a certain goal in the face of uncertainty, often
caused by human reflexivity. Agent-based modelling is perfectly suited to simulate
these actors interaction in a business environment and evaluate strategic choices.
It gives scenario developers a tool to explore the emergent collective behaviour
and quantify narratives of actor behaviours and their interaction.
8.5 Reflection
8.5.1 On modelling of the energy transition
As human decision making is complex, models that try to simulate this decision
making process in the energy domain are subject to large uncertainties. Simulating
the emergence of a transition inherently requires conceptualising agent behaviours
which are different from the empirical validated historical decision making
processes of the past. Simulation methods such as agent-based modelling
face modellers therefore with a continuous quest for plausible, believable agents
behaviours.
The model conceptualisation of the (uncertain) actor behaviours can lead
to outcomes which are straightforward reflecting input assumptions. However,




Relying on rational agents which in reality are bounded rational can create a
sense of certainty that is illusive.
This aspect I encountered in a project where I modelled consumers deciding
between mitigation and adaptation to climate change based on dynamic costs
expectation of mitigation and adaptation efforts [431]. This modelling exercise
illuminated this problem; straightforward quantifying of a narrative faces the
danger of getting results that are straightforward and directly reflecting the
assumptions put in the model. However, this still can have value as illustration of
a particular narrative facilitates discussions between stakeholders on assumptions
and dynamics.
In the projects described in Chapter 6 and 7 of this dissertation, actors were
chosen with a plausible behavioural drive but who are heterogeneous and bounded
rational; investors in the energy system. We found ourselves more comfortable
with their decision making process as their decision making process is relatively
straightforward; in its most rudimentary form investors have a commercial drive.
Results from these models have highlighted interesting aspects of the electricity
market and its transition (which are described in Chapter 6 and 7).
The research project described in Chapter 5 led us to more fundamental
epistemological questions on the value of the application of agent-based modelling
to the energy transition. It resulted in the characterisation of our approach as
post-normal sciences as described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. It also highlighted
the importance of modelling for insight instead of for numbers reflecting the
perspective on the value of modelling as a means to find clear and explicit
reasoning.
Valuing the application of agent-based modelling requires modesty on the
requirement to be truth-finding. This challenge is equally challenging for
conventional modelling methods and are related to modelling studies in general;
“All models are wrong, some are useful” [432]. This highlights that the value of
modelling in general is most often in the insights its creates, often generated in
the modelling development process.
We have shown that agent-based modelling has an essential role to play in
providing new perspectives on the way societal actors will, can and must tackle
the problem of climate change. That role can be summarised in the following
three aspects:
1. Quantifying story lines of actor behaviour provides tools to improve
communication between researchers and stakeholders. With the
application of agent-based modelling a story line can be illustrated and
structured giving the means to discuss assumptions and outcomes with a
variety of stake holders, even without generating directly new insights from
the modelling exercise itself.
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2. Quantification via conceptualisation and simulations brings the means
to analyse this actor behaviour in a structured way. Agent-based
modelling forces researchers to think about actor interactions and structure
them in model conceptualisations. This in itself can generate insights.
Dynamics emerging from these agent behaviours can be further explored
and analysed to generate additional insights. Vice versa agent interaction
can be further analysed in relationship to the emergent dynamics of interest.
3. Quantification enables the use of computer power to simulate and
analyse actor dynamics and thereby shed light on emergent behaviour
in complex systems. Simulating actor behaviour in computer models
expands the possibilities to calculate the outcomes of their complex
interactions.
8.5.2 On the emergence of the energy transition
Apart from these insights on the value of modelling, and agent-based modelling
specifically, more than four years of dedicated research on the emergence of the
energy transition has highlighted several aspects.
An inclusive energy transition Given the nature of climate change, its complex
and common pool resource character, this transition will need to be inclusive.
Inclusive here means that all actors and all sectors need to be on board of
this transition. Not one energy consuming sector can be disregarded in tackling
climate change, all sectors will need to transition and decarbonise. Although some
sectors may be easier to decarbonise than others, to get to net-zero emissions
within the coming decades, all sectors will need to contribute. This means that for
example, international air-travel, so far often disregarded given its international
character and the few technological options it has to decarbonise, will need extra
attention. It also means we cannot disregard any energy carrier. Although there
is often a lot of attention given to the electricity sector, it currently only provides
one-fifth of our energy demand. The fuels-part of energy sector therefore should
not be forgotten.
Inclusive also means all countries, especially the large contributors, need
to be on board. So far, the international negotiation architecture of the
United Nations, the UNFCC is our best hope to achieve further international
agreement to limit climate change. Although such negotiations, unilateral or at
national level between various stakeholders (such as the Dutch Energie Akkoord),
sometimes only achieve seemingly slow progress, the energy transition is such a
wide ranging, all-encompassing system change, they are needed for a successful




countries, businesses or individuals should wait on others. There are plenty
economic, strategic, moral and ethical reasons to individually transition the energy
system. Therefore, we need brave politicians that do not shy away for de facto
political decisions on the future of the energy system.
Balancing efforts Actors in this energy transition will need to balance their
efforts on current and future problems. The United Nations now have articulated
17 Sustainable Development Goals [433], which means this is not an obvious
task. To achieve such a balance, it is easy to get distracted by trendy, fashionable
issues such as the circular economy. The other extreme is focusing on climate
change and forgetting the growing energy demand of a growing world population.
Decision makers should keep their eye on the ball and be aware of the overarching
stresses climate change is treating our human society with while balancing the
current needs of the world population. Sometimes efforts on subjects such as to
decrease noise levels near airports, or limit air pollution can be a double edged
sword that also limits climate change. But decision makers should always be
aware their decision take effect on the right problems.
Take your own responsibility Actors (individuals, politicians, businesses) are
easily caught to be pointing fingers at others for being responsible to take further
steps to transition the energy system. Consumers pointing at cooperations,
businesses pointing at their shareholders (often pension funds) which point at their
obligation to their pension receivers bringing us back to square one. The same
holds for by citizens elected politicians. The point is that all these actors have
their responsibility. An important and guiding principle articulated by Mahatma
Gandhi is still true: “you must be the change you want to see in the world”.
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9.1 Onderzoekscontext, focus en aanpak
Dit proefschrift bevat een aantal verschillende benaderingen om inzicht te geven
in de zich ontwikkelende energietransitie; intellectuele kaders zijn beschreven,
mogelijke paden zijn gesuggereerd en bevindingen uit simulatiemodellen zijn
gepresenteerd. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een korte samenvatting gegeven van meer
dan vier jaar van mijn onderzoek naar de zich ontwikkelende energietransitie.
Bovendien bevat dit hoofdstuk een reflectie op dit onderzoek en worden
aanbevelingen voor beleidsmakers en bedrijfsvertegenwoordigers gegeven.
9.1.1 Onderzoekscontext en focus
Klimaatverandering is een van de grootste uitdagingen voor de mensheid in haar
huidige vorm. Aangezien het energiesysteem de grootste bijdrage levert aan de
uitstoot van broeikasgassen door het gebruik van fossiele brandstoffen, zal de
samenleving moeten werken aan een transformatie van het energiesysteem; een
energietransitie. Deze transitie zal moeten voortkomen uit de interactie tussen
sociale actoren en hun drijfveren, de economie, technologieën en het ecosysteem.
Dit maakt de transitie een complex probleem en niet alleen een technische, maar
ook een intellectuele uitdaging. Tegen deze achtergrond heeft dit proefschrift de
vraag onderzocht:
Hoe beïnvloeden individuele drijfveren en de interacties tussen actoren het
pad en het tempo van de zich ontwikkelende energietransitie?
We kunnen niet verwachten deze vraag in zijn volledige vorm te kunnen
beantwoorden in deze dissertatie. Deze vraag heeft wel de richting van ons
onderzoek bepaald en de resultaten hebben inzicht gegeven in verschillende
aspecten van deze vraag.
Het simuleren van interacterende actoren als computer-entiteiten, “agenten”,
geeft ons de middelen om de dynamiek van interacties tussen actoren te
verkennen. De toepassing van een relatief nieuwe modelleringsmethode, “agent-
based modelling” (of agent-gebaseerde modellering), waarmee deze agenten
kunnen worden gesimuleerd, biedt scenario ontwikkelaars een additionele methode
voor het quantificeren van scenarios van de energietransitie. Agent-gebaseerde
modellering geeft de mogelijkheid om verhalenvertellers te verbinden met model-
leerders.
Inzichten verkregen door het simuleren van realistisch actor-gedrag hebben
inzicht gegeven in de dynamiek tussen individuele motieven, prikkels en collectieve
actie. Modelresultaten hebben nieuwe inzichten opgeleverd die kunnen worden
gebruikt om actuele en mogelijke toekomstige ontwikkelingen rondom de ener-




Tabel 9.1 – Onderzoeksvragen per hoofdstuk. Rechter kolom geeft de gebruikte
onderzoeksmethode aan.
gebruikt ter ondersteuning van strategische beslissingen door publieke en private
actoren en om te anticiperen op de gevolgen van hun (toekomstige) beslissingen.
9.1.2 Onderzoeksaanpak
Gezien de complexe aard van het probleem van klimaatverandering moest onze
onderzoeksbenadering verschillende aspecten bestrijken: i) de omvang en aard
van het probleem van de klimaatverandering (met betrekking tot tijd en ruimte),
ii) het faciliteren van dialoog met belanghebbenden, iii) het aanpakken van de
uitdagingen van agent-gebaseerde modellering en iv) de kloof overbruggen tussen
verhalenvertellers en modelleerders, tussen wetenschappers en politici en tussen
wetenschappers en bedrijfsvertegenwoordigers. Dit heeft geleid tot onze algemene
onderzoeksaanpak die zich richtte op het vinden van een minimale weergave van
de relevante systeemelementen met een minimum aan veronderstellingen die recht
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deed aan de complexiteit van het probleem.
Proberen te begrijpen hoe de energietransitie zich zal ontwikkelen, brengt ons
naar de grens van de wetenschap omdat de onzekerheden en belangen groot
zijn, keuzes gemaakt moeten worden en culturele waarden in het geding zijn. In
dat licht kan onze onderzoeksbenadering worden gezien als een voorbeeld van
postnormale wetenschap. Dit heeft ons een perspectief gegeven waarmee we de
meerwaarde van agent-gebaseerde modellering konden verkennen.
Ons onderzoek heeft geleid tot verschillende conclusies en aanbevelingen die
hieronder zullen worden besproken. Deze samenvatting eindigt met een reflectie
op het onderzoeksproces en de bevindingen.
9.2 Conclusies
Conclusies van ons onderzoeks werden gegenereerd in onderzoeksprojecten die
verschillende aspecten van onze onderzoeksvraag exploreerde. Gepresenteerde
modellen en analyses zijn gebaseerd op de in Hoofdstuk 2 gepresenteerde
intellectuele kaders. Deze verschillende intellectuele kaders hebben de basis
gevormd voor de conceptualisering van het actorgedrag in de agent-gebaseerde
modellen. Perspectieven vanuit de economie, de psychologie en de ecologie
gaven achtergrondinformatie over de dynamiek tussen individuele drijfveren en
collectieve actie.
Omdat de atmosfeer wordt gedeeld door ons allen is gebleken dat het
“common pool resource dilemma” een relevante beschrijving geeft van het
dilemma van actoren in de energie transitie; het dilemma tussen individuele
drijfveren en collectieve actie. Dit dilemma is in het geval van klimaatverandering
vooral uitdagend vanwege de volgende drie aspecten; de intergenerationele
tijdschaal, de wereldwijde geografische schaal en de onvoorspelbaarheid van
de gevolgen van klimaatverandering en de zich ontwikkelende energie transitie.
Inzichten uit de psychologie en sociologie hebben verschillende elementen laten
zien die het menselijk gedrag onderscheiden van de veronderstellingen van de
neoklassieke economie; persoonlijke vorming, wereldbeelden en begrensd rationeel
gedrag leidden tot beslissingsstructuren die in verschillende simulatiemodellen zijn
gebruikt.
De in de verschillende onderzoeksprojecten gegenereerde inzichten, gerang-
schikt per hoofdstuk, zullen respectievelijk worden besproken.
Hoofdstuk 3: Optimistische veronderstellingen over de technologische
ontwikkeling van Solar Fuels maken een nieuw scenario mogelijk over
hoe de vraag naar brandstoffen kan worden voorzien zonder additionele




energietransitie scenarios geven ons een nieuw perspectief op de mogelijke paden
van de energietransitie: All Renewable en Balancing Act laten zien welke
mogelijkheden de samenleving heeft om klimaatverandering aan te pakken en
om aan de stijgende energievraag te blijven voldoen. Beide verhaallijnen gaan
uit van het idee dat de energietransitie vandaag de dag wordt gedreven door
verbeterde energie-efficiëntie, de verdere uitbouw van elektrische, hernieuwbare
energiebronnen en sectorgewijze electrificering. Deze ontwikkelingen zullen echter
tegen grenzen aanlopen omdat er sectoren zijn die moeilijk te elektrificeren zijn
(denk aan de luchtvaart, scheepvaart, zwaar wegvervoer en hoge temperatuur
processtechnologie). Dit zal leiden tot een residuele vraag naar op koolstofgebas-
seerde brandstoffen. De vraag naar deze brandstoffen kan emissie-loos worden
voldaan door de resulterende emissies af te vangen of de resterende emissies in
evenwicht te brengen met negatieve emissies. Een andere manier zou zijn een
nieuw type, op hernieuwbare energie gebaseerde brandstoffen, zogenaamde “Solar
Fuels”, te produceren.
In dit hoofdstuk wordt besproken wat er nodig zou zijn om deze scenarios
bewaarheid te laten worden. In Balancing Act beschrijft een scenario waarin de
wereld de collectieve actieproblemen overwint. Dit zou leiden tot grootschalige
toepassing van (bio-energie) koolstofafvang en -opslag en de uitrol van grote
nieuwe distributie- en transmissiesinfrastructuren. All Renewable beschrijft
daarentegen een scenario waarin wordt gegokt op technologie ontwikkeling dat
uiteindelijk zou moeten leiden tot de ontwikkeling en productie van zonne-
brandstoffen. Deze emissieneutrale koolwaterstofbrandstoffen zouden moeten
worden geproduceerd door uit de lucht geabstraheerde CO2 te synthesiseren met
waterstof. Dit kan mogelijk gemaakt door gebruik te maken van hernieuwbare
elektriciteit, waterelektrolyse (productie van waterstof), CO2 activering van
de uit de luch geabstraheerde CO2. Als optimistische veronderstellingen
over technologieontwikkeling werkelijkheid worden, kunnen deze emissieneutrale
brandstoffen betaalbaar worden (tegen een prijs van 200 $ /bbl) wat zou kunnen
leiden tot grootschalige marktgestuurde inzet.
Het feit dat individuele (commerciële) drijfveren de ontwikkeling van solar
fuels zouden kunnen stimuleren, differentieert All Renewables van Balancing
Act waarvoor meer betrokkenheid van de overheid vereist is om de collectieve
actieproblemen te overwinnen.
Hoofdstuk 4: Nu energie afkomstig van hernieuwbare en niet-brandbare
bronnen een steeds belangrijker deel van de energiemix wordt, wordt
de precieze betekenis van belangrijke energie metriek, Totale Primaire
Energie en Elektriciteitsproductiecapaciteit, steeds onduidelijker en mogelijk
misleidend. De ontwikkeling van modellen voor de energietransitie vereist
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diepgaand inzicht in energie-metriek, de bouwstenen van beleidsdoelen en
energiescenario’s. De afgelopen decennia zijn fossiele, brandbare energie bronnen
met een eenvoudig te bepalen primaire energie equivalent, de dominante
energiebron in de energiemix geweest. De voortgaande decarbonisatie heeft
er echter toe geleid dat energie afkomstig van hernieuwbare en niet-brandbare
bronnen een groter deel van de energie mix beslaat. Hierdoor wordt er meer
energie geproduceerd uit bronnen met een ruime totale beschikbaarheid, maar
een beperkte instantane beschikbaarheid (wind en zon).
Dit hoofdstuk heeft laten zien dat de aanhoudende elektrificatie van het
energiesysteem in combinatie met de decarbonisatie van het elektriciteitssysteem
ertoe heeft geleid dat de huidige energie-metriek niet meer representatief is.
Dit heeft invloed op belangrijke energie-metriek: Totale primaire energie en
bijbehorende indicatoren Energie-efficiëntie en Energie-intensiteit, en Elektrici-
teitsproductiecapaciteit.
De primaire-energie-equivalent voor niet-brandbare energiebronnen zoals wind
en zon wordt niet consequent gedefinieerd in energie modellen en scenario’s. De
resulterende verschillende statistische representaties van hun primaire energie-
equivalent resulteert in onduidelijkheid. Evenzo heeft intermitterende her-
nieuwbare energieopwekking verschillende capaciteitsfactoren die interpretatie en
sturing op elektriciteitsproductiecapaciteit ambivalent maken. Dit maakt dat deze
metrieken niet-representatief, moeilijk te interpreteren en uiteindelijk misleidend
worden. Dit is problematisch omdat deze energie-metriek klimaatbeleid en
investeringsbeslissingen stuurt op basis van statistische artefacten, in plaats van
een feitelijke weergave van het energiesysteem.
Om deze problemen te verhelpen, wordt modelleerders en energie scenario
ontwikkelaars aangeraden om expliciet en transparant te zijn over de toegepaste
statistische methodes om het primaire energie-equivalent voor niet-brandbare
energiebronnen te berekenen en mogelijke consequenties van de gebruikte aanpak
te benadrukken. Hierdoor kunnen conclusies op basis van statistische artefacten
worden voorkomen. Een verdere aanbeveling beslaat de suggestie om te focussen
op energie-verbruik en dus op de energie-metriek Totale Energie Verbruik omdat
deze energie-metriek vrij is van de besproken ambiguïteit. Met betrekking tot de
productiecapaciteit voor elektriciteit wordt de aanbeveling gedaan om deze cijfers
in perspectief te plaatsen door ze te begeleiden met de verwachte capaciteitsfactor
(waarmee de verwachte electriciteits opwekking kan worden berekend) of de grote
van de gemoeide investering.
Hoofdstuk 5: De maatschappelijke dynamiek rond klimaatverandering en
de energietransitie geeft aanleiding tot het simuleren van de energie-




op agenten gebaseerde modellering kan hun invloed op het tempo van
de energietransitie worden onderzocht. Kritische transities zijn snelle
en sterke systeemveranderingen veroorzaakt door relatief kleine veranderingen
in externe omstandigheden. In dit hoofdstuk wordt dit concept toegepast
op de energietransitie om te onderzoeken hoe de sociale dynamiek rond het
energiesysteem het tempo van de transitie beïnvloedt. We hebben het concept
geïntegreerd in een agent-gebaseerd model en verschillende sociale aspecten
van de emergente energie transitie onderzocht. De invloed van leiders, de
heterogeniteit van actoren en het effect van netwerken die lokale gemeenschappen
vormen zijn onderzocht.
De twee belangrijkste bevindingen zijn; i) het belang van lokale gemeenschap-
pen en ii) leiders kunnen zowel de energietransitie stimuleren als ontmoedigen;
een bevinding die bestaande literatuur over kritische overgangen nuanceert. Een
analyse van de sterke en zwakke aspecten van de gekozen aanpak heeft geleid tot
een reflectie op het gebruik van conceptuele modellen. Deze modellen bieden een
nuttig hulpmiddel om de dynamiek tussen individuele prikkels en collectief gedrag
te analyseren, deze dynamiek in de juiste context te plaatsen en een dieper begrip
mogelijk te maken.
Hoofdstuk 6: Effectief beleid om het elektriciteitsnet te decarboniseren,
vereist het ontwerpen en evalueren van dit beleid op basis van het
realistische gedrag van actoren. De transitie van het elektriciteitssysteem zal
cruciaal zijn voor de transitie van het energiesysteem als geheel. In dit hoofdstuk
wordt de invloed van het ontwerp van de geliberaliseerde elektriciteitsmarkt op
de uiteindelijke elektriciteitsmix geanalyseerd door het realistische gedrag van
investeerders in deze markt te simuleren.
Dit hoofdstuk heeft laten zien dat het simuleren van het “realistisch gedrag”
van agenten helpt bij het ontwerpen en evalueren van beleid met een specifiek
(niet economisch) doel, in dit geval decarbonisatie van het elektriciteitssysteem.
Het simuleren van investeerders in het elektriciteitssysteem met agent-gebaseerde
modelen biedt een extra hulpmiddel voor dit beleidsontwikkelingsproces. Het geeft
beleidsmakers de kans om het mogelijk effect van hun beleid te analyseren op basis
van simulaties van het realistische gedrag van agenten.
Hoofdstuk 7: Volledig geliberaliseerde elektriciteitsmarkten zullen niet
voldoen aan volledige decarbonisatie doelstellingen, zelfs niet met sterke
CO2-beprijzing De volledige decarbonisatie van het elektriciteitssysteem
vereist een grotere flexibiliteit om het toenemend aandeel van variabele elek-
triciteitsopwekking zoals als elektriciteit afgeleid van wind en zonnestraling te
kunnen accomoderen. Door het gedrag van investeerders te simuleren en voort
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te bouwen op de bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk 6, laat dit hoofdstuk zien dat de
geliberaliseerde elektriciteitsmarkt, zelfs met sterkte CO2-beprijzing, niet zal
leiden tot een volledige hernieuwbaar, betrouwbaar en betaalbaar energiesysteem
in de tweede helft van de eeuw.
Met behulp van simulatie modellen hebben we laten zien dat het ontwerp
van de elektriciteitsmarkt als als zogenaamde ënergy-only"markt (i.e. een
markt waarin enkel daadwerkelijk geleverde energie wordt vergoed) investeerders
niet zal stimuleren om te investeren in de vereiste mix van flexibiliteit en
hernieuwbare elektriciteitsproductie. We hebben aangetoond dat onder een
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(wereldwijd) dimensies. Omdat de belangen en onzekerheden groot zijn maakt
dat het bestuderen van de ontwikkeling van de energietransitie een voorbeeld van
postnormale wetenschap. In dit perspectief op de wetenschap is het een illusie
te denken dat wetenschappers de waarheid in pacht hebben om beleidsbepalers
mee te kunnen inlichten. Het feit dat wetenschappers geen definitief antwoord
kunnen geven aan beleidsmakers, maakt dat deze beslissingen de facto politieke
beslissingen zijn (waarvoor politici niet mogen schrikken). Om deze beslissingen
zo goed mogelijk te maken, kunnen verschillende perspectieven worden ingebouwd
in beleidsdiscussies. In dit proefschrift wordt agent-gebaseerde modellering
gepresenteerd als een extra hulpmiddel voor scenario- en beleidsontwikkeling als
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dit niet alleen bijvoorbeeld kostenminimalisatie op basis van rationele agenten,
maar moet gerelateerd zijn aan de totale CO2-uitstoot en het realistische gedrag
van de actor. Daarom moeten beleidsmakers gebruik maken van simulaties
van realistisch actorgedrag om de uitkomst van specifieke beleidsmaatregelen te
evalueren. Dit betekent dat beleidsmakers zich, in plaats van te veel te vertrouwen
op modellen die uitgaan van perfecte informatie, perfecte rationaliteit, homogene
actoren en focussen op de laagste (systeem) kosten, zich meer moeten richten op
modellen die realistisch gedrag van agenten expliciet incorporeren. Dit proefschrift
laat zien dat het omarmen van deze complexiteiten van de energietransities een
ander en rijker perspectief biedt op de mogelijke ontwikkelingstrajecten van het
energiesysteem.
Ons onderzoeksperspectief heeft de volgende specifieke aanbevelingen voor
beleidsontwikkeling:
CO2-neutrale brandstoffen Hoewel het aandeel van elektriciteit in de ener-
giemix aanzienlijk zal stijgen (van de huidige 20% tot ongeveer 60%), zal
de vraag naar op koolstof gebasseerde brandstoffen blijven bestaan. Het
gebruikelijke verhaal van de belangrijkste scenario ontwikkelaars (zoals het IPCC)
is afhankelijk van door de overheid opgelegde grootschalige koolstofafvang en -
opslag, vaak in combinatie van biomassa. Door de integratie van verschillende
opkomende technologieen zou echter een CO2 neutrale brandstof kunnen
worden geproduceerd waarvan de productie commercieel aantrekkelijk zou kunnen
worden. Die zou kunnen leiden tot marktgedreven productie van CO2 neutrale
brandstoffen.
Gezien deze twee mogelijke scenarios voor de energietransitie, overheid
of markt-gedreven, zou het voor beleidsontwikkelaars verstandig zijn ook de
marktontwikkeling van de productie van solar fuels te stimuleren. (Hoofdstuk
3).
Energie-metriek Aangezien de algemene doelstelling van klimaatbeleid is om
de uitstoot van broeikasgassen te verminderen, moeten beleidsdoelen worden
uitgedrukt in energie-metriek die deze doelstelling ondersteunen. Bovendien
moeten beleidsmakers zich bewust zijn van de verschillende boekhoudkundige
kwesties rond belangrijke energiestatistiek en beleidsdoelstellingen voorkomen die
zijn gebaseerd op statistische artefacten. (Hoofdstuk 4).
Sociale dynamiek en het tempo van de energietransitie Beleidsmakers
moeten zich ervan bewust zijn dat actoren in de echte wereld niet perfect
rationeel zijn en mogelijk anders reageren op beleidsmaatregelen dan rationele,
geïdealiseerde actoren zouden doen. De sociale dynamiek van actoren beïnvloedt
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beleidsresultaten en daarom zou moet beleid kunnen worden ontwikkeld dat
rekening houdt met deze inzichten. Bovendien kunnen deze inzichten worden
gebruikt in beleid, bekend onder de term nudging. (Hoofdstuk 5).
Elekticiteitsmarktontwerp Elektriciteitsmarkten moeten volledig gedecarbo-
niseerd om internationaal overeengekomen doelen om klimaatverandering tegen
te gaan te halen. Om deze volledige decarbonisatie te faciliteren met behoud
van betaalbaarheid en betrouwbaarheid van het elektriciteitssysteem, zullen
beleidsmakers twee taken hebben. Ten eerste moeten zij hun aandacht verleggen
van de verbetering van markten ontworpen als energy-only markten naar de
ontwikkeling van geschikte capaciteitsbeloningsmechanismen. Dit mechanisme
zou investeerders de juiste prikkels kunnen geven om te investeren in de
combinatie van hernieuwbare elektriciteitsopwekking en flexibilisering van het
elektriciteitssysteem om elektriciteits van variabele productie technologien zoals
uit zon en wind, te kunnen absorberen. Ten tweede moeten flexibiliteitsmarkten,
waarin opslagbedrijven kunnen betalen voor een overschot aan hernieuwbare
elektriciteitsopwekking, worden gefaciliteerd. Dit zou investeerders de motivatie
kunnen geven om overtollige hernieuwbare energie te genereren die op andere
momenten kan worden opgeslagen. (Hoofdstuk 6 en 7).
9.4 Aanbevelingen voor zakelijk besluitvorming
Onderzoek gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift heeft geresulteerd in verschillende
aanbevelingen ter verbetering van zakelijke besluitvorming:
Ondersteun van strategische besluitvorming met modelontwikkeling Mo-
delontwikkeling zou een essentiële rol moeten spelen binnen het besluitvorming-
proces van bedrijven. Hoewel het gemakkelijk is om modellen en hun uitkomsten
te bekritiseren omdat ze altijd slechts een deel van de werkelijkheid weerspiegelen,
dwingt modelontwikkeling als onderdeel van strategische besluitvorming de
belanghebbenden ertoe zich in te zetten voor een structurele aanpak en
veronderstellingen en resultaten kritisch te evalueren.
Wees betrokken bij het modelontwikkelingsproces Net als beleidsmakers
bevinden zakelijke besluitvormers zich bij tijd en wijle in situaties waarin de
belangen groot zijn, culturele waardes verschillen, en beslissingen dringend zijn.
In die gevallen is het al te eenvoudig om het besluitvormingsproces uit te
besteden aan een modelleerteam. Onze ervaring heeft geleerd dat de inzichten
uit modelstudies vaak worden gegenereerd in het modelontwikkelingsproces. Om




besluitvormers belangrijk om niet enkel te wachten op de resultaten maar om
actief deel te nemen aan dit modelleringsproces.
Creëer een omgeving die transdisciplinaire kennisuitwisseling mogelijk maakt
Uit ervaringen uit deze disseratie blijkt dat agent-gebaseerde modellering in het
algemeen, en onze modelleringsaanpak in het bijzonder, buitengewoon geschikt is
om de kloof tussen modelmakers en belanghebbenden te overbruggen: agent-
gebaseerde modellering biedt een natuurlijke manier om na te denken over
actoren, hun interacties en de resulterende dynamiek van het systeem. Een
aanpak die gericht is een minimale weergave van deze actoren en focust op de
fundamentele dynamiek maakt betrokkenheid van belanghebbende, transparantie,
reproduceerbaarheid en traceerbaarheid van model resultaten mogelijk.
Gebruik agent-gebaseerde modellering om strategische besluitvorming te
ondersteunen Veel modellen die worden gebruikt in de dagelijkse bedrijfsvoe-
ring zijn optimalisatiemodellen; denk aan supply chain-optimalisatie, logistieke
optimalisatie, operationele optimalisatie, enz. Bij strategische besluitvorming
gaat het echter vaak om het ontwikkelen van een strategisch plan om een bepaald
doel te bereiken in een zakelijke omgeving waarin de onzekerheden groot zijn.
Deze onzekerheden worden vaak veroorzaakt door menselijke reflexiviteit; mijn
handelen heeft invloed op anderen waarop ik mij weer kan/moet aanpassen.
Agent-gebaseerde modellering is bijzonder geschikt om de interactie tussen
actoren in een commerciele omgeving te simuleren en strategische keuzes te
evalueren.
Gebruik agent-gebasseerde modelling als additionele methode voor scenario-
ontwikkeling Veel bedrijven maken scenario’s om strategische beslissingen
te ondersteunen. Shell heeft bijvoorbeeld een lange geschiedenis in scenario-
ontwikkeling. Binnen dit scenario-denken kunnen scenario-ontwikkelaars zich
eenvoudig verliezen in technologische en economische ontwikkelingen; leercurves,
empirisch gevalideerde relaties tussen belangrijke factoren, etc. Agent-gebaseerde
modellering geeft deze scenario-ontwikkelaars een hulpmiddel om verhalen van
het gedrag van actoren, hun interactie en hun emergente collectieve gedrag te
onderzoeken en te quantificeren.
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9.5.1 Het modelleren van de energie transitie
Omdat menselijke beslissingen complex zijn, zijn modellen die dit besluitvor-
mingsproces (in het energiedomein) proberen te simuleren, onderhevig aan
grote onzekerheden. Het simuleren van een transitie vereist inherent het
simuleren van agent-gedrag dat anders is dan de empirisch gevalideerde historische
besluitvormingsprocessen uit het verleden. Simulatiemethoden zoals agent-
gebaseerde modellering zorgen er daardoor voor dat modelmakers voortdurende
zoeken naar plausibel, geloofwaardig agent-gedrag.
De modelconceptualisering van het (onzekere) gedrag van actoren kan leiden
tot uitkomsten die de begin-assumpties direct weerspiegelen. Conventionele
modellen elimineren deze onzekerheid echter door te vertrouwen op rationele
agenten. Vertrouwen op rationele agenten die in werkelijkheid rationeel begrensd
zijn, kan een gevoel van zekerheid creëren dat illusoir is.
Dit aspect ben ik tegengekomen in een project waarbij ik consumenten
modelleerde die konden kiezen tussen mitigatie en aanpassing aan klimaat-
verandering op basis van dynamische kostenverwachting van mitigatie- en
aanpassingsinspanningen [431]. Deze modelleringsoefening bracht precies dit
probleem aan het licht; eenvoudige quantificering van een verhaal leidt soms
tot resultaten die direct de veronderstellingen weerspiegelen die in het model zijn
opgenomen. Dit kan echter nog steeds waarde hebben als illustratie van een
bepaald verhaal. Dit kan discussies tussen belanghebbenden over aannames en
dynamieken mogelijk maken en daardoor toch nuttig zijn.
In de projecten beschreven in Hoofdstuk 6 en 7 van dit proefschrift werden
actoren gekozen met een plausibele motivatie maar die heterogeen en niet
perfect rationeel zijn; investeerders in het energiesysteem. De aannames die
we moesten maken om hun besluitvormingsproces plausibel te simuleren konden
relatief eenvoudig blijven, in de meest elementaire vorm zullen investeerders
een commerciële motivatie hebben. Resultaten van deze modellen hebben
interessante aspecten ontwikkelende elektriciteitsmarkt naar voren gebracht (die
worden beschreven in Hoofdstuk 6 en 7).
Het onderzoeksproject dat beschreven is in Hoofdstuk 5 leidde ons tot meer
fundamentele epistemologische vragen over de waarde van de toepassing van
agent gebaseerde modellering op de energietransitie. Het resulteerde in de
karakterisering van onze benadering als post-normale wetenschap zoals uitvoerig
beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2 en Hoofdstuk 5. Het benadrukte ook het belang van de
juiste motivatie voor modelleer-studies: Men zou moeten modelleren om inzicht




perspectief op modellering als een middel om een duidelijke en expliciete redenering
te vinden.
Om agent-gebaseerde modellering te kunnen waarderen is het een vereiste om
bescheiden te zijn over de eis om aan waarheidsvinding te doen. Deze uitdaging is
even uitdagend voor conventionele modelleringsmethoden en heeft betrekking op
modelstudies in het algemeen; “Alle modellen zijn fout, sommige zijn nuttig” [432].
Dit benadrukt dat de waarde van modelleren in het algemeen het vaakst ligt in
de inzichten die het creëert die vaak ontstaan in het model-ontwikkelingsproces.
We hebben aangetoond dat agent-gebaseerde modellering een essentiële
rol kan spelen om nieuwe perspectieven te bieden op de manier waarop
maatschappelijke actoren het probleem van klimaatverandering kunnen en moeten
aanpakken. Die rol kan worden samengevat in de volgende drie aspecten:
1. Gequantificerende verhaallijnen van actorgedrag bieden hulpmiddelen
om de communicatie tussen onderzoekers en belanghebbenden te
verbeteren. Met de toepassing van agent-gebaseerde modellering kan
een verhaallijn worden geïllustreerd en gestructureerd. Op deze manier
kunnen aannames en uitkomsten worden besproken met een verschillende
belanghebbenden, zelfs zonder direct nieuw inzicht te krijgen uit de
resultaten van het model zelf.
2. Quantificering via conceptualisatie en simulaties biedt de mogelijkheid
om het gedrag van actoren op een gestructureerde manier te analyse-
ren. Agent-gebasseerde modellering dwingt onderzoekers na te denken
over actorinteracties en ze te structureren in model-conceptualisaties.
Dit alleen kan inzichten genereren. Dynamiek die voortkomt uit deze
agentgedragingen kan verder worden onderzocht en geanalyseerd om
aanvullende inzichten te genereren. Vice versa kan agent-gedrag verder
worden geanalyseerd in relatie tot de zich ontwikkelende dynamiek.
3. Quantificering maakt het gebruik van rekenkracht van computers
mogelijk waarmee emergent gedrag in complexe systemen kan worden
bestudeerd. Simulering van het gedrag van actoren in computermodellen
vergroot de mogelijkheden om de uitkomsten van hun complexe interacties
te berekenen.
9.5.2 De zich ontwikkelende energietransitie
Naast de inzichten over de waarde van modellering en specifiek de waarde van
agent-gebaseerde modellering, heeft meer dan vier jaar onderzoek naar de zich
ontwikkelende energietransitie een aantal additionele inzichten gebracht.
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Een inclusieve energietransitie Gezien de aard van klimaatverandering, het
complexe en common pool resource-karakter, zal deze transitie een inclusief
karakter moeten hebben. Inclusief betekent hier dat alle actoren en alle sectoren
betrokken moeten zijn bij deze transitie. Niet één energieverbruikende sector kan
buiten beschouwing worden gelaten bij het aanpakken van de klimaatverandering,
alle sectoren zullen moeten bijdragen om in de komende decennia tot nul-
nulemissies te komen. Dit betekent dat bijvoorbeeld luchtvaart, die tot nu toe
vaak buiten beschouwing worden gelaten vanwege het internationale karakter
en de beperkte technologische mogelijkheden, extra aandacht nodig zal hebben.
Het betekent ook dat we geen enkele energiedrager mogen negeren. Hoewel
er vaak veel aandacht is voor de elektriciteitssector, voorziet deze sector
momenteel slechts een vijfde van onze energievraag. Het brandstof-gedeelte van
de energiesector mag daarom niet worden vergeten.
Inclusief betekent ook dat alle landen, met name de grote contribuanten, aan
boord moeten zijn. Tot dusverre is de internationale onderhandelingsarchitectuur
van de Verenigde Naties, het UNFCC, onze beste hoop om verdere interna-
tionale overeenstemming te bereiken om de klimaatverandering te beperken.
Hoewel dergelijke onderhandelingen, unilateraal of op nationaal niveau tussen
verschillende belanghebbenden (zoals het Nederlandse Energie Akkoord) soms
slechts ogenschijnlijk trage vooruitgang boeken, is de energietransitie zo’n
brede, alomvattende systeemverandering, dat ze nodig is voor een geslaagde
energietransitie. Inclusief betekent echter niet dat individuele actoren, zijnde
landen, bedrijven of individuen op anderen moeten wachten. Er zijn tal van
individuele, economische, strategische, morele en ethische redenen om het
energiesysteem te transformeren. Daarom hebben we dappere politici nodig die
niet wegschrikken voor de facto politieke beslissingen over de toekomst van het
energiesysteem.
Het balanceren van inspanningen Actoren in deze energietransitie moeten
hun inspanningen in evenwicht houden met de huidige en toekomstige proble-
men. De Verenigde Naties hebben nu 17 Duurzame Ontwikkelingsdoelen [433]
geformuleerd, wat betekent dat dit geen voor de hand liggende taak is. Om zo’n
balans te bereiken, is het gemakkelijk om afgeleid te worden door trendy, modieuze
kwesties zoals de circulaire economie. In het andere uiterste richt men zich op
klimaatverandering en vergeet men de groeiende energievraag van een groeiende
wereldbevolking. Beslissers moeten hun oog op de bal houden en zich bewust zijn
van de overkoepelende impact die klimaatverandering heeft op onze samenleving,
terwijl ze rekening houdt met de huidige behoeften van de wereldbevolking. Soms
kunnen inspanningen op onderwerpen zoals het verlagen van het geluidsniveau in




zwaard zijn dat ook de klimaatverandering beperkt. Maar besluitvormers moeten
zich er altijd van bewust zijn dat hun beslissing effect heeft op het juiste probleem.
Neem je eigen verantwoordelijkheid Actoren (individuen, politici, bedrij-
ven) kunnen gemakkelijk betrapt worden op het wijzen van anderen op hun
verantwoordelijkheid om verdere stappen te nemen om het energiesysteem te
veranderen. Consumenten wijzen naar bedrijven, bedrijven wijzen naar hun
aandeelhouders (vaak pensioenfondsen) die wijzen op hun verplichtingen jegens
hun pensioengerechtigden wat ons weer terug brengt naar het begin. Hetzelfde
geldt voor door burgers gekozen politici. Het punt is dat al deze actoren hun
verantwoordelijkheid hebben. Een belangrijk en leidend beginsel dat is verwoord
door Mahatma Gandhi is nog steeds waar: “je moet zelf de verandering zijn, die
je in de wereld wilt zien”.
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